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EBY

Lloyd

THE
H I S T O R Y
OF THE LATE
WAR IN GERMANY,
BETWEEN THE
KING OF PRUSSIA,
AND THE
EMPRESS OF GERMANY AND HER ALLIES.

Vol. II.

ERY

JOHN WATTS DE PEYSTER.

— 1898 —

Master of Arts, Columbia College of New York, 1872.—LL.D., Nebraska College, 1870.—Litt. D. (1893) and LL.D. (1896), Franklin and Marshall College, Pennsylvania.—Honorary Vice-President of the Numismatic and Antiquarian Society of Philadelphia.—Honorary Member Clarendon Historical Society, Edinburgh, Scotland; of the New Brunswick Historical Society, St John, Canada; of the Historical Societies of Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, Northern Indiana and of Lancaster County, Penn.; of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, &c.; of the New York Burns Club, &c.—Corresponding Member of the Quebec Literary and Historical Society, Canada, &c.—Honorary Member of the London Society of Science, Letters and Art, 1893, and recipient of the Gold Medal for 1894 for "Scientific and Literary Attainments," and of United Empire Loyal Association of Canada, 1895.—Hereditary Member of the Military Society of the War of 1812.—Life Member Royal Historical Society of Great Britain, London, Eng.—Member Maatschappij Nederlandsche Letterkunde, Leyden, Holland. First Honorary Member Third Army Corps (Army of the Potomac) Union.—Honorary Member Thrid Army Corps, Gettysburg Battlefield Reunion, and Member of the Honorary Committee.—Director of the Gettysburg Battlefield Memorial Association, 1864 to 21st June, 1880.—Member American Historical Association, United States; of the Holland Society, New York.—Associate Member Military Institution of the United States, &c., &c.—Member, Life, Honorary and Corresponding Member of over forty State and Local Historical, Scientific and Literary Societies and Associations, &c., at home and abroad.—Recipient of Votes of Thanks from Legislatures of New York and Pennsylvania, and twice from the State of New Jersey.—Colonel N. Y. S. L., 1846—assigned for "meritorious conduct" to command of 22d Regimental District, M. F. S. N. Y., 1849.—Brigadier-General for "important service" (first appointment in New York State to that rank, hitherto elective), 1851, M. F. S. N. Y.—Military Agent State of New York, in Europe, 1851-53.—Authorized and endorsed by the United States, 1851-53.—Assisted in organization of present Police, New York, and first reported in favor of Paid Fire Department with Fire Escapes and Steam Engines, 1852-53, New York.—Adjutant-General State of New York, 1855.—Brevet Major-General State of New York for "meritorious services rendered to the National Guard and to the United States prior to and during the Rebellion," by "Special Act" or "Concurrent Resolution," New York State Legislature, April, 1866 (first and only General officer receiving such an honor (the highest), from State of New York, and the only officer thus breveted (Major-General) in the United States.)

THE
H I S T O R Y
OF THE L A T E
WAR IN GERMANY,
BETWEEN THE
K I N G OF P R U S S I A,
AND THE
EMPRESS OF GERMANY AND HER ALLIES:
CONTAINING
The CAMPAIGNS of 1758, and 1759.

WITH
A correct MILITARY MAP of the SEAT of WAR; and PLANS of the SIEGE of OLMUTZ,
AND OF THE BATTLES OF
ZORNSDORF, HOCHKIRCHEN, PALTZIG,
CUNNERSDORF or FRANKFURT, and MAXEN.

By MAJOR-GENERAL LLOYD,

Who served several Campaigns in the Austrian Army.

Published from the GENERAL'S MANUSCRIPTS, under the Inspection of an
ENGLISH OFFICER,


And illustrated with NOTES CRITICAL, HISTORICAL, and EXPLANATORY.

Bellum maxime memorabile omnium, quæ unquam gesta sint, ne scripturum, quod Annibale duce Cartaginienses cum populo Romano gessere. Nam neque validiores opibus ullæ inter se civitates gentesque contulerunt arma: et baud ignotas belli artes inter se, sed expertas primo Punico conferebant bello, et adeo varia belli fortuna, ancepsque Mars fuit, ut propius periculo fuerint, qui vincere, odii etiam prope majoribus certarunt, quam viribus. LIV.

V O L. II.

L O N D O N:
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M DCC XC.



J. Watts de Peyster :

L. L. D.

MASTER OF ARTS, Columbia College, of New York, 1872.
ROSE HILL, IN THE TOWNSHIP OF RED HOOK, NEAR TIVOLI P. O., DUCHESSE CO., N. Y.
September, 1874.

JUDGE ADVOCATE, with the rank of MAJOR, 1848.
COLONEL N. Y. S. I. 1848; assigned for "Meritorious Conduct," 1849;
BRIGADIER-GENERAL for "Important Service" (first appointment—in N. Y. State—to that rank,
hitherto elective) 1851, M. F. S. N. Y.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, S. N. Y. 1855.
BRIEF MAJOR-GENERAL, S. N. Y., for "Meritorious Services,"
[first and only general officer receiving such an honor (the highest) from S. N. Y.,] and the only
officer thus brevetted (Major-General) in the United States.]
by "Special Act," or "Concurrent Resolution," New York State Legislature, April, 1866.

LAWS OF NEW YORK, Vol. 2.—39th Session, 1866, Page 5142.
Concurrent Resolution requesting the Governor to confer upon Brigadier-General J. WATTS
DE PUYSTER [de Peyster] the brevet rank of Major* [General] in the National Guard
of New York.

RESOLVED, (if the Senate concur,) That it being a grateful duty to acknowledge in a suitable
manner the services of a distinguished citizen of this State, rendered to the National Guard and
to the United States prior to and during the Rebellion, the Governor be and he is hereby author-
ized and requested to confer upon Brigadier-General J. WATTS DE PUYSTER [de Peyster]
the brevet rank of major-general in the National Guard of New York, for meritorious services,
which mark of honor shall be stated in the Commission conferred.

STATE OF NEW YORK, in Assembly, April 9th, 1866.
The foregoing Resolution was duly passed. By order of the Assembly,
J. B. CUSHMAN, Clerk.

STATE OF NEW YORK, in Senate, April 20th, 1866.
The foregoing Resolution was duly passed. By order of the Senate,
JAS. TERWILLIGER, Clerk.
*So in original.

MILITARY AGENT, S. N. Y., (in Europe,) 1861-'2.
HONORARY MEMBER, THIRD CLASS, of the MILITARY ORDER of the LOYAL LEGION of the U. S.
FIRST HONORARY MEMBER Third (Army of the Potomac) Corps Union.
MEMBER—10th June, 1872, DIRECTOR—of the GETTYSBURG BATTLEFIELD MEMORIAL ASSOCIATION.
MEMBER of the NETHERLANDISH LITERARY ASSOCIATION
[Maatschappij der Nederlandsche Letterkunde] at Leyden, Holland.
RECIPIENT, 1856, of Three Silver Medals from H. R. M. OSCAR, King of Sweden and Norway,
Ac., for a Military Biography of LEONARD TORSTENSON, Field Marshal, Generalissimo;
of a Gold Medal in 1859, from WASHINGTON HUNT, Governor S. N. Y., for
"Efforts to improve the Military System of New York," Ac. Ac.,
and Suggestions for a Paid Fire Department with Steam
Fire Engines, Ac. Ac.;
of a Gold Medal in 1859, from the FIELD AND STAFF OFFICERS of his Command, 9th
Brig., 2 Div., N. Y. S. Troops, "In testimony of their Esteem and Appreciation of his
Efforts towards the Establishment of an efficient Militia," Ac.; in 1870, of
a Magnificent BADGE, MEDAL and CLASP voted at the Annual
Meeting of the Third Corps (Army of the Potomac)
Union, held at Boston, MASS., Thursday,
May 5th, 1870, when

A Resolution was adopted to present a Gold Medal of the value of \$500, to Gen. J. WATTS DE
PEYSTER, of New York, as a testimonial of the appreciation by the Corps of his eminent
services in placing upon record the true history of its achievements, and in defending its
commanders and their men from written abuse and misrepresentation,"
and of several other Badges, Medals, Ac., for services in connection with the military service
of the State of New York.

HONORARY MEMBER of the NEW JERSEY and of the MINNESOTA HISTORICAL SOCIETIES,
and of the PHRENOLOGICAL SOCIETY of PENNSYLVANIA COLLEGE, Gettysburg;
of the PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY, Missionary Institute, Berlin's Grove,
and of the EUROPEAN SOCIETY, Muhlenberg College, Allentown, Pennsylvania,
and of the GERMAN LITERARY SOCIETY, of Nebraska College, Nebraska City.
HONORARY MEMBER of the N. Y. BURNS CLUB.

(BURNS was a member of the Dumfries Volunteers, of which Col. ARBENT SCOUTYLER DE PEYSTER,
8th or King's Foot B. A., was Colonel, to whom the "National Bard of Scotland" addressed,
just before his death, in 1796, his "POEM ON LIFE.")
and LIFE MEMBER of the ST. NICHOLAS SOCIETY of NEW YORK,
(of which city JOHANNES DE PEYSTER, first of the name in the New World, was Schepen, 1655,
Alderman, 1666, Burgomaster, 1673, Deputy Mayor, 1677. Mayoralty offered and refused.)

MEMBER
of the NEW YORK, of the RHODE ISLAND (Newport) and of the PENNSYLVANIA HISTORICAL
SOCIETIES, of the MILITARY ASSOCIATION of the STATE of NEW YORK,
and of the CENTURY CLUB, New York City.

LIFE MEMBER
of the HISTORICAL SOCIETY of MICHIGAN,
of the NEW YORK GALLERY of FINE ARTS, and Director of the N. Y. Institution for the
INSTRUCTION of THE DEAF AND DUMB,
and of the NUMISMATIC and ARCHEOLOGICAL SOCIETY of NEW YORK.

LIFE MEMBER or FELLOW of the AMERICAN GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY; PATRON of the
ASSOCIATION for the BENEFIT of COLORED ORPHANS, and of the NEW YORK
DISPENSARY; LIFE DIRECTOR of the AMERICAN TRACT, and LIFE
MEMBER of the AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY, N. Y.

CORRESPONDING MEMBER
of the STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETIES of MAINE, of VERMONT, of RHODE ISLAND, (Providence),
of CONNECTICUT, and of WISCONSIN; of the LONG ISLAND and of the BUFFALO
HISTORICAL SOCIETIES; of the NEW ENGLAND HISTORIO-GENEALOGICAL
SOCIETY; of the QUEBEC LITERARY & HISTORICAL SOCIETY;
of the NUMISMATIC and ANTIQUARIAN SOCIETY
of PHILADELPHIA, Pennsylvania;
etc. etc. etc.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS
F R E D E R I C,
DUKE OF YORK AND ALBANY,
&c. &c. &c.

S I R,

THE last Sheets our Author lived to publish, were dedicated to YOUR ROYAL BROTHER THE PRINCE OF WALES; to whose Patronage then could the Remainder of the Work be with so much Propriety addressed as to that of YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS? But You have a still better Title, Sir, to this Homage; it is to Your Royal Highness that the British Army looks up as the future Restorer of that uniform System of Military Discipline, which distinguished it under Your Great UNCLE of glorious Memory; without which, in spite of its native Valour, it will always fall far short

short of Perfection, and which, Experience has proved, can in this Country never be long maintained but under the Auspices of a Prince of the Royal Family. Deign then, Sir, to read, and to protect this posthumous Work of the almost only original Military Writer of our Country; his Precepts were written for Princes, and are worthy of them.

THAT Your ROYAL HIGHNESS may one Day have an Opportunity of applying them to the solid Advantage of the Nation, the increased Lustre of its Arms, and Your own immortal Glory and Renown, is the sincere and ardent Wish of him, who has the Honor to subscribe himself, with the warmest Attachment, and the most profound Respect,

Your ROYAL HIGHNESS's

Most obedient, and devoted Servant,

THE EDITOR.

T H E

EDITOR'S PREFACE.

THE following Sheets are printed from a Manuscript in General LLOYD's own Hand Writing, which he left nearly ready for the Press. Little else was wanting than supplying some Minutiæ of Detail, such as Orders of Battle, et cætera, and the necessary Topographical Illustrations; these the Editor has furnished from the best Materials he could procure, and further than this he has nothing to boast. The Author's Style he has left as he found it, referring the Reader to the General's own Excuse for it, contained in his Preface to the first Volume. With respect to the Observations the Editor has hazarded in the Notes, he has rather detailed the Author's Ideas than obtruded any

any of his own; nor should he have ventured to do even that, but under the Conviction, that Truth and Knowledge are to be produced only by Discussion, like Fire by Collision; and that by inspiring a Taste for Military Criticism into his Brother Soldiers, he might render an essential Service to his Country, since in correcting his Ideas, they must almost necessarily purify and enlarge their own.

H I S T O R Y
OF THE
WAR in GERMANY.
C A M P A I G N of 1758.

C H A P. I.

Of the Operations of the Prussians till the Taking of Schweidnitz.

THE king of Prussia commanded at Breslau during the months of December, January, and February: the fifteenth of March he left that city, accompanied by his brother March: prince Ferdinand, prince Maurice of Anhalt Dessau, prince Eugene of Würtemberg, and several other generals, to contract his quarters, and assemble his troops in the neighbourhood of Landshut, in order to cover the siege of Schweidnitz, with which he proposed beginning the operations of this campaign, which would enable him to undertake some other expedition of greater consequence in Bohemia or Moravia, before the enemy could approach his frontiers. His majesty's head-quarters were at Creysau, with six regiments of infantry, and some battallions of guards. His light troops, supported by some regular infantry and cavalry as circumstances required, were continually employed in harrassing the Austrian posts in the mountains, and driving them back, in order to prevent them from approaching Schweidnitz. Several expeditions were undertaken and executed with various success,

of little or no advantage to either party, and always attended with great loss of men, particularly in winter: generals are too lavish of the blood of light troops, which are counted for nothing; they harraß them continually in marches, and counter-marches, in attacking posts, &c. I am of opinion, that no operation whatever should be attempted, or post attacked, unless the possession of it be absolutely necessary to facilitate some capital enterprise. I would also recommend that the new recruits, on coming to the army at the beginning of the campaign, should be employed in the advanced posts with the light troops, to accustom them to see the enemy often. This in a short time would inure them to labour, and inspire them with courage and coolness equal to the veterans.

April.

The necessary preparations being made for the siege of Schweidnitz, which had been blocked up during the winter, lieutenant general Treskow, with five thousand men infantry, two companies of miners, and thirty-five squadrons of cavalry (in all about nine thousand six hundred men) opened the trenches before that place in the night between the first and second of April. In a few days nine batteries were erected, four of four cannon, and four howitzers, three of five mortars, each placed behind the former, one of five mortars, and one of eight twenty-four pounders. The thirteenth and fourteenth a new bomb battery opposite the Waffar fort, and on the fifteenth at night took the Galgen fort by assault, which reduced the governor lieutenant general Count Thierhaimb to surrender the sixteenth. The garrison consisting of two generals, one hundred and seventy-three officers, three thousand four hundred and thirty-six soldiers, one thousand three hundred invalids, were made prisoners of war. Besides the cannon which the Austrians had found in the place, when they took it the preceding year, there was found belonging to the Austrians twenty twelve pounders, three twenty-four pounders, three of ten, eight mortars, ten pounders, one of thirty, ten of sixty, all brass, and six iron of sixty, in all fifty-one pieces, cannon and

and mortars. The loss of the Prussians was two officers, three under officers, one bombardier, ninety-one soldiers, and five common men killed; fourteen officers, ten under officers, two bombardiers, two hundred and thirty-one soldiers, and four men belonging to the army wounded.

This place is by no means strong; it was taken the preceding year by the Austrians in nearly the same space of time. In one thousand seven hundred and sixty-one Laudohn took it in a few hours sword in hand, without opening the trenches; and it was finally retaken in one thousand seven hundred and sixty-two, after a defence of ten weeks. Whence proceeded this very great difference? From the difference of characters, and abilities of the different persons, who conducted the siege and defence, in the different periods. The last siege was remarkable for the noble defence the place made owing chiefly to the superior abilities of M. Gribeauval, now a lieutenant general, and I believe at the head of the department of artillery in France. We shall therefore in the sequel give an exact plan of the place, and its environs, with the positions of the respective armies during the siege, and a journal of it, with some remarks of our own, on that event, which concluded the war, for no other enterprise of consequence was afterwards undertaken or executed.

The retaking of Schweidnitz reduced the state of the war to what it was at the breaking out of it; the fatal battle of Leuthen was the cause. Had the Austrians avoided it, being in possession of Glatz and Schweidnitz, and their army powerful, this campaign might and ought to have begun with the siege of Glogau, which the approach of the Russians would have facilitated. Neiss must have fallen of course. The war was finished; Silesia conquered: the Prussians could not pretend to defend Brandebourg and Pomerania after the taking Glogau, when attacked and surrounded by the Austrians, Russians, and Swedes.

C H A P. II.

Of the Operations of the Prussians and Austrians after the taking of Schweidnitz, till the retreat of the former from Olmutz into Silesia, with Reflections.

AFTER the taking of Schweidnitz, the king of Prussia intending to penetrate into Moravia, and besiege Olmutz, ordered the troops which were to compose that army, to assemble near Reichenbach, and from thence to proceed towards Neifs. General Ziethen, with a corps of about eight thousand men, was detached towards Upper Lusatia*. General Fouquet, with about an equal number, was left in the county of Glatz, from whence he sent troops to occupy the mountains on his right towards Friedland, which effectually covered the march of the former. In the mean time the king visited the county of Glatz, and ordered the roads leading to Landscron and Habelschwerd to be repaired.

The Austrians quitted their quarters on the nineteenth of April, and went to occupy the camp, which had been traced for them at Skalitz (on the frontier of the county of Glatz) where the head quarters was established. General Boscow with a considerable corps, was placed at Trautenau on the road which leads from Bohemia to Landshut and Schweidnitz in Silesia. The duke of Arenberg, with the corps of reserve was posted at Nachod, and general Laudohn with his light troops at Lewin. Before we proceed further in relating the operations of this campaign, it will be right to give a state of the Prussian forces, and how and where they were employed.

* The king says, he was sent to Landshut, and rejoined his army before Olmutz, about the 10th of June.

ORDER

Schweidnitz.

2 Battalions	Bornbadt.	2 Battalions	Münchow.	2 Battalions	Old Krenz.	1 Battalion	Langen.
2	Prince Ferdinand.	2	Tarfel.	2	Tarfel.	1	Sydow.
2	Prince Henry.	1	Dierke.	2	Dierke.	4	Mitchaphel.
2	Markgrave Henry.	2	Bulow.	1	Bulow.	3d and 4th	Mantel.
2	Ponguet.	1	Krentzen.	1	Borgsdorf.	4	Quadt.
2	Neuwiedt.	1	Burgdorf.	1	Arup.	4	Lattorf.
2	Pannwitz.	1	Oftreich.	1	Oftreich.	1	Blankensee.
2	Young Brannwick.	1	Oftreich.	1	Angenelly.	1	Do. First Regt. Guards
16		4	Garr. B. Sydow.	12		2	Ditto Treikow.
5 Squadrons	Wittenburg's Dra-	4	Mantel.	10 Squadrons	Seydlitz's Hussars.	1	G. B. Billerbeck.
10 Squadrons	Möhring's Hussars.	1	Lattorf.			1	Ditto Baehr.
15		5 Squadrons	Drier.			2	Young Krenz.
		5	Prince of Prussia.			2	Lattorf.
		5	Markgra. Frederick.			2	Mitchaphel.
		5	Old Krokow.			Total	31
		5	Ryew.				
		5	Schonrich.				
		5	Bredow.				
35							

The Army under Prince Henry, including the Reinforcement * General Drieffen brought him out of Silefia, which was composed as follows, viz.

1 Gren. Bat. Lubath.	1 Free Battalion Meyer
1 Bornbadt.	1 Monjow.
1 Billerbeck.	1 Wulsch.
3 Battalions	Rathlen.
2	Hulsen.
2	Funch.
2	Porkammer.
2	Goltz.
2	Grabow.
2	Cafel.
2	Salmut.
2	Inghelm.
2	Kneblau.
2	Leffwitz.
2	Brandeis.
2	Bredow.
30	

* This reinforcement consisted in two Battalions of Foot, fifteen Squadrons of Cuirassiers, and five of Hussars, which marched for Saxony the seven-teenth of April, immediately after the siege of Schweidnitz.

The Army under Count Dohna, intended to act against the Russians in Pomerania, was composed of the following Corps, viz.

INFANTRY.	CAVALRY.
1 Gren. Bat. Willomeny	10 Squadrons Schorlem-
1	mer's Dragoons.
1	Neffen.
1	Loffow.
1	Petersdorf.
2	Battalions Sewald.
2	Dohna.
2	Kantz.
2	Below.
2	Rauer.
2	Pr. Maurice.
2	Pr. of Bevern
2	Pr. of Bevern
2	Ruefch Hussars
2	Malachowky.
2	Free Battalions Horst
15	

The following Detachment was sent to the Allied Army, which consisted of

5 Squadrons	Holstein's Dragoons.
5	Finkenfein.
2	Ruefch Hussars.
and 3	Malachowky's.
INFANTRY.	CAVALRY.
22 G. Battalions.	43 Squadrons Cuirassiers.
58	Dragoons.
3 G. Battalions.	50 Hussars.
27	Cuirassiers.
4 G. Battalions.	20 Dragoons.
14	Hussars.
15	Dragoons.
	Hussars.
	10 Squadrons Dragoons.
	5 Hussars.

So that the Prussian Forces distributed in the several Countries which formed the Theatre of this Campaign may be classed as follows, viz.

In Silefia	22 G. Battalions.	43 Squadrons Cuirassiers.
-	58	Dragoons.
In Saxony	3 G. Battalions.	50 Hussars.
-	27	Cuirassiers.
In Pomerania	4 G. Battalions.	20 Dragoons.
14		Hussars.
	15	Dragoons.
		Hussars.
In the Allied Army	10 Squadrons Dragoons.	
	5 Hussars.	

The Prussian army destined to besiege Olmutz being assembled at Neifs, marched in two columns, and in three days that led by the king arrived at Troppau, and the other led by Marshal Keith, who was to command the siege at Jagerndorff, these two columns entered the plains of Olmutz the third of May, one by Sternberg, and the other by Gibau. Part of these troops passed the Morave at Littau, and went to encamp near Marisch Neustadt; General de Ville who had commanded the troops in Moravia during the winter, threw the greatest part of his infantry into Olmutz, and with his cavalry retired to Prosnitz. The king ordered a detachment of two regiments of hussars under Colonel Werner to march to Olfchan, where the Austrians had some magazines covered by a small detachment which retired without loss. The Prussians supported by his majesty in person, with a corps of infantry and dragoons, advanced towards Prosnitz, from whence General de Ville retired with his cavalry, and occupied a strong post at Predlitz, on which prince Eugene of Würtemberg, with four regiments of dragoons, one of hussars, and some batallions of infantry occupied Prosnitz.

General Fouquet observing by Marshal Daun's motions, that he proposed marching towards Moravia, having reinforced the garrison of Glatz, went with the remainder of his corps to Neifs, and from thence conveyed the ammunition and artillery designed for the siege of Olmutz towards that place, and on the twelfth of May arrived at Gibau, upon which the king, then at Littau at the head of about ten thousand men, went to join the prince of Würtemberg, who commanded about eight thousand men at Cretkowitz. These two corps were formed in two lines, the artillery of reserve was placed on a high ground between them, general Fouquet with the heavy artillery, ammunition, &c. replaced the troops which had been drawn from Littau by prince Maurice of Anhalt Dessau.

The king, with a great body of troops, chiefly cavalry, left Czetkowitz, passed by Prosnitz, advanced to attack General de Ville at Predlitz.

Predlitz. This last retired towards Wischau: there was a smart action at the village of Driffitz, in which, after some loss on both sides, the Prussians were repulsed by Count St. Ignon, who commanded the Austrians. The day following the king retired to his former camp near Prosnitz*. Soon after the Prussians began to contract their different posts, in order to besiege Olmutz; Markgrave Charles occupied Neustadt; prince Maurice, Littau; general Wedel, Namest; the king, the heights between Prosnitz and the Morave. The trenches were opened before Olmutz the twenty-seventh of this month, on the side of Tobitschau, beyond the river; a regiment of dragoons, five hundred hussars, and two batallions were sent to invest the place on that side.

General Laudohn, who conducted the avantgarde of Marshal Daun's army with about five thousand men, chiefly light troops, quitted his post at Lewin the second of May, and marched to Reichenau. The main army on the third likewise left the camp of Skalitz, and went to Wodierad. A considerable body of troops commanded by general Harfch, was posted at Nachod, to cover Bohemia on that side; while Marshal Daun advanced to Chotzen on the fourth, and the day following encamped at Leitomischel. In the mean time general Laudohn advanced to Landsron, and being informed that General de Ville had retired towards Prosnitz, advanced to Hohenstadt, where he arrived on the sixth, and immediately occupied the posts of Aufsee and Muglitz, from whence strong parties were continually detached to observe and restrain those of the enemy. In the mean time general Jahnus, with a considerable body of light troops, took post at Schildberg the sixth, and sent detachments to Schomberg and Grunberg, from whence he would observe the motions of the Prussians, and interrupt their communication with Troppau and Upper Silesia. On the nineteenth this general took post at Aller Heiligen, near Muglitz, and from thence sent

* See Note A.

sent detachments on the enemy's communications towards Bährn and Hoff, which alarmed their posts, attacked several with success, and destroyed and took several of the transports sent into the country to collect forage, &c. in all which skirmishes the Austrians obtained great advantages. The progress of the siege was greatly interrupted by these continual attacks; for which reason the king, at the head of ten battalions, fifteen squadrons of cavalry, and two of hussars, with some artillery, marched at eleven o'clock in the night, between the twenty-first and twenty-second of May, and at break of day began a terrible fire of artillery against the posts, which general Laudohn had at Namiest and Belvedir, which lasted till six in the evening; when general Laudohn advanced with two regiments of hussars to support his posts, on whose appearance those of the Prussians halted, and soon after returned to their camp, having lost some men in their retreat; a battalion of their grenadiers was attacked by the Austrians sword in hand, and suffered very considerably; the Austrians lost two captains, a lieutenant, and thirty men on this occasion*.

On the twenty-third of May: the army under Marshal Daun, left Leito-mischel, and encamped at Zwittaw, and the next day marched to Gewitsch, where it occupied a very strong camp, the right flank being posted at the town and stretching from thence to a village called Kornitz, on the road which runs between Drosnitz and Tyrnau; it turned off there in a potence formed by the cavalry belonging to the left wing. The corps of grenadiers and carabiniers occupied the height in front of the town between Jarmeritz and Biskupitz, the reserve encamped on the right of the army with its left to Gewitsch, and its right to Opatowitz; a small rivulet with marshy banks covered the front, and some dykes the left flank. Here the Marshal remained till the sixteenth of June. Meanwhile the corps commanded by General Harsch marched to Marisch Tribau: the country between these posts and those of the Prussians was filled by the troops under Generals Laudohn, Jahnus, and de Ville, so that not a day passed without many skirmish-

C

cs;

* See Note B.

es; and though in some of them the Austrians were forced to retire, upon the whole they always reaped the advantage, by interrupting the operations of the enemy, and forcing him to contract his posts, so that he could draw little or no forage or other succours from the country itself; every thing must come from Troppau, about forty miles off, which road was continually infested by the several detachments posted in the neighbouring mountains. One of these attacked a considerable convoy on the twenty-eighth near Heidenpilsch, dispersed the escorte, took about three hundred waggons with most of the horses, and carried them off. Laudohn attacked the Prussians at Laskow with success. Möhring's hussars were totally dispersed, and lost many men and horses. Colonel le Noble, at the head of eight hundred men and some cannon, was attacked by Lieutenant Colonel Lanus near Sternberg, and totally routed, having lost four hundred men taken prisoners with three pieces of cannon, the convoy destroyed, himself wounded with about two hundred men only escaped. On the fifteenth of June Marshal Daun ordered General St. Ignon with a strong detachment of cavalry to advance towards Prerau on the left of the Morave to restrain the enemy's parties from plundering the country. The same day the Marshal having made his dispositions for the march of the army on the day following, went off in the evening, though late, to examine the camp he proposed occupying; accordingly the army broke up before day break, and proceeded in five columns to the camp marked out, near a village called Prodivanow, where it arrived at six in the evening, the march having been retarded by heavy rains which broke the roads, which were otherwise very bad, so they passed through great and difficult mountains, passes, &c. The heavy baggage was left behind. The seventeenth the march was resumed in the most secret manner, and the army proceeded in three columns, the Marshal at the head of the van composed of the grenadiers and carabiniers, that he might form his dispositions according to the circumstances which might occur during the march, being near the enemy (a method which all Generals should imitate in such cases).
This

This march, like that of the preceding day, was difficult, on account of the mountains, ravins, &c. through which it passed. The army halted in coming out of the last passes that the whole might come up, which being done, it proceeded to occupy the camp traced between Prödlitz and Evanowitz, and was there joined by the corps under General de Ville.

These fine and decisive marches were planned with such wisdom, and conducted with such secrecy, that the enemy had not the least intelligence of them, insomuch that their troops were then foraging in that neighbourhood, when the army arrived.

On the eighteenth General St. Ignon attacked a Prussian post at Hollitz, consisting of two battalions and two squadrons of Bareuth's dragoons, and three of Putkammer's, and forced them to abandon it with great loss. Count Stainville, brother to the duke of Choiseul, who attacked the enemy's left, took a pair of silver kettle drums, killed near two hundred men, and made one hundred and five prisoners; those on the other wing had equal success. This affair being happily concluded, Count St. Ignon was returning with his detachment to his former post, and was about a league from Hollitz, when a dragoon came from Olmutz to inform him, that the garrison made a sally, and that they had shut up the enemy at the village of Wisternitz, whom they desired the Count to attack. On which, though the troops under his command were extremely fatigued, the Count, without hesitating a moment, wheeled about, on approaching Wisternitz he perceived seven squadrons of the enemy which seemed disposed to attack him in his rear; he ordered his detachment to wheel right about, and instantly charged them, and though supported by a battalion of infantry, and two pieces of cannon, they were totally destroyed, having lost near eight hundred men killed and wounded; among the latter was general Meyer, who commanded them.

The regiment of light horse had been raised during the winter, and greatly distinguished itself on this occasion, like our Elliot's, though it was the first action of consequence in which it had been engaged.

It is observable that new raised infantry do not in general behave so well as new raised cavalry; the reason I believe is, that the former being placed in a line, and moving slowly has too much time to reflect on the danger of its situation; when cavalry being instantly brought to action, moreover incited by emulation, goes on with more vigour than the old regiments. If there is not in the troops a sense of honour, *fear* then prompts them to act with the utmost vigour, which is regarded as the only means to finish the danger.

This action does much honour to the zeal, valour and wisdom of Count St. Ignon and his officers. It is an example worthy to be imitated, and we therefore recommend it to our brethren.

The new position taken by Marshal Daun so near the Prussians, obliged his Majesty to contract his posts that he might be in sufficient force, either to attack him or defend himself in case he was attacked; he therefore recalled the corps posted at Neustadt and Littau, and placed them in the camp near Proßnitz and Czetcowitz. On the twentieth his Majesty at the head of ten or twelve thousand men, advanced on the hills beyond Prädilitz in order to reconnoitre Marshal Daun's camp, and at the same time to cover a foraging made in the village on his right; these two objects being fulfilled, he returned to his camp at Proßnitz.

On the twenty-first Marshal Daun detached General Baron Bülow with twelve thousand men, with orders to march by Prerau into Olmutz, which he executed the day following without losing a man.

The Prussians made a great foraging on the twenty-third, abandoned the mountains of Rumbach near Littau, retired to Klein Senitz

Senitz and reinforced their posts at Laskow, with two regiments of infantry and one of cavalry drawn from the corps at Prosnitz, and from that which made the siege of Olmutz. They also withdrew the rest of their troops from Littau, and concentrated their forces near Olmutz; and to prevent the Austrians from passing the Morava, broke up their bridges on that river at Nenakowitz, and Dub. The twenty-sixth the corps which carried on the siege were reinforced by about eight thousand men chiefly cavalry, which occupied Wisternitz, Teinitz, Hollitz, etcætera, on the left of the Morava to prevent the Austrians from throwing any more succours into the place on that side, while the king with the main army did the same on the other side.

On the twenty-seventh after dinner, Marshal Daun unexpectedly ordered his army to march to Dobromielitz, his right came towards Klenowitz, and his left at the former place, both covered by two small rivers. His motives for taking up this new position were probably as follows; in the first place, to draw the king's whole attention to his own safety, under the persuasion that he was on the point of being attacked, and consequently preventing his Majesty from making any considerable detachments. In the next place, to cover the march of a corps that he sent across the Morava, under the command of General Ziskowitz; for the Marshal being informed that a great convoy consisting of several thousand waggons, loaded with stores, money and provisions, escorted by twelve or fourteen thousand men commanded by general Ziethen, was advancing from Nies by Troppau, to the camp at Olmutz, determined to attack it, accordingly he detached general Laudohn, who was posted at Willinow with about six thousand men, to fall upon it on that side, and General Ziskowitz with the same force to do the like on the other. These two generals came up with the convoy between Bautsch and Domstättle and instantly attacked, dispersed and defeated the


the escorte, which lost about three thousand men. General Laudohn made prisoners, general Putkammer, two majors, twenty officers, two hundred soldiers, with six pieces of cannon, and near one thousand waggons, while general Ziskowitz took thirty officers, two battallions of eight hundred men each compleat, six pieces of cannon, and near one thousand waggons; General Ziethen was forced back to Troppau, a very small and trifling part of the convoy arrived in the camp before Olmutz. This remarkable action deserves to be transmitted to posterity, with all the particulars of it, as it will furnish an useful lesson to such officers as may be employed on similar occasions. We shall therefore give here a translation of the different accounts published of it, by both parties.

Though this siege was conducted as all others, which I believe differ only in a greater or lesser degree of vigour shewn on both sides, the mode of carrying it on must be the same, the points of attack also must be regulated by the position of the place, and the greater or lesser facility of approaching it, on one side rather than on the other, all places being constructed on the same principle, the method of attacking them is determined by rules analagous to the trenches, parallels, saps, mines, galleries, batteries, &c. and their constructions; contrary to custom, the besieged shewed more vigour than the besiegers. We shall therefore give the journal of the siege, and the more so as it will serve to explain some other transactions*.

* The Journal alluded to, as well as the accounts of the destruction of the convoy, as published by the respective parties, not having been found among the Author's papers, the Editor has supplied that deficiency by an Extract from Colonel Templehoff's very accurate Work.

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ASTOR, LENOX AND
TILDEN FOUNDATIONS



JOURNAL of the Siege of OLMUTZ.

AFTER general Fouquet's corps had joined the camp at Krenau, Field Marshal Keith took upon himself the command of it and the conduct of the siege; he had under his orders lieutenant general Fouquet, and Major generals Schenkendorf, prince Francis of Brunswick and Rebentisch. The king came to the camp from Prosnitz, and after he had reviewed the army of the siege, and the train of artillery, he rode out accompanied by the general officers and engineers, to reconnoitre the fortress and its environs, and gave out the necessary orders respecting the siege. The corps appointed to carry it on, was ordered immediately to invest the town on the side of Drosnitz, and to form a chain of posts in such a manner, as that that whole extensive space might be occupied. The right wing was on the Morava and had Neustift before its front, and Nimlau in the rear; the left extended itself beyond Krenau, and had this village in its rear; the Field Marshal's head quarters was in Schnabellin, and was occupied by the battallion of Lattorf, and the two companies of miners. Near this village was placed the artillery, and the depot of all the other necessary stores for carrying on the siege in Horcke, a village on the left. Near a forest, was placed the bakery, to which were attached two hundred and fifty waggons of the Proviant-train, and here also was a depot of meal and forage, and the field hospital belonging to this corps; two companies of the battallion of Naumeister were posted to protect these, and the two others on the bridge of Chometau. On the right wing, near the regiment of Pannerwitz, was a bridge thrown over the Morava, to facilitate the communication with the country on the other side of that river; this was occupied by a corps under the command of general Meier of the dragoons, which was posted

as follows: the battalion of Naimcheffky in Lodenitz, two hundred jagers in Druffowitz, ten squadrons of Bareuth dragoons, and two squadrons of Seydlitz's hussars in the neighbourhood of Starnau, and Bauniowitz; this little corps was so distributed, in order to maintain the communication with Silesia, with which view also the free battalions, Le Noble and Salenmon occupied Sternberg, in order to cover the siege; his Majesty posted himself at Prosnitz, with a corps consisting of the following regiments.

I N F A N T R Y.

1 gren. bat.	Haake.	2 battalions,	old Brunswick.
1 ditto	Kremzow.	2 battalions of	guards.
2 M. B.	Charles.	1 battalion	Retzow.
2 ———	Kannaker.	1 gr. bat.	Carlowitz.
2 ———	Itzenplitz.	1 ditto	Wedel.
2 ———	Wedel.	1 ditto	Diringhofen.
2 ———	Lattorf.	1 ditto	Benkendorf.

C A V A L R Y.

5 squadr.	Gardes du corps.	5 squadrons	Seidlitz.
5 ———	Gens d'Armes.	5 ———	Norman dragoons.
5 ———	Carabiniers.	5 ———	Czetteritz.
5 ———	Krokow.	5 ———	Young Krokow.
5 ———	Schmettau.	5 ———	Young Plathen.
10 ———	Ziethen's H.	10 ———	Werner's H.
10 ———	Putkammer.	10 ———	Möhring.

Total 21 battalions.

88 squadrons.

The generals attached to this corps were to the infantry; lieutenant general Prince Ferdinand, major generals Geist, Bülow, Kahlden, Wedel—to the cavalry, lieutenant generals Prince of Würtemberg, Ziethen

Ziethen, and Seydlitz, and major generals Lentulus, Bredow, Schmettau, the Younger Krokow, Czetteritz, and Putkammer. The bakery, with two hundred and fifty waggons of the proviant-train, was in Drehowitz.

In the camp near Littau, or Afchmeritz, were posted the following corps under the orders of Prince Maurice, who succeeded in this command to Field Marshal Keith.

2 batallions, Prince of Prussia.	2 batallions, Affebourg.
2 — Forcade.	2 — Munchau in Littau.
2 — Manteufel.	
1 gren. bat. Schenkendorf.	1 gren. bat. Rath.
1 — Rohr.	1 — Heyden.
5 squadrons Schöneich.	5 squadrons Kyau.
5 — Bredow.	200 Ziethen's hussars.

Total 15 batallions.

15 squadrons.

The generals attached to this corps were, lieutenant generals Forcade and Neuwied, and major generals Prince Charles of Bevern, Lattorf, Saldern, and Kreutz, to the infantry; Schöneich and Krokow, to the cavalry. The bakery for these troops was in Littau, together with the field commissariat, the military chest, the magazine of meal, and other provisions, the hospital, and four hundred and fifty waggons of the proviant-train.

In the camp of Neustadt, under the Markgrave Charles, were

1 grenadier batallion, Beverling.	
1 — Manteufel.	
1 — Unruh.	
2 M. B. Geist.	
2 — Kalkstein.	

7 batallions.

And 3 squadrons of Seydlitz's hussars.

The generals with these were, lieutenant generals the prince of Hesse Cassel and Retzow, and major generals Kannaker, Bornstädt, and Goltz. This corps drew its subsistence from Littau.

The Austrians on their side were also separated into several corps; Marshal Daun, with the grand army, encamped near Leutomischel, and general Harfch having quitted his post at Nachod on the seventeenth, was advanced as far as Nikel; general Laudohn, with his light troops, was stationed near Konitz, and extended his posts to Willinow, Namiest, Laskow, Ptin, and so on, to keep up his communication with De Ville, who with a strong corps of cavalry, was posted on the road to Brinn; general Janus occupied the heights of Allerheiligen, near Muglitz, with his light troops, who possessed themselves also of Seren, Lofitz, the castle of Busow, and Aufsee. Colonel Lanius, with about a thousand light troops, was at Friedland and Lobnick, to observe and molest the road of communication with Silesia.

The numbers of their light troops (the greater part of whom are composed of men who are to be depended on, and who are accustomed to a very hardy course of life), gave the Austrian generals a considerable advantage; and they are obliged to them for the success of many of their enterprizes, which otherwise they perhaps never would have risked. They profit by this superiority in light troops, to draw round their encampments a chain of a prodigious extent, consisting not merely of single posts, but of small corps, so that the grand army is not only perfectly secured from surprizes, but is enabled behind this curtain to make various movements, without their opponents receiving the least intelligence of their motions, till they are drawn up and ready to attack him; all their marches are by this means covered, and it is absolutely impossible to attack them on the move, since it commonly happens that a chain of these troops is drawn quite from the camp they quit to that which they are to take up; desertion for the
same

same reason can never be very great among them, although an Austrian army contains as many foreigners, or perhaps more, than any other. Their opponents on the contrary are exposed to various little accidents, which though they decide nothing on the whole, are nevertheless very troublesome to the troops. They must pay the strictest attention to render secure the communications with their detached corps and magazines, the enemy's light troops infesting the whole country, and watching every opportunity to snap up something, wherein they are very often successful.

Between the king's army and the corps under prince Maurice at Littau, there was a considerable space left entirely open; and this circumstance gave general Laudohn an opportunity through his detachments posted at Willinow and Namiest, to render the communication between the two extremely insecure; this was the more troublesome inasmuch as the consumption of the bakery in Drehowitz was to be supplied from the magazine in Littau, and to this end transports were constantly passing to and fro. The king determined hereupon to drive Laudohn away. With this view, in the night of the twenty-first and twenty-second of May, he put himself in motion with a strong corps of troops in three columns; the first under the command of the prince of Würtemberg, consisted of the grenadier battalion of Diringshofen, five hundred dragoons, and five hundred hussars, of Werner; they moved forward to Blumenau, and there remained to cover the march of the others against the corps under De Ville. The second under Ziethen, which consisted of the second battalion of Lattorf, and five hundred dragoons, was destined to take the enemy in the right flank; and with this view marched by Rostelitz, Starechowitz, and Czech, to Premeslowitz: in the third column, under generals Geist and Puttkammer, was the grenadier battalion Carlowitz, the second battalion of Markgrave Charles, the second of Kannaker, and the second of old Brunswick; they took their march by Czech, and from thence over

the mountains strait to Namieft. At the fame time prince Maurice had received orders to detach prince Charles of Bevern with the grenadier batallion, Schenkendorf, the fecond batallion of Manteufel, and the fecond of Affeburg, with fifty huffars, ftrait to Willinow and Namieft, to come on the left flank and the rear of the enemy; all thefe columns marched off in fuch a manner as to arrive at the fame moment at day-break at their feveral pofts; the fuccefs meanwhile did not anfwer thefe excellent difpofitions.

General Laudohn had received timely intelligence of the king's approach, as well from his advanced pofts as from his fpies, among whom you might reckon almoft every peafant in the country round about; befides this, the detachment under the prince of Bevern, arrived earlier than the other columns, and put the enemy in motion. The fmall advanced detachments did not lofe a moment in falling back on their main body, leaving the greater part of their baggage behind them; and the mountainous and woody nature of the country (of which the light troops knew every foot path) gave general Laudohn the means of gaining the heights behind Konitz; without any confiderable lofs. Indeed Ziethen's huffars found an opportunity to take prifoners one captain and one lieutenant of Croats, and one captain and one lieutenant of huffars, with forty-eight Croats, and to cut feveral more in pieces. There was on both fides a good deal of cannonading, but without effect; the enemy keeping constantly at a diftance, where there was no getting at them. The king followed them as far as Konitz, but when he faw that no effential advantage was to be obtained from purfuing them any further, he fent back his troops to their pofts again.

As foon as Marfhal Daun received advice that the army of the fiege, with the neceffary ammunition, and other ftore, was come before Olmutz, he thought it was then time to approach the king, and to devife fome means of relieving the fortrefs. With this defign he
broke

broke up his camp at Leitomischel, on the twenty-third marched to Zwittau, and on the twenty-fourth to Gewiez; at the same time general Harfch advanced from Nickel, and the same day encamped near Müglitz, on the heights of Allerheiligen: General Jahnus on the other hand posted himself near Loftiz, and compelled the out-posts of prince Maurice's corps, which occupied Remnitz and Neuschloß to retire nearer to the camp. General de Ville advanced once more with his corps as far as Wischau, and general Esterhazi was sent with some light troops to Ptin, to preserve the communication between him and the grand army; the vanguard of this, under the prince of Lowenstein, took post near Konitz to sustain General Laudohn, who, notwithstanding the little check he had received, still continued his expeditions.

In Olmutz General Marshal was indefatigable in carrying on his preparations for the defence of the place, on the capture of which the destiny of the campaign seemed to depend. So soon as he was assured that the siege was seriously undertaken, he caused part of the suburbs to be burnt, part to be demolished; the works to be repaired in many places, new ones to be constructed, and all holes, ditches, and hollow ways in front of them to be filled up, however small the advantage might be, which the besiegers could derive from them. He caused likewise some thousand fascines and gabions to be prepared in the neighbouring forest to serve for the reparation of the damaged works during the siege; and lastly, he laid under water the greatest part of environs on the side of the convent called Kloster Hradisch. Within the city he gave the necessary orders to the burghers for the preservation of the police, and for their conduct in various accidents to which they must be exposed during the siege; the useless mouths were likewise sent away, and all the cattle and other provisions collected together from the neighbouring villages, in order to guard against famine, an evil far more dreadful to a besieged town, than all the can-

non

non shot of the besiegers. In short, he provided for every thing, and displayed so much prudence and skill in his conduct, that in any event he was assured of the approbation of his masters, and the esteem of his enemy; whether through his steady and courageous opposition he preserved the place, or were in the end compelled to give it up with honour, after a brave defence. The besiegers on their part were not less active; and by the twenty-fifth every thing, whether fascines, gabions, or whatever other preparations are necessary, either for the engineers or artillery, were collected together in the depot at Schnabellin, a line of circumvallation drawn about their camp from the Morava as far as the wood of Horka.

The engineers diligently examined the ground round the town to determine upon the fittest point of attack; they found that the greater part might be laid under water, excepting what lies between Hatschin and Neustift, which rises continually as you leave the town. It was therefore immediately determined that the attack must be made on this side; but against which part of the works it might be directed with the greatest advantage, this remained still to be determined on.

About fifteen hundred paces from the fortress goes the road to Prosnitz, called the Imperial road, over a small height which is named the Tafelberg, and loses itself in the plain by degrees as it approaches the town; over this height ran a hollow way, some hundred paces in length, parallel with the works of the town, and afterwards turned and wound about in such a manner as to form natural approaches to the town. Colonel Balby, of the engineers, to whom the conduct of the siege was entrusted, promised himself great advantages from the situation of this hill, a man being able distinctly to overlook from it every part of the enemy's works; besides, he thought the artillery could not easily find a more commodious spot to place the ricochet batteries in the first parallel; and as he was looked upon as a man of more than ordinary skill in his profession, and having been pre-
sent

sent at various sieges, as Bergen op Zoom for instance, had joined practice to his theory; his opinion was listened to, and it was determined to employ this post to the best advantage. After this point was settled; there still remained the question, whether it were better to go with the first parallel to the right of the hill down to the Povalka, a small branch of the Morava, over against Neustift, or to the left, till it met the river not far from Hatschin; if the latter were chosen, nothing was to be feared from the works enfilading the trenches; but on the other hand, it was apprehended that they might be flooded by the time the sap was brought to the foot of the Glacis: of this there was truly no danger in the former case; but then one exposed the trenches and parallels during the continuation of the work, to the danger of being taken in flank and enfiladed along their whole extent by the works which the enemy had constructed in the islands near the place called Salzergut, and which from hence were known to the besiegers by the name of the Water-Fort.

These works could during the continuance of the siege be still further augmented, and they were by so much the more dangerous, as they lay very low; made a *feu rasant*, the most dangerous of all, and were scarcely exposed to be injured, or their fire silenced; by the artillery of the besiegers.

This circumstance appeared however to Colonel Balby to be of no importance. He thought to be able to cover himself from them to the rear, and even hoped to ruin the works themselves by his bombs and grenades. It was therefore determined to conduct the attack on this side, and the night of the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth of May was appointed for opening the trenches.

At five o'clock in the afternoon, the batallions appointed to cover this operation assembled, as did also one thousand three hundred and twenty-five working men from the regiments, who being provided with the necessary instruments, waited for the time of breaking ground;

ground; it was proposed not only to draw the first parallel, and the communications leading thither, but also to compleat in the first night, a battery of twelve cannons, and two mortar batteries, one of twelve and the other of four pieces. The working men were divided into four parties; the first was commanded by Colonel Balby, it consisted of one major, two captains, and four lieutenants of engineers, fifteen miners, and two hundred working men of Markgrave Henry's regiment, these were appointed to prepare one half of the parallel, from the middle of the Tafelberg, about four hundred paces on to the right hand, as also an epaulement for the cavalry.

Colonel Wredel of the engineers commanded the second division, which consisted of two captains, four lieutenants, fifteen miners, and two hundred working men from prince Henry's regiment, these were ordered to compleat the remainder of the parallel.

Lieutenant colonel Embers with the third division, consisting of three captains, three lieutenants, thirty miners, two hundred men of prince Francis's regiment, as many of Fouquets, with three hundred peasants, was appointed to draw the communications, and extend them to their opening into the approaches; the remaining five hundred and twenty-five men, were attached to the artillery for the construction of the batteries.

As soon as it was dark, the covering battalions marched out in two columns, observing the greatest silence; they were followed by the different divisions of working men. As soon as the former were come to the spot appointed, they formed themselves in a line, with considerable intervals, in front of the parallel, to be opened; and each battalion detached two platoons, two hundred paces forwards, which laid themselves on the ground, and sent out their out posts about eighty paces further, who also lay down. Behind each flank of the parallel were placed eighty dragoons, to be at hand to repel any attempt of the enemy's cavalry; the engineers traced

traced the parallel and approaches, the artillery their batteries; and the work advanced so briskly, that in the course of this night, the greater part was so far compleated, that the troops who at day break, drew back to wait for the relief, remained in them under cover. Notwithstanding the enemy's cavalry encamped in front of the Theresian gate, and strong picquets of infantry were posted all round the town, and the field posts also of the cavalry were advanced quite to the foot of the Tafelberg; yet the commandant was not informed of the opening of the trenches, sooner than four o'clock in the morning, he fired then some few cannon shot; but which hurt nobody.

In order to draw off the enemy's attention to another side, general Rebentisch received orders to attack the village of Repschin, at two o'clock in the morning; which the commandant had occupied with two hundred croats, as also Hatschin, Kowalkowitz and the convent of Hradisch, with other troops. To this end the batallion of Nimscheffky had detached two companies to Horka, while the batallion of Naumeister, which was posted there, made this attack; after that some cannon shot had been fired at the village, the volunteers advanced and marched strait up to it; the enemy quitted it without making the slightest resistance, left their field equipage, knapsacks, and a great quantity of arms, and retired into the town; the village was set on fire, and then it was perceived that the cavalry in front of the Theresian gate, continued perfectly quiet in their camp, on which prince Francis ordered a howitzer, and two six pounders to be brought into the parallel, whose fire soon drove them from that post, and compelled them to retire into the town. The commandant who perceived very plainly, that from the distance at which the parallel was traced, he could do little damage to it with his fire, thought it not prudent to waste his powder, which he intended to employ hereafter to more advantage, and there-

fore on that day made very little firing. The besiegers in consequence of this lost no more than one single man, from the opening the trenches to the hour of relief on the twenty-eighth in the afternoon.

On the thirtieth the first parallel was entirely completed, and the artillery ready with six batteries. In the croquet on the right flank stood three twelve-pounders, then followed a mortar battery of twelve pieces, then a battery of nine twelve-pounders, and four ten pound howitzers; further on a battery of three twelve-pounders, and after that one of eight four-and-twenty-pounders, and on the left of the whole one of three mortars. All these began to play on the thirty-first in the morning, but it was soon apparent that it was without effect, and served only to waste the ammunition which was already by no means superabundant; the distance in a direct line to the Theresian gate was reckoned at fifteen hundred paces, but the works against which the attack was directed, lying to the right of that near the Povalka, it might fairly be called eighteen or nineteen hundred paces from the batteries to them. The greater part of the bombs scarce fell on the Glacis at furthest, and the cannon shot being fired at an elevation, either went away clear over the works, or struck first and so flew over, or buried themselves so deep, that they never after rose, and consequently did not in the least endamage the artillery on the ramparts. For the same reasons the fire from the fortress had not the smallest effect, notwithstanding that the besieged enjoyed an advantage, which had the distance been less considerable, would have been of the greatest importance.

The small extent of the parallel which did not exceed seven hundred paces, crowded the batteries very near each other, and the front of attack extending nearly in a strait line, with bastions of a very obtuse angle, enabled the enemy to employ almost the whole of his artillery against our works, on which all his fire was united as in a central point, which must naturally give him a great advantage over the besiegers.

siegers. On this day one thousand two hundred and twenty cannon shot were fired, and three hundred and eight bombs and twenty-six grenades thrown, without dismounting one single cannon from the ramparts. At least as many shot were fired from the town, and the whole loss sustained by the besiegers consisted in four killed and as many wounded, without a single battery being damaged, a single platform broken, or a single gun dismounted. But on the other hand the mortars and howitzers suffered uncommonly on account of the great distance they fired from; the beds of four mortars were so much damaged in the great battery, that they were forced to be repaired, and one was rendered wholly useless; in the others three were rendered unserviceable, and one mortar split; all the platforms, without exception, stood in need of repair. The reason of this was, that the mortars were forced to be charged with three pounds of powder. Now whoever is acquainted with the effects of powder, will easily perceive that in this case at the ordinary elevation of forty-five degrees, the stress upon the mortar beds and platforms is too great for them long to resist. It would have been better not to have fired at all; experience, the best instructress, now taught us to our cost, that the approaches were commenced at too great a distance from the works.

Field Marshal Keith insisted therefore with colonel Balby, that he should no longer lose time in finishing the first parallel, but go on forwards with his approaches, that the batteries might be brought nearer to the town, and might be employed with more effect. The first parallel was upon this lengthened about seven hundred paces to the right hand out from the crochet, and another battery constructed of eight pieces of cannon, to damp the fire from the water fort, which took this parallel in flank; but as this battery must necessarily expose its own flank to the other works, it was constructed *en cremaille*. On the fourth of June we were ready with our second parallel; notwithstanding that, it being almost entirely enfiladed by the water fort,

we were obliged to fill it with traverses. The artillery did not lose a moment in forwarding the construction of new batteries, under whose protection the approaches might be carried on with more safety and expedition, for we had now got within eight hundred paces of the works.

Colonel Balby however was not of this opinion; he conceived the batteries on the Tafelberg to be much better calculated to protect the advancement of the work, than all those which were proposed to be constructed in the second parallel, and this for no other reason than that from the former one might discover near two thirds of the height of the works; whereas on the contrary, in the second parallel the fall of the ground scarce permitted you to see the embrasures; and as to the small progress we had hitherto made in destroying the defences and artillery of the besieged, this he imputed merely to an ill-judged parsimony in confining the charge of our twenty-four pounders to ten, and of our twelve pounders to five pounds of powder, whereas he maintained they ought to have been considerably augmented, and that we should carry the first to fifteen, and the second to seven pounds, if we wished to produce the effect intended. He would not have maintained these opinions if he had been better acquainted with the effects of artillery, nor have fallen into the error, that the range of a shot increases always in proportion to the charge of powder. This principle was held as long as artillery was treated rather as a handicraft than as a science, but men soon learnt from experience that three-eighths of the weight of the shot was at all times the properest charge, and generally speaking, far from being too weak. Besides, the range of a cannon shot does not depend upon the charge alone, but on the angle of elevation, the length and strength of the piece, the resistance of the air, and various other small circumstances, which a man must take into his calculation, if he would avoid falling into considerable errors on the subject of gunnery.

As

As the progress of the works advanced, we were more and more convinced that what had been considered as a mere trifle, would be attended with the most serious consequences. The fire from the water fort became every hour more destructive, and as it enfiladed a part of the second parallel, we were obliged there also to construct traverses for the protection of the men, and a battery on the right flank to check the vivacity of its fire. Many difficulties attended the execution of this latter work. The water fort lay so far detached from the other works of the town, that being able to flank the whole front of attack, it was consequently impossible to attack it without exposing one's flank to the town; this rendered the progress of the work very tedious, and cost us very many men. I myself have been often present whilst superintending the working men, when a shot from the water-fort has gone through them, and has crossed another from the town, which has taken off a whole rank of workers. Nothing is more capable of destroying all courage and good-will in the troops, either for working or fighting, than a flanking enfilading fire, though the imagination perhaps represents the danger as being greater than it really is. It is therefore with reason established as one of the first principles of our profession to avoid this fire, and it will ever be considered as a capital fault in the conduct of this siege, that we should have exposed ourselves to it, when we might have avoided it by giving another direction to our parallel.

At length on the eighth of June the batteries on the left, and on the twelfth the great battery on the right, were so far advanced as to admit of several pieces being brought into them. Till this was done the fire had been very much interrupted, as it was determined for the above-mentioned reasons to fire no more from the batteries on the Tafelberg, which had been found to be an unnecessary waste of ammunition; by this means the engineers were hindered in the advancement of their works, which the very heavy and destructive fire from the town absolutely

lutely stopped, and so found themselves obliged to employ several days in remedying the original errors committed in the choice of our attack. On the ninth the king himself came from Kleinlaten, to which place he had removed his head quarters from Schmirnitz, and reviewed the state of the siege; he soon discovered where the fault lay, and was extremely displeased with the small advancement of the approaches. This drew a very sharp reprimand upon colonel Balby; the colonel however would by no means admit that it was to be imputed to the excessive distance at which the parallel had been traced, nor yet to the direction chosen for the approaches, but solely to the batteries having been removed from the Tafelberg.

In the letter which he wrote on the tenth to Field Marshal Keith and General Fouquet, he says, among other things, " They took away
" all the artillery from the Tafelberg. In all that part therefore of
" their works which were within reach of the left flank of our ap-
" proaches, the enemy were at liberty to do whatever they pleased, and
" to bring the whole of their artillery to bear upon that point; hav-
" ing nothing to hinder them or divert their attention. If only six or
" eight guns had been left me there! but no, they took every one
" away. His majesty is much displeased that the works do not ad-
" vance more rapidly. On the contrary, any man who is acquainted
" with the principles on which a siege ought to be conducted, would
" rather impute it to me as a great fault, that I should have advanced
" my approaches so imprudently, without having the protection of
" the batteries, and without having in any degree damped the fire
" from the enemy's ramparts. I proceed to-night still further with
" my approaches; and your Excellency knows that on the right flank
" there is not one battery yet in readiness, and probably will not be
" for some days to come; however, I shall carry on the sap under a
" most dreadful fire, but I will not be answerable for the conse-
" quences if the enemy should profit by this advantage. A man
" must

" must have cannon, mortars, and howitzers; a man must have
 " powder, shells, and cannon shot; a man must keep up an unin-
 " terrupted fire, and superior to that of the fortrefs, if he expects a
 " siege should be carried on with vigour.—Nothing of this is the
 " case, I therefore will answer for nothing."—So much for colonel
 Balby's ideas on gunnery.

After the batteries in the second parallel were in readiness, the sap went on rapidly, notwithstanding the heavy fire from the town; and on the twenty-second it was carried as far as the foot of the Glacis, and we should have reached it sooner had we not been compelled by the fire from the water fort, (which took the workmen in flank,) to make a double sap instead of a single one, which considerably delayed the work. This parallel then became the first, and what was the first served only as a communication; from hence one may judge how considerably the works would have been advanced, if on the first night we had approached to within eight hundred paces of the town; we should then have been ready on the twelfth, or at latest on the fifteenth of June, to begin working on the third parallel, and this would have had a very considerable influence on the success of the undertaking. I have already said that the advantages expected to have been derived from the situation of the Tafelberg, determined colonel Balby to depart from principles which he sufficiently understood, and had himself employed at the siege of Schweidnitz.

But this alone was not all his reasons, the enemy had several picquets of infantry before the town, and parties of his cavalry were posted at the foot of the Tafelberg; now it was apprehended that we might have been discovered by them, and so prevented from finishing our parallel on the first night by the fire that discovery would have drawn upon us; but even had we been so discovered, that consequence does not necessarily follow; it scarce ever happens that a parallel is drawn about a fortrefs without discovery, and yet it is always
 pretty

pretty considerably advanced; at three sieges of Schweidnitz this was the case, and particularly at the last; nevertheless the work was so far advanced during the first night, and that too without any considerable loss, that on the following day the men were completely under cover from the enemy's cannon shot; indeed this parallel was traced at a thousand paces distance, and consequently further off than was necessary; and it is plain from hence, that in the present instance we might have advanced without danger, at least within this distance of the town. Then I may add how watchful soever general Marshall might be, however prudently he may have taken his measures, it would all find a parallel in the conduct of General Guasco's defence of Schweidnitz.

But the great error was in carrying the approaches to the right towards the Povalka; for every one knew that we *must* have the fire of the works raised in the islands there, otherwise called the Water-Fort in our flank. This openly broke through all the rules of art: but admitting that the attack could not be carried on, on the side of Hatschin and Repschin, on account of the inundation to which the third parallel might be exposed, still it did not necessarily follow that it must therefore be undertaken on the opposite side; besides, this object of our apprehension deserved a somewhat stricter enquiry than was given to it, to discover whether in fact it were as well grounded as it appeared to be. It was by no means probable from the elevation of the ground in that quarter, that the inundation could reach the Theresian gate; but suppose it even could have reached it, the enemy would scarcely have had recourse to this expedient for his protection, since having countermines under his Glacis, which in that case would have been also overflowed and rendered useless, he would have thereby lost one of his best means of defence.

It will immediately strike any engineer who examines the plan of this town, that the attack ought to have been carried on upon the
ravelin

ravelin on the left of the Theresian gate, looking from the fields, and on both the bastions which defend this ravelin. Thereby we should not even have lost the imaginary advantage of the Tafelberg, we should have received no fire in our flank, and we might have advanced directly on the capital of the ravelin; instead of which by turning to the right hand, we lost five days in altering the direction of our approaches. Indeed the Povalka seemed to cover the right flank of the parallels, but that in this instance is no very important advantage, as great as it is in the situation of camps and other posts, a redoubt on either flank, and a few field pieces in it, would have answered the purpose full as well.

I shall now proceed no further with the journal of the siege, which any man may find in the publications of that time. Except two great sallies and various small ones made upon the workmen at the head of the sap, (which like all others ended in spiking up a few cannon, and a trifling loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners on either side), there happened nothing worthy our notice. Whoever is in any degree acquainted with the theory of sieges, will very easily supply this gap in our narrative. The besiegers completed their third parallel in spite of all chicanes the enemy could oppose to them, and kept still advancing, though with tedious steps, till at length other circumstances rendered it necessary to raise the siege. But as these belong to the operations of the two armies who continued observing each other, I shall now return once more back to them.

Both armies were in a position which seemed to promise something decisive every day, but Marshal Daun did not find it prudent to commit himself with the king, and determined to remain a quiet spectator of the siege, till he had drawn together all his reinforcements, and till circumstances afforded him a fair opportunity of hazarding somewhat, notwithstanding that the weakness of the Prussian army, and their repartition into various separate corps, between whom the communica-

tions were at no time perfectly secure, seemed to invite him to more activity. The king made no essential alteration in the disposition of his troops, on the approach of the enemy's grand army; he fought only to procure more security against the incursions of their light troops, for his communications with the corps under Prince Maurice, near Littau. To this end, General Wedel was detached on the twenty-fifth of May, with the grenadier battalions Benkendorf and Bieverling, the second battalion of Münchow, Putkammer's Hussars, and two hundred men of Le Noble and Salenmon's free battalions; and he pitched a camp on the hill named Hrad, between Namieſt and Laſkow. By this disposition General Laudohn was more restrained, but not absolutely prevented from molesting this little corps, though without any advantage obtained; so that it was forced, during the whole time it remained in that camp, to stand under arms nearly the whole night through. Now as the great distance of four German * miles between the army at Schmirſitz, and the corps under the Princes, might tempt Marshal Daun to attack the one or the other, while in the mean time another body of troops marched strait upon the army employed in the siege; his majesty ordered them to join him instantly, if he himself should be attacked; and in case the enemy marched against them, then the king was in like manner to march to their support. But if timely advice was received of the enemy's intentions, then in that case, both corps should march towards each other, and unite at Grofs Sehnitz. But the one case happened no more than the other; for except some small skirmishes with the out posts, and the usual nightly visits of the Croats, from which they often carried back broken pates, nothing went forwards worth relating. Notwithstanding the opportunities General Harſch had of disturbing the road leading

* About eighteen or twenty English.

out of Silesia, the convoys passed as regularly, as if he had not been there. The battalion of Kleist which was stationed in Troppau, escorted on the twenty-sixth of May, some hundred Wispels of meal into the camp, and returned back without seeing one single enemy.

Again, on the eighth of June, General Putkammer arrived in camp, with a considerable convoy of waggons laden with meal, ammunition, and other necessaries and provisions, under the escorte of three thousand Convalescents, Kleist's grenadier battalion, and the free battalion of Rapin, which was raised for the most part from the French prisoners, at Magdebourg, and deserters, without the loss of one single waggon. Kleist's battalion returned back immediately to Troppau, but that of Rapin was quartered in Holitz, on this side of Olmütz. The two free battalions, Le Noble and Salenmon, suffered somewhat in this.

In order to cover this convoy, General Meyer was ordered to occupy a place called Sauberg, near Döllein, with the grenadier battalion of Nimscheffky; and to draw a chain of posts from Chometau to Gibau, with a detachment of Bayreuth's dragoons; the grenadier battalions of Unruh belonging to the Markgrave Charles's corps, occupied Sternberg; and the free battalions posted there were advanced as far as Bährn. Here Colonel Le Noble received intelligence, that the convoy was already passed through Gibau; and without more enquiry whether this really had any foundation, he immediately recommenced his march back to Sternberg. In the mean time Colonel Lanius, who was posted in the mountains, had possessed himself of the woods and heights by Deutch Lodnitz, and attached the free battalions in the defilé, near Siebenhufen; and as they had been compleated by a considerable number of Austrian deserters and prisoners, so the greatest part of them went over immediately to the enemy, who obtained such an advantage from the superiority of numbers they derived from these traitors,

that it was no difficult matter for them to take from us three pieces of cannon, and three hundred prisoners, the rest cut their way through.

All these trifling advantages however could have very little real influence on the destiny of Olmutz; this would have been easily decided if Marshal Daun had determined to attack the king with all his forces; but this the Marshal's wary character did not permit; he would not be induced to hazard a chance which it was at any time in his power to recur to, till he had tried every other means that appeared conducive to the accomplishment of his object; of these, one was to open his communication with the fortress without exposing himself to the danger of being forced into a battle by the king while on his march; the other was to compel his adversary to relinquish his enterprize by cutting off the convoys of whatever was necessary for carrying on the siege, which he was still obliged to draw out of Silesia.

Now a communication with Olmutz was to be obtained by these two ways; in the first place, if whilst general Harsch marched round the corps of Markgrave Charles at Neustadt, taking his route by Sternberg, the Marshal in the mean while had followed with the main army by the way of Müglitz, and so the two corps might unite between Sternberg and Olmutz; this the corps of prince Maurice at Littau in conjunction with that of the Markgrave was still too weak to prevent; the king himself must have fallen back from Prosnitz with the greatest part of the corps he had there, and united himself with them both before he could make head against the enemy on that side; now Daun by this very movement became master of all the roads which lead into Silesia, it is probable therefore that the king would have attacked him, and besides also his communication with the magazines in Leutomischel and further on into Bohemia would thereby have been, if not utterly

utterly lost, at least rendered very difficult, he therefore determined to try the other mode and post himself opposite the king, waiting till he found an opportunity of effecting the designs he had formed upon Kremsir and Prerau. He hazarded nothing by this measure. I have already observed that he had drawn an impenetrable chain of different corps of light troops from Müglitz to Wischau; these occupied all the defiles and passes in the mountains between Gewicz and Wischau, so that the grand army could make any kind of movement behind them with the greatest conveniency, without being under the least apprehension of being attacked on the march, or even in any shape disturbed or interrupted by the king. The Field Marshal had thereby the advantage of the ground constantly on his side, he found withal positions, which secured him from any attack, even though the king had been as well acquainted with his plans as he himself were, but above all his movements were concealed by the woods and hills from the discovery of the eye the most practised in reconnoitring. The difficulties which are inseparable from every march over mountains and through hollow ways, were the only hindrances he was exposed to; on the sixteenth of June the army broke up from its camp at Gewicz with all possible secrecy, and marched in five columns to Prodowanow. General Harsch left his camp near Müglitz on the same day, and marched to Konitz; on the seventeenth the Austrian army put itself again in motion by break of day, and took up its camp between Ewannowitz and Predlitz, the right flank was posted at the first named place, and was covered by a marshy rivulet, the left stood on the steep sandy hills which lie on the right of Predlitz; this and all the villages lying before the front were occupied by infantry and the corps of general de Ville, here joined the grand army.

This

This general had a few days before detached general St. Ignon with the Saxon regiment of dragoons, called Prince Charles's, the two Austrian regiments, imperial Würtemberg and Löwenstein, Deschofisches Hussars, a Pulk of Houlans, and some hundred Croats towards Prerau, to observe the Prussian disposition on that side. There St. Ignon heard that the Bayreuth dragoons were quartered at Bistrowan, and two squadrons of Seidlitz's Hussars at Wisternitz, which could only be sustained by the grenadier battalion Nimscheffky, which was in Drozdin, and Rapin's free battalion posted at Hollitz, he resolved therefore to fall on them; with this view he broke up from Prerau on the sixteenth, and approached the dragoons just at the entrance of the night. Field Marshal Keith had in the mean while received intelligence of this march, and had apprized general Meyer of it, who commanded on that side; this general therefore kept his people under arms the whole night through, and drew to his support the battalion of Nimscheffky, which was ordered to occupy Wisternitz. At day break, nor till half past five in the morning could any enemy be discovered; the patrolles which had been sent out during the night, were not yet returned: all this time not a shot had been heard, but a perfect silence reigned all around. This general Meyer, contrary to all the rules of prudence took for a good sign; he thought that the patrolles having met with no enemy, advanced too far to be back so soon, and it never once occurred to him that the enemy might have surprized and carried them off in silence. He held the intelligence therefore as unfounded, and although several officers thought they had discovered cavalry in the woods which lay before their front, still he was so positive in his opinion, that he thought it unnecessary to send out one single man to ascertain whether this observation were well founded or not; he rather gave orders to the grenadiers to return back to their quarters, and to the dragoons to unsaddle and

and to prepare for foraging, and thus fell into the snare with his eyes open. The grenadiers were scarcely returned into their quarters, before the enemy fell on the dragoons with his whole force, penetrated into the whole camp, cut to pieces many men, wounded and made prisoners many more, and compelled the remainder to retire to Drozdin to the protection of their infantry. The two squadrons of Seidlitz's hussars had not been so precipitate; they remained still saddled, and though they were forced indeed to give way before superior numbers, yet they lost not a man, but on the contrary made some prisoners. In the mean while, the battalion of grenadiers got once more under arms, marched with all possible expedition against the enemy, stopped him by some cannon shot from pursuing any further his advantage, and chased him again from the camp of the dragoons quite back to Groß Teinitz. At the same time the free battalion of Rapin quartered in Hollitz, and two other squadrons of the Bayreuth dragoons, who were posted near that village, were attacked. But these withdrew themselves in time over the Dam which leads to the Morava, and the enemy made only one officer and thirty men prisoners, who were posted in the church yard. General Meyer on this received orders from Marshal Keith to draw back to Holitz, with his battalion of grenadiers. These formed themselves into a square, took their baggage in the center, and although they were attacked by the enemy, as well on the side of the Heiligen Berg, as by some hussars who sallied from Olmutz, they made good their way to Holitz without the loss of one single man; general Meyer on the contrary, who had gone forward with the remaining part of the regiment, was once more attacked by the enemy, and compelled to pass the Dam near this village on the full gallop. On this the dragoons fell into confusion and came in pell mell with the enemy, who pursued them very hotly indeed; the loss would
here

here have been very considerable, if the free batallion which had posted itself behind the Dams, had not by a heavy well directed fire, stopped the enemy's pursuit. The regiment lost in this unfortunate affair into which they had been drawn by the imprudent security of their commander, about fifty killed; general Meyer himself, four other officers, and one hundred non-commissioned and privates wounded, and about three hundred prisoners. Field Marshal Keith on the very first alarm passed the Morava without delay, with two batallions and five squadrons of Würtemberg's; he came however too late to ward off this blow, for general St. Ignon on his approach retired back to Prerau. Holitz was once more occupied by Nimschefsky's grenadiers, and the free batallion of Rapin, and those of the Bayreuth dragoons, who were still mounted together with Seidlitz's Hussars, encamped near the village. As for the Field Marshal, he returned with his troops back to the camp before Olmütz.

The march of the enemy's army was immediately reported to Prince Maurice and the Markgrave Charles, by their out posts of Hussars; they both kept their troops all the night through dressed and accoutred, to be ready to turn out in a moment, in case of an alarm; but every thing remained quiet. Next morning the Prince detached general Saldern with Schenkendorf's grenadiers, and Möhring's Hussars, to reconnoitre the enemy. He found the camp on the heights of Müglitz abandoned, and all the accounts he could procure, agreed in this, that the enemy's grand army had turned to the right towards Wischau. The Markgrave Charles also had now no longer any enemy before him at Neustadt; and as the march could be reported to the king, and to the Bayreuth dragoons, at the same time, he gave orders to that corps to break up its camp immediately, and go and post itself on the other side of Olmütz, to cut off the communication

munication between Prerau and that town. This was the more necessary, as the handful of troops who were posted there could not prevent the enemy from being from time to time supplied with provisions, several waggons with powder being secretly conveyed into the town; nor the commandant from keeping up constant correspondence with Marshal Daun's army. General St. Ignon also was posted near Prerau, with no other intention than to sustain the reinforcement which was intended to be thrown into the town. On the seventeenth the Markgrave's corps also left its camp near Neustadt, and went to Bauniowitz. But on the eighteenth, after that the Markgrave and the Prince of Hesse Cassel had marched with the king to Prosnitz, it moved into the neighbourhood of Bistrowan, and was posted in the following manner by general Retzow, who at this time commanded it. The regiment of Kalkstein, and one squadron of Seidlitz Hussars were placed at Lodenitz, and were ordered to break up and ruin all the roads which lead to Chometau. The second battalion of Geist, and two more squadrons of Hussars were sent under the command of general Goltz, to Wisternitz. The first battalion of Geist, together with the second battalions of grenadiers, Unruh and Manteufel, eight squadrons of Bayreuth's dragoons, and two squadrons of general Seidlitz's hussars went to Bistrowan. Sternberg at the same time was abandoned, and the two free battalions, Le Noble and Salenmon, who had been posted there, went to Holitz; which town was already occupied by Nimschefsky's grenadiers, the free battalion of Rapin, and two squadrons of Bayreuth. Prince Maurice likewise changed his disposition, drew himself more to the left, and took a new camp on the heights by Choelein, in such a manner, that his right wing came on the hill where his left had stood, and the left stretched out over this village, in which he placed his head quarters, Littau remained in the rear. But when the king had

reconnoitred the enemy, and found that he had a force greatly superior to himself before him; he on the twenty-first called in Prince Maurice with ten battalions, fifteen squadrons, and the two hundred hussars who were attached to this corps, and made these troops encamp in the second line of his left wing. The grenadier battalions Bohr Wangenheim and Heyden, under the command of general Kreutz, occupied the posts near Klein Schnitz, where Möhring's regiment of hussars was already posted. This little corps was destined in conjunction with that under general Wedel at Namieſt, to keep up our communication with the army of the siege, and to hinder general Laudohn, who was still near Konitz, with four regiments of regular infantry, a regiment of dragoons, and several thousand Croats and Hussars from disturbing the progress of the siege by his expeditions. The first battalion of Münchow, with two hundred men detached from the regiment of Manteufel, remained at Littau, under the command of Major Wobersnow for the protection of the hospital, in which about a thousand soldiers dangerously ill or wounded were left behind. The military chest, the field commissariat, the proviant-train, and the less seriously affected sick and hurt, went to Krenau. The Bakeries however were removed to Horka, and were covered by the free battalion of Rapin, which came from Holitz and encamped in front of that village. On the twenty-third, Littau was summoned by a detachment of Austrian light troops under colonel Zobel; who having received the usual answer, and learning the approach of general Kreutz, drew off again.

In the mean while Marshal Daun, who had received positive orders from his court to succour the place, sought to approach more and more to his object; but as he well knew the vigilance and activity of the king, he would not venture to make a single step by which he might run the hazard of coming to action with him.

him. The usual measure of strengthening the garrison with a reinforcement of fresh troops, appeared to him to be by so much safer, as the Prussian quarters on the left bank of the Morava, were very much dispersed, and moreover very slightly occupied. He entrusted therefore General Bülow with the conduct of this expedition, and detached him on the nineteenth with one thousand two hundred infantry, and about thirty men of the artillery; this officer arrived without difficulty at Prerau, the next morning General St. Ignon sent out strong patrols towards Olmutz, whose business was to contain those of the Prussians, and to cover the march of General Bülow; the general took a considerable *detour* through thickets, wilds and a very covered country, and as he was furnished with guides who knew every nook and footpath, and as all necessary measures were already taken before hand with the commandant, he succeeded in getting behind general Retzow notwithstanding all his vigilance, and on the twenty-second at day break, fortunately entered the fortress by the way of Dölein, between Lodenitz, and the Heilige Berge with his whole detachment. But as general St. Ignon was apprehensive that this enterprize would be attended with more difficulty, and that perhaps general Bülow might not be able to reach the town during the night, but might be compelled to cut his way through by day light; he himself advanced with his corps, and shewed himself at five in the morning on the heights of Gross Teinitz, to draw upon himself the attention of General Retzow, and to sustain the detachment in case it were attacked. At the same time the light troops which the besieged still had in Kowalkowitz, moved out, and being reinforced by a part of the garrison, drew up in order of battle before the village in the rear of the Prussian camp at Bistrowan; Field Marshal Keith being informed of this, detached instantly the regiment of Pannewitz, and the Wurtemberg dragoons to General

Retzow. The enemy however undertook nothing further, but after General St. Ignon had waited till ten o'clock, and from the stillness which reigned all around, could easily judge that the stroke must have succeeded, he began his retreat back again to Prerau.

The king had no sooner learnt what had happened, than he ordered Lieutenant General Ziethen to advance against General St. Ignon, to reconnoitre his position and if possible drive him from his post, before he should have time to receive such reinforcements as might enable him to attack General Retzow with superior numbers, and thus open a communication with the town. Ziethen therefore at one in the afternoon broke up from the camp at Prosnitz, with the grenadier battalions of Carlowitz, Schenkendorf and Rath, under General Putkammer of the infantry, and five squadrons of Ryau, five of Schmettau cuirassiers, three hundred hussars of Ziethen, three hundred of Werner, and three hundred of Putkammer under General Krokow the younger; with these troops he passed the Morawa by the bridge which the army of the siege had thrown over that river and joined General Retzow: On the twentieth, this corps advanced as far as the heights of Prerau; General St. Ignon had occupied this town with some hundred croats, his cavalry was posted behind it in a camp, whose front was covered by the Beczwa, a river with marshy banks, and by several ditches. Notwithstanding the strength of this post, he sent away his baggage to Kropin, drew back with his corps to the heights of Bicknow, and left only a hundred croats in the town; it would not have been difficult for General Ziethen to drive out the croats, and open the road to pursue the enemy, they would probably not have held out a moment, and the affair would have ended with a very trifling loss of men; but in the mean time came intelligence, that the enemy had occupied the castle of Tobitschau with

with some hundred croats, under the command of colonel Vehla. These General Ziethen must have left behind him had he advanced any further, and as still more troops of the enemy from Kropin and Kremfir, might fall upon the flanks, he might have met with some difficulty in effecting his retreat, he therefore marched back to Olmutz, and General St. Ignon returned to his old position. This was not the only destination of General Ziethen's detachment, a great convoy was expected out of Silesia, which had set out on the twenty-first from Neisse and Kosel, under the escorte of two battalions of Treskow, two of young Kreutz, two of Mitschefahl, one grenadier battalion Bahr, one old Billerbeck, between two and three thousand recruits and convalescents of the infantry divided into four battalions, and one thousand one hundred men of the cavalry. The convoy consisted of between three and four thousand waggons, of which only eight hundred and eighteen were laden with ammunition, and other necessaries for carrying on the siege, the rest contained meal, various other provisions, and the small mountings for the troops; in proportion as the safe arrival of this convoy was of importance to us, in like manner it was of the utmost consequence to the enemy to intercept it. Therefore although the escorte was sufficiently strong to protect it against any enemy, not excessively superior in force, and the best measures might be reasonably looked for from colonel Mosel, who had the command of it (a man of tried resolution and experience) still circumstances might happen which would make some succour absolutely necessary. General Ziethen therefore received orders to meet the convoy with his corps, and to reinforce himself if he thought proper with some battalions from that under General Retzow; in the mean time he disposed his troops in and about the villages, on the side of the Heilige Berge in such a manner, as that the town was compleatly invested; Rath's grenadiers were posted

posted in Drozdin, and three hundred of Werner's hussars near them; the batallion of Carlowitz occupied Samotiska, and five squadrons of Schmettau's encamped between these two villages; Schenkendorf's batallion occupied Towerz, and five squadrons of Ryau, with three hundred of Putkammer's hussars were posted between that place and Samotiska, beyond Towerz towards Glasfowitz, were three hundred of Ziethen's hussars; by means of the position of colonel Lanius in the neighbourhood of Sternberg, and of General St. Ignon in Prerau, who could without danger send on their patrols as far as Troppau, and through the readiness of the country people, to take upon themselves the employ of a spy; the enemy were enabled without difficulty, to learn whatever was going forward on this side, while on the contrary the king's intelligence was rare, uncertain, and very often absolutely contradictory. As soon as Marshal Daun heard of the approach by the convoy, he had no other choice left, he must of necessity think of contriving the means of either cutting it off or destroying it, and these he found as well in his great superiority over the king, as in the natural circumstances of the country, and the inclinations of its inhabitants, by whom he run no risk of being betrayed. General Laudohn therefore received orders to approach the road to Hof, taking a great circuit round by Müglitz, and so over the hills; to join the detachment under Colonel Lanius with his whole corps, and wait the arrival of the convoy. On the other side, General Ziskowitz had orders to pass the Morava, to call in General St. Ignon's corps from Prerau, and then to conceal himself in the woody mountains near Alt Liebe, till he found an opportunity of falling upon the convoy.

In the mean time the Austrian general sought by all possible means to lead the king into the belief that he intended to give him battle; and these demonstrations appeared the more probable, because the fate
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of the siege depended on that circumstance alone, if the enterprize upon the convoy should fail. It was therefore contrived that the king should receive advice that an attack was intended upon Prosnitz, which would oblige him to direct his attention that way. The light troops made some attempts upon Ziethen's hussars, but without success however. Marshal Daun frequently reconnoitred the Prussian camp, and at length on the twenty-seventh unexpectedly took up a new position with his right wing at Klenowitz, and his left over Dobromielitz, whereby he not only approached nearer to the king, but also threatened his majesty's left flank; at the same time general Buccow was detached with a corps of some thousand men to Ptin against his right, and the posts near Tobitschau were considerably reinforced. All these movements were made with the following view, partly to conceal the march of general Ziskowitz, who in the mean while had passed the Morava, and was gone away to his destination, and partly also by the apprehension of an attack to prevent the king from detaching any more troops to meet his convoy.

As soon as this was assembled near Troppau, colonel Mosel, who commanded it, put himself in motion on the twenty-sixth, and arrived with the head of the column on the Heights near Bautsch. The line of march of this great train was very tedious and full of impediments; from the constant arrival of convoys to the army the roads were extremely broken up, and now from the rains which had lately fallen were so completely spoiled, that the carriages were every moment stuck fast, and the line thereby stopped and interrupted; so that on this day the convoy could make but a very small progress indeed on its route. It was prevented also the following morning from proceeding at all, for colonel Mosel perceived it was absolutely necessary to halt where he was on the twenty-seventh, to draw together the remainder of the convoy, and even then it would not be possible for him to carry in more than about two thirds of the whole safe into camp. The rear
which

which was by good fortune composed only of sutlers waggons and such like, which in case of necessity the army might do without, remained behind in confusion, dispersed on the road to Troppau. This circumstance had a great influence on the fate of the convoy.

In the mean time general Laudohn had reached Sternberg on the same day, and occupied various posts so as to hinder the king from receiving the smallest intelligence of the fate of this great convoy. From hence it arose that colonel Werner, who had been detached by general Ziethen on the same day to meet colonel Mosel, with a battalion of grenadiers, two hundred dragoons, and three hundred hussars, was able to proceed no further than Gibau; from this circumstance the Austrian general was convinced that succours must be approaching, and that he had no time to lose, unless he would abandon the enterprize entirely. He therefore, without delay, moved forwards, and on the twenty-eighth, in the morning, entered the environs of Gunterdsdorf; he immediately occupied all the Heights, from whence he could command the Defilé running between Bautsch and Alt Liebe, through which the convoy must absolutely pass, and threw his croats and Hungarian infantry into the adjoining thickets, while his hussars and cavalry formed themselves right in the plain, in order to fall on the line of march on every side. Colonel Mosel in the mean while had in like manner put himself in motion by day-break, without waiting for the rear of his convoy. It was not long before he discovered the enemy with his avantgarde, and directly came to the resolution of attacking him. The first battalion of Young Kreutz marched quickly through the Defilé, formed in front of it, notwithstanding a very vigorous fire of artillery which the enemy directed upon the *Debouché*, and maintained its post till more battalions came up, and colonel Mosel conceived them to be sufficiently strong to clear the road before them by force. The second battalion of Young Kreutz, the grenadier battalion of Old Billerbeck, and one half of
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of the battallions composed of the convalescents and recruits belonging to prince Ferdinand's regiment, commanded by captain Pirch, were the first who passed the Defilé, and formed next to the first battallion of Young Kreutz, and were followed by the remainder, excepting those who remained behind for the protection of the train of waggons. The enemy had placed a strong battery upon a height which played upon the left flank. The battallion of Billerbeck's grenadiers who covered this flank, and were consequently most exposed to this fire, did not hesitate a moment, but rushed into the wood, drove the croats and Hungarians, and pushed on pell mell to the battery, where the enemy made so obstinate a defence, that they could only be driven from it by the bayonet; at length however the grenadiers beat them from this post, took from them one piece of cannon, and made two hundred prisoners. A moment after the regiment of Kreutz, and the battallion of prince Ferdinand's recruits advanced, and with so much vigour and intrepidity attacked the enemy, that after a very warm engagement, and with all the exertions that general Laudohn could make to sustain his post, in the end he was beat with the loss of one piece of cannon taken on the spot, and another abandoned in his flight; upon which he retired back as far as Bahrn, with the loss of above five hundred men killed, wounded, and made prisoners. Colonel Mosel could not let himself be drawn into any pursuit, being obliged to employ himself in reducing to order the line of march of his convoy, which the foregoing affair had thrown into the greatest confusion. The peasants being panic struck at the very first cannon shot, fled back, scattered themselves all over the field, and the greater part made the best of their way at one stretch back to Troppau. This circumstance was very favourable to the enemy's hussars and croats, who broke in here and there, and plundered every waggon, till they were chased away. When every thing was quiet, and the order of march for the most part re-established, colonel Mosel sent off immediately adjutant Beville

to the king to Prosnitz, to acquaint him of this affair, and of the progress he had made with his convoy, and then making good his way further on, came the same day as far as Neudörfel, without the enemy's having been able to take any thing more from him. General Ziethen had on the same day, marched from Olmutz with his corps, which had been reinforced in the night between the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth, by both the grenadier battalions of Unruh and Manteufel, which had been sent after him; and after he had reunited to his own corps, the detachment of colonel Werner whom he found at Gibau, he joined colonel Mosel on the same evening. Here he found not the half of the waggons, the greater part could not proceed through the badness of the relays, others were deserted by their drivers, and indeed every one of them had turned about to go back. From these circumstances he saw himself compelled to halt all the following day, till by detached parties from his hussars, he had collected the greater part together, and resettled the order of the march; all this greatly favoured the enemy's designs, General Ziskowitz had from hence time to come up, and to post his corps in the thickets between Stadt Liebe and Domstädtl, where they were compleatly concealed. On the thirtieth the convoy resumed its march by break of day on the road to Domstädtl; the cavalry of General Ziethen's corps marched on the right of the waggons, and in squadrons with great intervals; so long as the ground was for the most part even, the infantry marched on the left hand. The head of the column reached the defilé near Domstädtl, without any enemy having shewn himself, but when scarcely about one hundred and twenty waggons had passed through the defilé, the enemy appeared upon the heights on the left hand, began immediately a most severe fire from his artillery on the entrance, shot almost every horse dead, and thus brought the line of march absolutely to a stand still; General Ziethen
hereupon

hereupon left the waggons, as they arrived by little and little to draw up before the defilé, took both the grenadier battalions, Rath and Carlowitz under General Putkammer, with about two hundred hussars, and moved against the enemy; the attack had at first a very prosperous success, every battalion of the enemy was broken, every one of his cannon taken; but the Saxon dragoons rushing from the thickets where they had been concealed, charged the grenadiers in flank and rear, cut in pieces a great part, took many more and drove the rest quite to the waggon bourg, where they fled for refuge; on this General Ziskowitz turned the whole of his force on the center of the convoy, recovered again the artillery he had lost, and kept up a constant unceasing fire upon the waggon bourg, and the waggons that had already past the defilé. In a very short time General Laudohn also appeared, coming back again from Bahrn and attacked the convoy on the other side; the combat was very obstinate, and lasted above two hours with various success: but the troops composing the escorte being broken and subdivided by the waggons, and the enemy on the other hand keeping their lines always united, they at length broke in, in several places, overpowered the escorte, and dispersed the whole convoy. Each battalion drew off to the defilé of Domstädtl, but General Ziethen with his party was cut off from it and obliged to retreat, continually fighting his way back to Troppau; General Krokow who commanded the avantgarde, and who from the smoke of the powder waggons, set on fire by the enemy, the silence which followed the explosion, and the retreat of the scattered fugitives, readily concluded that the enemy must have effected their design, came to the resolution of collecting all he could get through the defilé, and setting forward on his march strait to Olmutz.

Before he could accomplish this, he had the mortification to see the enemy renew his attack on the waggon bourg, formed

on the other side the defilé, cut in pieces a great part, and make prisoners of the remainder of the escorte before his face, without having it in his power to afford them any assistance. He marched off therefore with what remained of the batallions of Manteufel, Unruh, Schenkendorf, Billerbeck, Rath, Carlowitz, the regiment of young Kreutz, five squadrons of Ryau, one Schmettau, and about five hundred hussars; together with near two hundred and fifty waggons, and without making any more halts, arrived in the evening between Bistrowan and the bridge of boats. Near Heiligen Berg he was again attacked by the hussars and croats, who plundered *one* waggon; by good luck General Ziethen had placed all the money waggons at the head of the convoy, which from this circumstance were saved. The recruits of Prince Ferdinand's regiment who had never before once seen an enemy, distinguished themselves in both these actions by the most remarkable firmness; never did Spartan or Roman veterans, fight for their country with more undaunted valour, than these raw lads from seventeen to twenty years of age. They determined to defend themselves to the last gasp, but the greater part of them together with their commander captain Pirch, carried their laurels with them to the grave; out of nine hundred there were scarce sixty-five men taken, some who were but slightly wounded got back to Troppau, the remainder all lay dead in their ranks. They might have answered with a certain Spaniard, after the battle of Rocroi to one who asked how strong they had been; *as many as you find killed or wounded*. Upon the whole no fault can be imputed either to the Prussian troops or their commanders; they did every thing that a man can expect in such circumstances, from brave men and skilful officers. But the enemy was so vastly superior to them, he had all the advantage of the ground so intirely on his side, and fortune favoured his whole enterprize in such a manner, that the escorte might wholly perish, but
could

could not possibly come off victorious. Nothing moreover is easier than to disperse a convoy, and even to destroy it, either in whole or in part, if the assailants only know how to profit in any degree by their advantages, even though they should not be commanded by a Laudohn or a Ziskowitz; a train of three thousand four wheeled waggons, even if no stop or accident happens but all keep close together, takes up at least the space of four German miles, if as commonly happens in a mountainous country, they cannot proceed but in a single file. But suppose we allow ten thousand men for the escorte, and admit that the commanding officer is able to make the waggons drive four abreast, which reduces the line of march to one mile, his troops also will be disposed of along this space; I will take it for granted they are divided into three parts, three thousand for the advanced guard, three thousand in the center, and three thousand to cover the rear, the remaining one thousand shall be dispersed in platoons all along the convoy, by this disposition the three divisions will still be half a mile distant from each other. Suppose now the enemy has only six thousand men, he will still be considerably superior to each division, and if he only attacks one of them with vigour, he must in all probability cut it in pieces before the others can come to its assistance, (which would take up a full hour) or else his troops must be good for nothing. Without letting myself go here into an enumeration of all the advantages he may draw from the nature of the ground, from making various false attacks, from ambuscades, &c. in short to describe the case in one word, he always is the assailant, and his opponent must confine himself to a mere defensive, and that without daring to hazard himself in the least from his convoy, which he must always be at hand to succour. While this successful enterprise was carrying on, Marshal Daun was not without apprehensions

ensions lest the whole project should miscarry. For as his reputation and the confidence he had hitherto acquired with his sovereign, depended upon his relieving Olmutz, he came to the resolution of drawing as near as possible to this town with his army. The better to conceal his views, he shewed himself about nine o'clock in the morning of the twenty-ninth, with a strong corps on the other side Prosnitz, and made as if he would attack that town; during this time General Buccow gave an alarm to Ziethen's hussars near Kosteletz; the king immediately took Lattorf's regiment and marched that way, leaving orders with several battalions of the left wing, to hold themselves in readiness to follow him in case the enemy should penetrate further. Werner's hussars, who were supported by the dragoons, Young Platen and Czettritz as soon as they came in sight of the enemy, rushed upon him, broke into his ranks sword in hand, and made about sixty prisoners. But the Field Marshal intending merely to reconnoitre, would not suffer himself to be drawn into any thing serious, and withdrew into his camp. On hearing that a very strong body of the enemy was posted near Tebitschau, the king detached lieutenant general Seidlitz with some hundred dragoons and hussars, to acquaint himself of the truth of this intelligence. He found, however, nothing but hussars, of whom he brought back a few prisoners. Towards evening came the flugel adjutant Beville, detached by colonel Mosel to head-quarters, who informed the king that this convoy, after that the escorte had repulsed the enemy, had reached the half way between Bautsch and Domstädtl, and that general Ziethen was on his march, with intention to join colonel Mosel. This intelligence was the more agreeable to the king, as he might now with greater probability hope that the convoy would arrive without any further molestation; for the march of general Ziskowitz was totally unknown to him, so perfectly did mere accident by a most singular caprice of
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of fortune, favour the project of the Austrian general, and give to all his false demonstrations the appearance of reality. And now Daun being observed on the following day wholly employed in strengthening his camp with redoubts, and various other field works; it was conjectured that having without doubt learnt the check general Laudohn had received, he sought by these precautions to put his troops in a situation to give the king a warm reception in the expected attack; and indeed this conjecture had such a degree of probability in it, that it would have been difficult to have any otherwise accounted for the Marshal's views. He however had in the mean time caused several bridges to be thrown over the Morava, between Kremfir and Kogetin; and in the night of the thirtieth of June to the first of July broke up his camp at Dobromielitz in the most profound silence, passed the river with his army, and accelerated his march to such a degree, that he arrived towards the evening on the heights between Gros Teinitz and Checkowitz, about half a mile from Olmütz, having made that day a march of more than five miles. Moreover, lest the king having any intelligence of these movements, should take measures to interrupt them, the Marshal had drawn his chain of trusty light troops very close together, so that it was impossible for any deserter to penetrate it, and general Buccow, who with a corps of four or five thousand light troops had been left behind at Ptin to keep up the communication with general Jahnus, who was posted at Konitz, had orders to fall on Ziethen's hussars near Kosteletz, at two in the morning on the first of July, to draw the king's attention on that side; he was however driven back with loss by some infantry, who had occupied a hollow way which he must pass. The out posts sent in word that the Austrian army had left their camp, and soon after the fatal news arrived that the convoy had at last, after a bloody engagement, been for the greater part cut off. Marshal Keith, who heard this sooner than the king, but supposed that general Ziethen might still hold out,

out, detached that same morning general Retzow with seven battalions and fifteen squadrons to Gibau to extricate him, but the blow was already struck; general Retzow could penetrate no farther than Dolein, where he was informed of all the circumstances of the affair; he marched back therefore without having accomplished his object; and as he arrived in his old camp near Bistrowan, discovered the whole of the enemy's army on the heights of Gros Teinitz, on which he passed the bridge of boats near Holitz that same evening, and joined Marshal Keith, who had already received the battalions that came back with general Krokow, and the miserable remnant of the convoy. As soon as all had passed, the bridge was broken down.

Marshal Daun not having been able to force the king to change his strong camp, nor effectually to interrupt the progress of the siege, and desirous to avoid a battle, determined to pass the Morava and approach Olmutz, so near as to open a communication between it and the army, which of course would force the enemy to raise the siege without running the risk of a general action; accordingly on the thirtieth of June at night, the army began its march which lasted all that night, and almost the whole day following, being forty miles, very near the enemy, and through a difficult country, a river, and several bridges to pass, and late on the first of July, took its camp near a village called Gros-Teinitz. The Prussians were informed of this march so late, that they could not prevent, nor even interrupt it. This very extraordinary march, the position of the Austrians and the scarcity of stores and provisions, occasioned by the loss of the great convoy, forced the king to raise the siege immediately, to prevent further misfortunes, which very probably might ensue if his Majesty persisted in his enterprize now rendered impossible, as the Marshal, if he lost time, would concert such measures as would make his retreat very difficult. Accordingly the same night the siege was raised without loss, excepting a cannon or two, whose carriages were broke, the whole army marched off before day break in two divisions; the main army under the king directed its course by Gewitsch to Marisch Tribau, the corps which besieged Olmutz under Marshal Keith went by Littau, and Muglitz to Tribau. People ignorant of the circumstances in which the king was, wondered he had chosen this route rather than that which leads to Troppau, only forty miles off; he was forced to choose the former preferable to the latter, because the Austrians under generals Laudohn, Ziskowitz, Jahnus and St. Ignon, were masters of this, with about sixteen thousand men, who in a country

July.

• The author speaks of English miles sixty-nine to a degree.

extremely favourable for the operations of corps, and light troops in particular, could effectually interrupt his march, and give Marshal Daun an opportunity to attack him in his retreat, with every possible advantage.

Secondly, the forage on that road, as well as in upper Silesia, was intirely exhausted, and little or nothing in the camp, whereas by marching through Bohemia towards Königingratz, he avoided the former difficulties, and moreover took several magazines which the Austrians had collected in that country, and left unguarded, not suspecting the king would march that way, though on the least reflection they would have seen he could not take any other for the above mentioned reasons.

A body of Austrians marched on the right of Marshal Keith's column, and took some horses and waggons. The other column under the king, who had marched by Konitz to Tyrnau, and from thence by Krenau and Zwittau to Leitomischel, where the Van under prince Maurice arrived the fifth, and the main army the day following; general baron Buccow with a considerable corps, marched on the left of the king's column, he took post at Oppatowitz, from whence he sent detachments towards Zwittau, to break up the roads and by that means interrupt, and retard the march of the enemy; which obliged him to deviate a little from the main road, but did not at least prevent him from accomplishing his march to Zwittau as he had projected.

The Austrian generals Buscow, Laudhon, St. Ignon and Ziskowitz, with a very considerable corps, accompanied the enemy in his march, some between the right column and the frontiers of Glatz, some on the left to cover Bohemia, others followed; nothing however was done to interrupt it, much less to stop it effectually.

Marshal Daun having visited Olmutz on the fourth, passed the Morava and encamped on the hills near Drahanowitz; on the sixth, the

the Van consisting of grenadiers and carabiniers under count Lacy then quarter master general, advanced to Konitz to mark a camp for the army, which arrived there the day following, and on the next morning continued its march to Gewitsch. General Lacy with his corps always preceded the army a day's march to mark the camp for it, and then proceeded to reconnoitre the country and procure intelligence further on, so as to be able to proceed next day to mark a new camp; which method is excellent, it secures the march of the army, and gives time for any disposition which circumstances may require. In this course he discovered Marshal Keith's rear, marching from Tribau through Krenau, resolved to attack it, and drove the Prussians out of the village; upon which they halted and formed beyond the village, and brought up some cannon; the action (if it deserve that name) lasted from eleven o'clock, till night, what the loss on either side may have been, is not material. The Prussians by stopping the enemy the whole day, got time to arrive in safety to Zwittau, and thereby accomplished the end which they had in view, whereas the Austrians acquired no advantage at all.

On the ninth, Marshal Daun marched in two columns to Politschka, where the army arrived very late, the road being mountainous, and near fifteen miles. The same day the king came towards Hohemauth, but finding some passes occupied by general Laudohn, he encamped short of that place, so let the baggage proceed and followed the next day.

The tenth the Austrian main army remained at Politschka, while the king proceeded to Hollitz, and on the eleventh, arrived at Königgratz. On this day Marshal Keith who commanded the rear, left Leitomischel, passed by Hohemauth and encamped at Hollitz, the Austrians advanced the same day towards Leitomischel, hoping to find Marshal Keith there, but he was gone, so they camped between that place and Politschka; the gros of the Prussian army which had remained at Hollitz, marched to join the king at Königgratz.

General Retzow who commanded the rear of this corps, and escorted the artillery and provisions, set out about twelve o'clock, was attacked by general Laudohn near a village called Wlezkowitz, and forced to return towards Hollitz, and occupy some high ground near that village, and then parked his convoy, having put fire to some houses at Wlezkowitz, probably for a signal that he was attacked. When the Austrians had collected all the forces they had in the neighbourhood, Count St. Ignon with several battallions of grenadiers, and a regiment of dragoons, attacked the Prussian cavalry which he beat, and followed beyond the enemy's artillery and baggage, by which means it was thrown into disorder, which might have been fatal, as the Prussians were again in order, had not general Laudohn advanced with the infantry and cannon, which gave St. Ignon time to collect his men, and put them in order. The Austrians had taken three standards, and several pieces of artillery, which they were forced to abandon, because Marshal Keith appeared with the remainder of the rear guard, and the king also with a considerable body of troops, upon which the Austrians retired to their former stations, both parties lost a considerable number of men; the Prussians resumed their march without being interrupted, and consequently now as at the affair of Krenau had the advantage.

The garrison of Troppau, and what escaped of the convoy which was interrupted in going to Olmutz, quitted the former place and went to Neifs; on which general de Ville, who had been left in Moravia, advanced towards upper Silesia. The king being arrived on the eleventh, as we have said at Königsgratz, found general Buccow endeavouring to transport the magazines which the Austrians had there, who withdrew the small garrison, passed the Elbe, and took post on the other side at Chlumetz, without being able to accomplish their purpose, for a great part of the magazine fell into the hands of the Prussians, part of their army soon after
marched

marched to the frontiers of the county of Glatz, but the principal part of it remained encamped in two lines near Königsgratz, from whence detachments were sent out on every side to collect forage.

On the twelfth, Marshal Daun quitted his camp at Sebranitz, and marched to Hohemauth, the fifteenth the army advanced to Krockow-Teynetsch between the former place and Pardubitz.

General Jahnus who had made part of general Buccow's corps, was ordered to Königshoff on the Elbe, to observe the road to Trautenau on the Prussians right, whilst general Laudohn was posted at Hopotchna on their left. He was afterwards attacked in that post, and forced to abandon it. The king took up his head quarters there, with part of his army, the rest remained still at Königsgratz, and raised some works, which seemed to indicate an intention of staying there for some time.

Marshal Daun therefore thought it necessary to advance nearer the enemy, and on the eighteenth his army passed the Elbe at Pardubitz, and took an advantageous camp beyond it, between Libischan and Wossitz, the head quarters at Dobrezenitz in sight of Königsgratz; general Buccow and his corps joined the army here; some days afterwards the army marched on the left, so that it came between Urbanitz and Chlom.

The Prussians occupied the road which goes to Glatz, with small corps to protect the convoys which went to and from that place to their army, which they did effectually, for general Laudohn never could intercept the smallest part of them, though he often attempted it; the king returned to Königsgratz, leaving however, two camps at Lewin and Reinertz.

The twenty-fifth, the Prussians drew their equipages out of Königsgratz into their camp, and destroyed their ovens, which indicated they proposed quitting the country; accordingly on the twenty-sixth, they left Königsgratz and marched towards Neustadt, all the corps
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
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on the right and left, under generals Laudohn, Jahnus, &c. followed, and the Van of the main army under general Lacy, but could make no impression on the enemy. The corps under general Ziskowitz and St. Ignon, joined the main army, which marched out the thirtieth, and took its camp behind the Elbe, with the right at Rodow and the left at Ertina opposite Jaromitz, and the head quarters at Hertzmanitz, the Van at Smirschitz, with some grenadiers beyond the Elbe; on the thirty-first the king made a motion as if he intended going by Trautenau into Silesia, which made Marshal Daun take such a position as would interrupt him, and perhaps prevent it. General Laudohn who was on and behind the enemy's left, was ordered to quit that station, pass the Elbe, repass it above Jaromitz, and post himself at Welsdorf near the road which leads from Konigshoff to Trautenau; the same day the army made a motion on its left, so that the right came to Ertina, and the left on the hills by Kaschow to the wood near Kukus, the head quarters continued at Hertzmanitz.

August.

On the third of August the Prussians left Neustadt, and camped at Klein Skalitz; General Laudohn passed the road to Trautenau, and took post at Horzitzka, from whence he advanced to attack a Prussian post on a hill which covered their right, and after much blood spilt on both sides, retired; it being so near the enemy, it could not be forced entirely, nor indeed could Laudohn have occupied it long if he had succeeded.

On the fourth the Prussians marched to Nachod, and the fifth in two columns, the one to Starckstadt, and the other to Politz, on the road to Braunau.

On the seventh, the first went by Friedland into Silesia, and the other camped at Wiese, and the corps under general Fouquet took post at Wünschelburg. These different motions were performed (though in a very close and mountainous country), without any loss; notwithstanding

notwithstanding several thousand light troops attempted to interrupt them. General Laudohn, whose corps consisted of above ten thousand men, was ordered to Arnau, and from thence to precede the army, and make the van of it; and on the eighth, advanced to Hohen Elbe. Thus ended this memorable transaction, which deserves to be examined minutely, because it will furnish an example for such as may be employed on similar occasions.

A List of the Austrian Forces under Marshal Daun on the second of August, one thousand seven hundred and fifty-eight.

FIRST LINE.			SECOND LINE.		
Archduke Joseph's dragoons	6	} Squad.	Bathyany dragoons	-	6
Lowenstein dragoons	6		Archduke Leopold	-	6
Serbelloni cuirassiers	—		Stampach cuirassiers	-	6
Giulai ditto	—		Anhalt Zerbst	-	6
	24				24
Emperor	1	} bat.	Prince Charles of Lorraine	1	
Saxe Hildburghausen	2		Waldeck	—	2
Botta	2		Leopold Daun	—	2
Königseck	1		Keuhl	—	2
Palfy	2		Andlau	—	1
Clerici	2		Thierheim	—	2
Old Wolfenbüttel	2		Joseph Esterhazi	—	2
Deutschmeister	2		Bathyany	—	2
Brown	2		Forgatsch	—	2
Bayreuth	2		Puebla	—	2
Bethlem	1		Mercy	—	2
Stahrenberg	1				20
Old Colorado	1				
	21				

Odonell	—	6	} squad.	Anspach cuirassiers	—	6
Schmerzing	—	6		Archduke Ferdinand	—	6
Württemberg dragoons	—	6		Deuxponts dragoons	—	6
Darmstadt	—	6				—
		24				18

Kollowrath	—	1	} bat.	Geisruck	—	2
Molk	—	2		Y. Wolfenbüttel	—	2
Los Rios	—	1		Harrach	—	2
Archduke Charles	—	2				—
		6				6

Corps of Reserve.

Henry Daun	—	2	} bat.	Harfch	—	2
Ligni and Arbi	—	2		Baden Baden	—	2
Pallavicini	—	1		Wallis	—	2
Luzany	—	2		Neuperg	—	2
Durlach	—	1	} bat.			
Wiedt	—	2		Benedict Daun	—	6
Mayence	—	1		Kollowrath	—	6
Wurtzburg	—	1		Birkenfeldt	—	6
Aremberg	—	2	} squad.	Althan dragoons	—	6
				Kollowrath dragoons	—	6

Besides twelve battalions of grenadiers, and the carabineer corps, besides Croats, hussars, and other light troops, and besides the detached corps.

Reflections on the Siege of Olmutz, and the different Operations which were executed on that Occasion.

IT is evident that no operation, whether military or mechanical, can be performed, unless the men employed are provided with

with the instruments and materials necessary for the work intended; have their subsistence secured, and perfect safety, that they may prosecute their work without danger or interruption. In treating of a siege, we have said in the preceding part of this work, that previous to opening the trenches, a general should have in his camp, if possible, the artillery stores and provisions ready prepared, and particularly if his line of operation is of any considerable length, and the enemy has an army in the field, otherwise bad weather, and the attacks he must expect continually from the enemy, will render the arrival of his convoys precarious, slow, and uncertain. The greatest part of his army must be employed in escorts, patrols, &c. whereas it should be employed either in carrying on the siege, or in protecting those who do; so that the work may proceed regularly, and as quick as possible, for all delays are dangerous, and always turn to the advantage of the enemy of course: too many men, and too great a quantity of artillery, can never be employed.

In order to protect as much as possible those employed in the siege, experience has taught the necessity of lines of contravallation and circumvallation, which ought never to be omitted, if the garrison is strong and moreover the enemy has any army in the field. This enables you to carry on your operation without interruption, and greatly diminishes the labour of your troops. I do not mean that you should wait for the enemy within your lines, by no means; the army which covers the siege, must meet the enemy in the field, always at such a distance that in case you are beat, you have time to withdraw your troops, and artillery, as the king at Kollin, which could not have been done, had the battle been fought within a league or two of Prague. At the siege of Olmutz, the king neglected every precaution; insomuch, that the place was never properly invested, and of course the besieged several times received succours of various kinds unperceived, which

which besides its real use gives great encouragement to the garrison, and diminishes the hopes and confidence of the besiegers. When we consider that the enemy's light troops, very numerous, got immediately between Olmutz and Troppau, from whence every thing came to the army, and Monsieur de Ville was with a strong body of horse between the first place and Brinn, from whence detachments were continually sent beyond the Morava, which often defeated his majesty's posts, and always interrupted the progress of the siege, while Laudohn and his light troops acted day and night on his line of operation, and attacked his convoys. Thus the two capital points (I mean his subsistence and the safety of those who conducted the siege) being totally neglected, he was forced to raise it, which would have happened even had Marshal Daun had no army in the field, for I am convinced that Marshal Laudohn alone at the head of twenty thousand light troops, acting upon the king's line near forty miles long, in a country peculiarly adapted to the operations of such troops, would have forced his majesty to abandon it, and indeed this General and Ziskowitz, with two detachments of about twelve thousand men, did perform this work; for Marshal Daun did not act himself, but only placed himself so, that he might protect and support those who did. Moreover the king had by no means a sufficient quantity of artillery, seventy pieces is nothing against a good place and a good garrison, he should have had three times as much; despatch is every thing on such occasions. The post the king occupied at Prosnitz, was of all others the most improper, as it left his rear and his line with Troppau, quite naked and defenceless, and exposed to be continually insulted; whereas if he had camped with his main army at Mährisch Tribau, with two corps, one at Landscron and the other at Zittau, Marshal Daun could not have sent his light troops on the road towards Troppau, and must have changed his position, and by a round-about march, to avoid fighting, endeavoured to place himself between Olmutz and Brinn;

then the post of Prosnitz would have been good, whereas it was of no use, while Marshal Daun was at Leitomischel; on the contrary it enabled that General to employ his light troops with every advantage possible, and at last brought on the loss of the convoy, which was a decisive event, and alone would have forced his majesty to raise the siege. Posted as the Prussians were, they were surrounded by the enemy's parties, who penetrated wherever they pleased, and of course interrupted the operations of the siege; no army however numerous posted in detachments round a place, can invest it effectually; it must occupy nine or ten miles of ground, and if it formed a chain, which cannot be done, the enemy by making some false attacks, will get through it in twenty different places, and even by day force any part in spite of you; the circular form of such a chain, makes it every where weak, and no part can be abandoned to support those which are attacked. If therefore the enemy has any force at all in the field, a siege cannot be carried on unless the place is surrounded by good lines, and though this is a truth demonstrated by experience, and the examples of all great men, we find the king of Prussia always neglected this necessary precaution; we also find that he is not successful, for whenever any real attempt was made to raise a siege formed by him, it succeeded, and always will; even lines are often forced, because the communication between the different parts of them, is intersected by the cannon of the place, to a great distance, and very often by rivers, and other obstacles, so that the troops which guard them, must remain where they are; whereas the enemy's motions are free, so that he can bring a greater number to act in different points, than those who are confined within the lines. Hence it is that if they are accessible in many parts, and the enemy is provided with fascines, he will penetrate somewhere; you are too near the town to fall back and form again, on some advantageous ground, the troops to the right and left are taken in flank, and you must fly as you can. For which reasons

reasons no attempt should ever be made to defend lines, if they are at all accessible in many or all their parts, yet they are absolutely necessary if you besiege a place, and the enemy has an army in the field.

I suppose prince Henry's army was weak, otherwise it would seem, that if instead of going to Franconia, to raise contributions he had entered Bohemia, such an enterprize would have facilitated the king's operations before Olmutz; this is only a surmise, it is possible he was afraid of leaving Saxony, lest the army of the empire should force the passes behind him; his army was small no doubt, for we find he could not prevent the army of the empire taking Pirna and Sonnenstein in his presence.

The situation in which the king was, at the beginning of the campaign, made it necessary to take Schweidnitz, to prevent the enemy from entering Silesia on that side, and advance as in the foregoing year to Breslaw; but the siege of Olmutz was a rash and inconsiderate operation, which if successful would have proved disadvantageous to him, because he could not preserve it, unless he left there an army, and then only till winter, when the Austrians would have retaken it; no place isolated which you cannot preserve ought to be besieged unless to destroy it, because you will lose your garrison; moreover the king having many and powerful enemies in the field, and no men to spare in garrison, he ought to have collected all his forces for the field, and wait the moment it was necessary to act, and not act till then; more than two thirds of his army were new levies; he should have brought them into the field only when necessary, taken time to form them, and not expose them raw, as they were, to the hard labours which necessarily attends a siege; by doing otherwise an epidemical distemper seized them, and destroyed a prodigious number, insomuch, that the corps under Marshal Keith, which should have sixteen thousand men compleat, was reduced to less than half that number, which accounts for his

very

very slow progress; he had not a sufficient number of men, nor half artillery enough; he had but one attack, and that so weak, that during the whole siege, the fire of the place was superior to his, and after near forty days work, he was as far from taking the place as the first day; the nearer he approached it, the more certain his loss, while the enemy's fire was superior, and in my opinion, he must in the end have fallen back, until his fire was stronger, and perhaps abandoned the enterprise totally. People grow tired in a long siege, grow impatient, right or wrong will advance, this brings on heavy calamities, because you cannot advance with safety, but step by step, and in proportion as your fire increases, and that of the place diminishes. This is the reason why you must raise your first batteries at a distance, though perhaps favoured by the ground, it might be done much nearer, but it must not be done, for if the enemy's fire is strong, he will kill you many men, and in an hour destroy what you have been forty in doing. The event of this enterprise, and the cause which produced it, (I mean the taking of the convoy) confirms the doctrine we established in the preceding volume, which is, that a fortress, constructed with a view to cover the country, should be placed at a considerable distance from the frontier, and not close to it, because in the first case it enables you to act on the enemy's line of operation, which is the only method you have to retard the enemy's progress, with safety and success, for it is by no means adviseable to risk a general action. Whereas if it is placed close to the frontier, and of course the enemy's line is short and easily defended, you cannot act upon it, you must fight or let the place be taken in your presence; we shall conclude our observation, by saying that the king did no one thing, which should have been done. He abandoned his line of operation to the mercy of the enemy; he never invested the place, so that it received succours of different kinds during the whole siege; he had not artillery or stores, provisions, &c. sufficient; his army was not

not strong enough to carry on the siege, and to occupy a hundred different posts, which was done ineffectually, and harrassed his men so much that they became extremely sickly, and he lost many men. He neglected every precaution, as if the enemy had no army in the field, and that the garrison consisted only of a few hundred men, and the place a bicoque; for which reason he deservedly failed in his enterprise, which cost him many men, and much time and treasure.

When we compare his conduct with that of Marshal Daun, we shall find such rules for the conduct of generals, in similar occasions, as may serve hereafter for guides, certain and infallible.

The result of the king's conduct shews what is to be done by a general who undertakes a siege, for by neglecting it he miscarried.

That of Marshal Daun will furnish no less certain rules for a general who dares not risk a battle, and indeed ought not, but where every other means to stop the progress of the enemy fail, and is however commanded to do it.

Marshal Daun's army was almost composed of recruits; the few veterans dismayed by the unfortunate conclusion of last campaign. It was dangerous to approach the enemy, moreover, he expected considerable reinforcements from Flanders, Italy, &c. For which reason he wished to be forgot and neglected by the enemy; he was so, and therefore he continued a long time at Leitomischel. This position was strong, and so far off, that the king could not leave the neighbourhood of Olmutz, and go after Daun. The position of the Austrian forces while the king was at Olmutz, was as follows: The main army under Daun at Leitomischel, fifty English miles from Olmutz; General de Ville, with a strong corps, had been left in Moravia; upon the approach of the Prussians he retired gradually to Olmutz, and being pushed threw all his infantry into that place, and retired with his cavalry, step by step, towards Briinn, from whence he sent detachments over the Morava, which under Count

St.

St. Ignon did much and important services, as we have seen. On the left of the main army, and advanced before it, on the side of Glatz, was placed general Harsch, with a strong corps, and beyond this all the light troops which advanced occasionally to the road which leads from Troppau to Olmutz, and consequently covered the country on that side against the enemy's parties, and moreover alarmed his posts continually, and often intercepted and always interrupted his convoys; to which chiefly must be attributed the very slow progress of the siege, which was finally raised by their taking and destroying the great convoy, which must have happened though Marshal Daun had not interfered. This illustrious general who left nothing to chance, nor did a wrong thing when permitted to follow his own judgment, resolved to come nearer the enemy, when his own army was in a condition to meet him, and when his adversary's forces were greatly diminished, and scattered about the country to defend posts which he could not defend; accordingly he quitted his post at Zwittau, and in four days march through a most difficult country, arrived the seventeenth of June at Evannowitz, within ten miles of the enemy, without his having the least knowledge of it. This fine and vigorous operation, performed with wonderful wisdom and activity, was in itself decisive; for though the enemy had been provided with stores, provisions, &c. he could not possibly have carried on the siege with an army in front, a strong place in the rear, and his communication with Silesia cut off, inasmuch that a cart could not come from thence, unless escorted by a strong body of troops; and even this precaution was not sufficient, the place was not invested, or rather was absolutely open on the left of the Morava, so that nothing hindered the Marshal from throwing what succours he pleased into it. The proximity of the Marshal drew the king's attention that way, which enabled the Austrians to destroy the convoy, as we have seen. The Marshal not content with this decisive success,

success, resolved to put an end to the business, and in two more marches performed in the presence, and within reach of the king, passed the Morava, and encamped within cannon shot of the town; and if in that very night the king had not raised the siege and decamped, it is probable the Marshal would have taken such measures as to render the king's retreat difficult, and perhaps impracticable, which I suppose determined him to go off as soon as possible.

The column under Marshal Keith, where the artillery and equipage were, was conducted with uncommon wisdom, and defended, when attacked, with great vigour. On his coming to Zwittau he was forced to take the same road the king had done. It seems strange and contrary to all rules that Marshal Keith's column should march last. The king the second day should have taken some very strong camp, and ordered Marshal Keith's division to make the van of the whole, while his majesty, with the greatest part of his army, should have made the rear; and as on all such occasions, distributed his troops in echellons, so that they might support each other when attacked, and march thus separated, with the more celerity, which is the point to be aimed at in a retreat.

This retreat, like all others we hear of, was executed with success, for this simple reason. It was not interrupted by any serious and powerful attack, which is now the common practice. For my part, I should upon such an occasion pursue the enemy with my whole army, and attack one or other of his columns with my principal force, while the remainder should be employed in harassing the others. This nonchalance is the more reprehensible, as in acting with vigour you risk nothing. The enemy cannot remain on the spot, he must retire, he must fight if you please, or abandon his equipage, and part of his army, and run away. Whereas you may bring on a general action, or not, as you like, he cannot force *you*. It will be said that Marshal Daun ought not to risk an action, because he knew the enemy must

soon be obliged to retire, and be called elsewhere. I grant all this, but it is nothing to the purpose; for he might have fought him as long as he pleased, without being forced to fight a battle, which in such cases is by no means necessary; you may by partial, though vigorous attacks, ruin an enemy, or force him to abandon his artillery, equipage, &c. I beg leave to recommend to the Reader's perusal, what I have wrote on this subject in my preceding volume.

C H A P. II.

Of the Operations of the Russian Army commanded by General Fermor.

IN the preceding volume, we gave an account of the retreat of the Russians into Poland, which gave General Lewald an opportunity to march with his army to Pomerania to oppose the Swedes, and having beat them, to assist the king in Saxony, leaving in Prussia only two battalions and fifty hussars, who retired also into Pomerania, on the approach of the Russians, who with about thirty thousand men in the month of January, took possession of all Prussia, which the king found it impossible to defend at so very great a distance against a powerful enemy almost on the frontier of it, and so very properly abandoned it. By thus concentrating his forces, he could with more ease and facility oppose the various armies, with which he was surrounded, and upon any particular occasion collect a sufficient force to stop their progress, whereas if he persisted in defending Prussia, a powerful army would be necessary, and this he could not spare.

March. The Russians remained quiet during the months of January and February. In March a considerable corps advanced into Poland and took possession of Elbing and Thorn, on the Vistula, a necessary measure, in order to secure a passage over that river, and also to form magazines,

magazines, which might easily be collected in such a corn country as Poland, and brought there by water carriage, a thing of the utmost importance, and particularly where the roads on the falling of a shower of rain become impassable. In order to accelerate what might be thought necessary, the General, Count Fermor took up his head quarters at Marienwerder on the ninth of March; the army remained in quarters till May: about the end of this month the troops approached May. the Vistula and passed the river near Dirschau; the division commanded by Count Romanzow, encamped near Conitz, who sent a strong detachment under Major General Demiscow towards the New March and Pomerania in order to raise contributions, which orders he executed without mercy, carrying off what he could, and destroying the rest, if credit may be given to what has been wrote on the subject. The tenth of June, the army marched to Conitz, where the whole June. assembled and General Demiscow was again detached with three thousand hussars and two thousand grenadiers on horseback towards a town called Kazimirberg in Pomerania, which was taken and plundered as well as the whole country, where the Cossacks could penetrate and then retired again into Poland. The twenty-eighth of June, the army left Conitz, and on the first of July arrived at Posen on the Wartha, while Count Romanzow marched into Pomerania and the New March. The approach of such a powerful army, whose detachments run along the right of the Oder from the frontiers of Silesia through Brandenburg and Pomerania and spread terror and desolation wherever they came, made it necessary to oppose an army to curb, and if possible stop their progress; accordingly the king ordered that which the year before had been in Prussia under Marshal Lewald, and was now in Swedish Pomerania commanded by Count Dohna to march against the Russian main army. Lieutenant General Canitz preceded with a strong vanguard, a body of Russians under General Demiscow made an attempt against Driesen but was repulsed by Colonel Count Huerd. The same day (tenth of July) the Russian army advanced to Mied- July.

zyrycz, and immediately sent a strong corps provided with artillery, &c. to attack Driesen again, while a detachment was placed at Neübruck to intercept the garrison in its retreat. The Russians having taken the place followed the garrison to Friedberg where they attacked them, the greatest part of the garrison was composed of Austrians, who on seeing the Russians cried Vivat Maria Theresia, and joined them; the remainder composed of militia defended themselves extremely well and made good their retreat to Landsberg on the Wartha.

August. In the mean time Count Romanzow was advanced to Stargard and General Resanow to Stolpe, with a view to secure the communication with the Oder.

The chief object the Russians had, was the taking of Custrin, which they hoped might be done before the arrival of the king, who they knew was coming from Silesia with considerable succours to join Count Dohna's army which lay encamped near Frankfort. Custrin is small but very strong from its situation on the Oder, which joins the Wartha there, this river is very deep, and rapid in its course, being narrow; it is surrounded by a morass, through which is raised a wad or a dam by which alone you can approach it on that side. It communicates with the country beyond the Oder, by a bridge of timber, at the head of which is a fauxbourg, but no outwork I believe at all, which is a great fault, for had there been a good one, the Russians could not have come near enough to bombard the town, which laid it in ashes. It had at this time a strong garrison commanded by a brave man, Colonel Schach de Wittenau.

On the fifteenth of August a detachment of Russians followed by the whole army approached the town, and immediately without opening the trenches, or raising any breastwork or regular batteries to cover the cannon, or men that serve them, in open field began to throw bombs, which in a few hours laid it in ashes, but neither did nor could in the least hurt the ramparts, and produced no other effect than the ruin of many thousand people, and wounded three soldiers.

The

The third day only General Fermor thought it necessary to summons the town to surrender, which should have been done before he bombarded it, threatening to take it by storm, if they did not give up the place; this message was in the highest degree ridiculous, the Oder was to be got over without a bridge or even a boat. Not one single shot had been directed against the works, consequently no breach made, nor one cannon dismounted. How his Excellency proposed taking the place by storm, we leave it to his friends to explain.

On the twenty-second of August, the king with very considerable reinforcements from Silesia, and two regiments of horse from Saxony, arrived at Count Dohna's army, and on the day following passed the Oder below Custrin at Gustebiese; this obliged the Russians to raise the siege and take another position. The corps brought from Russia under General Broome, and that which had lain before Custrin joined the army; on the twenty-fourth the king advanced nearer the Russians, and on the twenty-fifth a general action ensued, the most bloody of any which happened during this very active war; which goes by the name of the battle of Zorndorff, a village on the field of battle. We shall give the different accounts.

Account published by the Russians.

IN obedience to the king's command I left Custrin, and on the twenty-fourth, found our army encamped at Darmutzel, that of the enemy was formed with the right at Zicker, and the left at Quartschen, and Zorndorff behind it, between two and three in the morning we advanced over the Mikel a small river, and proceeded through the wood called Massin, and the village Batzlow into a plain, where the columns opened and extended as far as Zorndorff, by which means we were exactly behind the enemy. We expected that this manœuvre would have thrown them into confusion, but we were mistaken, as the ground on which they stood was not sufficiently extensive, they formed in four lines, making front every way which was protected by a numerous artillery, and chivaux de frize, their right flank.

flank was covered by the village Zicker, behind which was their cavalry posted in the plain; prince Maurice under the king commanded our first line, General Manteufel the left of the infantry, and General Seidlitz the cavalry of the same wing; the infantry supported by the artillery attacked the villages, these were followed by two thousand two hundred grenadiers; but about eleven o'clock, when we saw the enemy preparing to withdraw the artillery, these grenadiers from whence much was expected, without any visible cause, run away, at least one thousand paces before they could be stopped. This made a great opening in the line, which left the flanks of both infantry and cavalry quite unprotected, of which the enemy's cavalry tried to avail themselves, but without success; first, by doing it too late, and secondly, that General Seidlitz, notwithstanding the ground was close and difficult, advanced at the head of the cavalry, which checked that of the enemy, and gave our infantry time to rally behind it; the king informed of the flight of the grenadiers, ordered three regiments of infantry, two battalions of grenadiers, five squadrons of dragoons, five of gens d'armes, and three of garde de corps to advance and assist them. At twelve o'clock the attack was renewed, and General Seidlitz having thrown the enemy's cavalry into confusion, took their infantry in flank, and our infantry at the same time supported by forty pieces of cannon, advanced and drove the enemy out of the village Zorndorff, where they found the baggage and military chest, in which was about eighty thousand rubles, (about one hundred and sixty thousand pounds); notwithstanding the disorder which prevailed in the enemy's right, they would not abandon their ground, which occasioned a great slaughter among them. While we thought ourselves sure of the victory, we observed the remainder of their right wing, and their reserve form again at Quartfchen. We advanced and attacked the enemy again, and after a vigorous onset, forced him to retire and quit his ground, and at sun-set the battle was finished; his defeat would have been complet

complete and total, had not one of the enemy's Generals (Demiscow) towards the evening, with a body of chosen men, advanced against our right, and though he lost the greatest part of his men, he got however time for their infantry to retire towards our left, and during the night to take another position, where the whole army was collected and united; we remained under arms during that night. The next morning, the twenty-sixth, we cannonaded each other; the twenty-seventh the enemy seemed inclined to fight another battle, but instead of advancing they marched towards the road which leads to Landsberg. As it was impossible for them to reach that city in our presence, so they turned towards Wietz, and camped between that village and the river Wartha, which was very wrong, as they had no bridge to pass it, nor could they subsist long there. Our loss, considering so great a victory, is very moderate, and consists of about thirty officers killed, eighty wounded, seven hundred and sixty men killed, one thousand three hundred and seventy-two wounded, and three hundred and fifty missing. Whereas the enemy's loss is about twenty thousand men; we took above twelve thousand prisoners, among which are five generals, and sixty officers of different ranks. The reason of our small loss compared with that of the enemy is, that their artillery was ill served, and the men not expert in the use of their arms. The men are however strong and brave, a shot through the body does not hinder them from continuing the fight; we have moreover taken one hundred and four cannons, twelve mortars, twenty-seven pair of colours, five standards, &c.

From this account nothing more can be collected, than that the Prussians left wing attacked the enemy's right, was repulsed, but at length drove it out of the field, after an action which lasted from near ten in the morning till six in the evening, and not till sun-set as the Writer says. The victory, such as it was, was entirely owing to the cavalry, under whose protection the repulsed infantry rallied, and at length

length after the cavalry had driven that of the enemy back, and attacked his infantry in flank, they advanced, renewed the attack, and drove him out of the field.

As I have the greatest veneration for the king of Prussia's abilities, it is with diffidence I presume to offer my opinion on his conduct; however I must ask, why, after the enemy's right was totally beat as it is said, and forced to abandon the field, he did not send some troops after them to prevent their rallying, and with the remainder of his army attack their center in flank and rear, while his right attacked their left? This would in all probability have produced their total defeat, or rather destruction. Why the day following, when the enemy formed a line in front, he did not attack them? When the twenty-seventh they retired, as this account says, between Wietz and the Wartha, with their rear to it, he did not place himself across their right wing? This would have rendered their retreat to Landsberg impossible, and having neither boats to cross the river, nor subsistence for many days, they must have fought their way through his army, or surrendered. Why camp at Tamsel, and so leave the road to Landsberg open? and in the six days they continued at Gros Camin, nor in their retreat, ever attempt to attack them? If the Russians after the battle formed on the left, as it is marked in all the plans I have seen of this battle, how could they march uninterrupted close before the Prussians front, if they were at Tamsel, or behind their army, and between it and Custrin, if it was on the field of battle, to Gros Camin? all this is inconceivable. We therefore think that the action did not pass as represented in the plan; or that the Russians, after the battle, did not form across the enemy's left flank, as in *yy* but on the contrary, across his right flank, from whence they could easily retire to Gros Camin, which in the other case seems impossible. It is wonderful that of six different accounts of this battle which I have now before me, none tells us precisely what was the position of the
Russians.

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Russians the twenty-sixth in the morning; nor when the king marched to Tamsel, though it should seem it was on the twenty-seventh, when the former went to Gros Camin. Upon the whole I think it certain that the Russians marched thither by their left to avoid another action, and not by their right, which would inevitably have engaged them in one, if the king thought proper. The king's army was formed in three lines; two of infantry, and one of cavalry, behind it, whose orders were to advance only when the enemy was thrown into confusion, or to protect the retreat of the infantry, and favour its rallying, in case it was repulsed, which happened. To this disposition alone his majesty owed his victory, as he avowed himself. We are happy to find our doctrine on this subject (proposed in the first volume) confirmed by such an example, and by so great a man as the king of Prussia.

The loss of the Prussians was not so small as the author of this account makes it. It consists of

In the CAVALRY, Officers and Soldiers

Killed			Wounded			Missing		
Officers	und. off.	sol.	Offic	und. off.	sol.	Offic.	und. off.	fold.
16	30	496	60	56	584	2	4	80
INFANTRY 45	98	2959	186	262	5015	15	38	1303

There are two more accounts of the battle given by the Prussians, but neither gives us any circumstances which may lead to the knowledge of the ground, or explain the manner in which it passed; they say nothing more than that their left wing having been repulsed several times, rallied under the protection of the cavalry, and by the help of this, after a bloody action from ten in the morning till night, drove at length the enemy's right out of the field, as we have seen. They do not say that their right or center acted at all, at least that they gained any advantage; on the contrary it seems clear by their own account, that General Demiscow's attack restrained them, and prevented their prosecuting the advantage gained over the enemy's right.

On the Russian side several accounts were published, two by the commander in chief, and one by general Panin, neither contains any thing which gives much insight into the affair. The first assures the Empress he got the battle, and that his army was encamped on the field of action, while the very same day he wrote to Count Dohna, the Prussian general, to desire leave to bury the dead, and carry off the wounded; what impudent lies! If he was master of the field, why ask leave to return there to bury the dead? Count Panin was wounded, with a contusion, very early in the action, the important part of which he was unacquainted with, and he recounts even what he saw in a manner, which proves that the smoke or other circumstances prevented him from seeing clear, which too often happens; we are therefore obliged to recur to the account given by one Arnfeld, a Swedish officer, volunteer in the Russian army, as the only one which has some likeness to truth.

“ Count Fermor being informed the king had passed the Oder, raised the blockade of Custring, and marched with his whole army into the plain, and formed with the right, consisting of the new corps which arrived this day towards Zicker, and the left towards Zorndorff; this position enabled him to oppose the enemy, whether he advanced by Neudamm or New Mill; he stopped at Neudamm, and seemed disposed to attack our left flank; however, the twenty-fifth in the morning he marched round our right wing, and behind us as far as Zorndorff, which obliged us to change our front, and consequently our right became the left, and the left the right; this was executed in the presence of the enemy, without confusion or loss of time; we drew back our right from Zorndorff to Quartchen, that we might have more room to extend our line, to prevent the enemy from attacking us in the flank; Zorndorff was burnt that he might not cover his motions; as the smoke was not dissipated soon enough, the enemy advanced, supported by a heavy cannonade, and attacked our right, which

which they endeavoured to take in flank. They were however repulsed, and ran off behind their third line composed entirely of cavalry, by which they were enabled to form again, and renew the attack. Our cavalry supported our infantry, but that of the enemy being much more numerous, it was obliged to give way, otherwise the affair in this wing would have been instantly determined in our favour. Our infantry obliged to oppose that of the enemy, was, after having repulsed it several times, compelled also to give way, while the enemy was continually reinforced by fresh troops. In the mean time our left was attacked, but repulsed the enemy, and with fixed bayonets drove him back in the greatest confusion, and even attacked the right of his center and left wing, and threw it into disorder; our right wing availed itself of these favourable circumstances, attacked the enemy, and drove him quite back; but his fine cavalry which had saved his left in the beginning of the action, again stopped our progress, hindered our grenadiers from prosecuting their advantage, and gave his infantry time to rally. Our cavalry on the left, commanded by general Demiscow, did great service on this occasion. As soon as the enemy's infantry was formed behind the cavalry, which had suffered much, they advanced and renewed the attack, which was likewise done soon after by their left, with more vigour than ever, and at last the enemy's corps de reserve penetrated into our center; and though he did not instantly derive any advantage from this circumstance, however our right and left were totally separated, and the first forced to retire, keeping up a continual fire towards the little river, the Mitzel, and the wood; our left remaining on the spot. Though general Brown, who commanded it, had been dangerously wounded, and colonel Soltikow, were taken prisoners by some hussars who came behind them, and a great number of other officers of all ranks; our good countenance, the disorder into which we had thrown the enemy's army, and his loss, and the continual fire from our right,

prevented him from renewing the attack against our left, and at last compelled him to retire by his right behind Zicker, leaving several pieces of cannon, and wounded men behind him; our right, in retiring towards the river, left also several pieces behind, which the enemy could not carry off that night. The same night our right joined the left, which had always remained on the field of battle; the confusion which prevailed every where, and the position the enemy took behind Zicker, obliged us to change ours, and we camped exactly opposite the place on which we stood the preceding day, where we remained two days, and then marched unmolested to Gros Camin, where our baggage was; we took twenty-six cannon, and several prisoners. The enemy camped between Zicker and Wilkerdorff, and drew a line before his front."

This account of the Russian manœuvres seems clear, the right wing joined the left, where it had remained during and after the battle, from whence I conclude, that on the twenty-sixth the Russians formed some where on that side; but if, as he says, the enemy was posted between Zicker and Wilkerdorff, and not at Tamsel, how could they march about his left to Gros and Klein Camin? There must be something wrong and unintelligible in all these accounts*.

The loss of the Russians killed, wounded, and missing, nine hundred and thirty-nine officers; non-commission and private killed and wounded, eighteen thousand five hundred; ditto taken prisoners, three thousand. The same officer, in another letter to Count Hamilton, a general in the Swedish service, says, that when the first line was forced back, and the second advanced to support it, they fired upon them, and killed a great number, which brought the whole into the utmost confusion; the consequence of which was, they fell upon their own baggage, plundered it, and got so drunk with brandy they found there, that they could no longer be brought to obey, or even hear their officers; and had the enemy advanced at that time, they would have been all cut to pieces.

After

* See note C.

After the battle the Russians marched on the heights between Camin and Vietz in a very advantageous position; both armies were formed in battle on the twenty-sixth, however nothing happened, except a heavy cannonade, which being far off, had little or no effect. On the twenty-seventh it changed its position, and camped further back, beyond these two villages, and the Prussians followed them about three miles. The king intended attacking some redoubts which the Russians had raised, in order to cover the road which leads through the wood towards Landsberg, on the Wartha, and advanced without any escorte to reconnoitre them within gun-shot of them; being observed, they fired a great number of shot from cannons and howitzers, which endangered his person. So he retired in haste; but as it was necessary to observe nearly the motions of the enemy, he ordered prince Maurice of Anhalt Dessau, with an avantgarde of forty squadrons of dragoons, two regiments of hussars, and seven battalions, to camp out of the reach of the cannon, while the army remained at Tamsel.

At length on the thirty-first of August the Russians quitted their camp behind Gros Camin, and marched by Blomberg, through the woods and village of Massin to Landsberg. The Prussians advanced to Blomberg the first of September, about four miles off Tamsel. On the second the king with part of his army returned towards Saxony, where the situation of prince Henry was critical, on the point of being attacked by the Imperial army under Marshal Daun, and that of the empire under the prince of Deuxponts. What remained of the Prussian army was much weaker than that of the Russians, which had been joined here by Count Romanzow's division, and the corps which general Risanow had in Pomerania, near Stolpe. Though the Russian army was by these reinforcements as strong as ever, yet it undertook nothing at all. The Prussians van was camped within four miles of Landsberg, which the Russians attempted to bring to action by surprise,

September.

prise, but in vain; the Prussian general always found means to baffle their attempts. On the twenty-first of September the Russians left Landsberg, and marched into Pomerania, leaving a strong garrison at Landsberg. General Wobersnow was sent to attack that post, which the Russians avoided by leaving the town, and passing over the Wartha into Poland. The Prussian van under general Manteufel followed the enemy's main army, which encamped by Stargard, the Prussians at Pyritz. The Russian general Pulmbach, with a considerable corps, was sent to besiege Colberg, a small place not strong, and a sea-port in the Baltic, which would have been of the utmost advantage to the Russians could they have taken it; who having a fleet might have formed magazines there, and co-operated with their army on land, and even have been enabled to place a great part of their army in winter quarters in Pomerania, where are many towns surrounded with walls in the old fashion, which by making a good ditch pallisaded, and raising a few redoubts before the gates, might be rendered capable of a good defence, at least until their forces could be collected, and brought to succour the place attacked. In short, with very little pains and industry such towns, even when they have no walls, may be rendered inattackable to any corps unprovided with cannon. There is no passing a good fossé pallisaded without cannon, if men will defend themselves. For these reasons this siege was determined on; accordingly General Pulmbach approached the place on the third of October, and in a few days raised several batteries, chiefly of mortars and howitzers, which fired continually until the thirty-first of the same month, when the Russians retired, not having been able to make a breach. Major Heyde, who commanded in the place a small but vigorous garrison, acquired immortal honour by his very brave and skilful conduct in the defence of this place; his loss killed and wounded did not exceed five or six men.

October.

During the siege the Russian army remained at Stargard, till the eighteenth, when they marched to Dramburg, where they remained
till

till the third of November. The Russians had occupied Greiffenberg, Count Dohna ordered General Platten, with a detachment of hussars and a regiment of dragoons to attack it; upon his approach the Russians retired, but the Prussians came up with them not far off and intirely defeated them; colonel Cubendorf and captain Lochstedt, distinguished themselves very much on this occasion. This event though in itself of small consequence contributed to raise the siege of Colberg; as it opened a communication with that city. After this action General Fermor recalled General Pulmbach and his corps, and on the third of November returned by Templeberg into Poland; General Ohlitz who commanded the Russians at Driesen, after he had ruined all the works old and new, abandoned that place, and retired also into Poland, where the Russians took up their winter quarters partly on the Vistula, and partly in the kingdom of Prussia. The head quarters, heavy artillery, &c. were fixed at Marienwerden, so the Russians with a mighty army concluded this campaign, without executing any one thing worthy to be transmitted to posterity; they wanted neither force nor valour, why then, will it be asked, did they nothing? the reasons are obvious, and will shew, why, during the war in which they gained some very important victories, they never executed any solid enterprize.

In the preceding volume we have said, that the final success of a war must chiefly depend on the length and nature of the line of operation; if this is well chosen and directed to some capital object, success will in general attend it; but if ill chosen, victory itself will lead to nothing.

The line on which the Russians acted has its source, and origin like all others at the capital, unless the sovereign commands in person; from thence generally stores of different kinds are brought, as well as the orders by which the operations of the army are regulated; for sovereigns, and their ministers, are too jealous of their power to confide it entirely to the General, however necessary; the circumstances

stances in war are transitory and almost instantaneous, a General should therefore be invested with every power, that he may avail himself of them, but that is not the case, and therefore we must consider the court as the first point of the line of operations ; the second is, that where your depots are lodged ; and the third, finally that point or place you intend attacking. It is evident, first, that you cannot reckon on any subsistence, which may be collected between these two last points, because the enemy will, or ought to employ every means to carry it off, or destroy it, which is easily done if he can take the field before you, and that your line is long, which of course makes your marches slow and tardy, and the more so, if his places of arms enable him to canton a great number of troops in a small circumference especially, and your cantonments are extensive ; but should the enemy leave the country unmolested, the whole resources you can draw from it, will be only green forage, some cattle, &c. until August, when you may get corn, and moreover horses to supply the wants of the army, transport provisions, &c. but this supposes the most exact discipline, and no less exact probity, in paying abundantly for whatever the peasants furnish, which circumstance is too much neglected in all armies, and much retards their operations, and very often forces them to quit the field without even attempting any thing. The Russian army so far from endeavouring to preserve a country, on the contrary seem to make it their only study how to destroy it, which they do so effectually, that wherever they can penetrate, they leave it a perfect desert, their steps are marked with blood and desolation. Hence it is that they cannot act for any time on a given line, or remain on any one spot for a fortnight ; when they advance a hundred miles from their depots, the transports become so difficult, particularly when Autumn is set in, and no intermediate depots are formed by what they might collect in the country as they advanced, they are of course obliged to return home, and always by a different road, from that by which they advanced.

It

It is a certain rule, from which a General ought never to depart, to shorten continually as he advances his line of operation, by forming new depots behind him on *that very line*, and no where else, otherwise he cannot move at all, for if he do form such depots, if they are not placed on his line, the enemy will destroy them, and put an end to his operations. When the line of operation is determined, (and it always is, or may be so,) why are depots formed any where else? why dispersed all round the country, as if intended to be given up to the enemy? unless to enable the commissary and contractors to make up a good account. The Austrians always lost many of their great depots. In every campaign Prince Ferdinand lost more than he ought to have done, which not only wasted immense sums, but what is more essential, retarded the operations of the army, and very often defeated some well laid project, or enabled the enemy to execute what otherwise he would not have attempted. Time is every thing in war, and nothing makes you lose it so much as delays, in receiving the necessary supplies; the reader will forgive this digression on account of its very great importance. Secondly, the extreme length of the Russian line, makes it impossible for them to carry with them artillery, stores, and provisions for an army destined to execute a capital enterprise, which reduces all their operations to meer excursions, and they are stopped by the most considerable fortrefs: every attempt they made miscarried in Turkey, excepting Bender, an old insignificant place, defended without knowledge, and without valour. Chotzim, Ibrahilou, and Georgewa, were attempted, but in vain; the Russians were repulsed with great loss by the Turks, and afterwards abandoned them for want of heavy artillery, stores, and provisions; they like the Tartars are forced to stop, change their route, or recur to violent and desperate means in attempting places; without any breach or force to make any, they attempt to storm walled towns; to facilitate which they begin with putting them on fire if they can, which sometimes succeeds; when

they meet men void of honour, ignorant, or timorous, but nine times out of ten they fail, which exasperates them, and renders them more cruel and unmerciful towards those unhappy people who fall into their hands. The Russian army has many of the customs and manners of the Tartars without their velocity; they are massive like the Europeans, but much slower, and undoubtedly less scientific. Though I must confess that the men are excellent, and among the generals there are many who would do honour to any army in Europe. Marshal Romanzow is a man of great merit, and among his many good qualities as a general, he studies and knows the genius and character of his enemy. Prince Repnin will acquire honour if ever he commands an army; so will Kamenskoi and Soworow, and many more I could mention, for the reasons above stated.

It is I think impossible for a Russian army, or indeed any army, to act effectually on a line of such length. And we see in fact that during this whole war every campaign was begun and ended as the preceding one had done. They marched from the Vistula to Franckfurt on the Oder, and returned from the Oder to the Vistula, without performing any thing, though in the year fifty-nine they had gained two great battles in a few days.

They and their confederates committed a most capital fault in the choice of their line of operations. The king of Prussia had wisely abandoned Pomerania, which he could not defend against an enemy who was so near that province, and of course had so much more facility in attacking it, than the king in defending it; this he did with a view to concenter his forces, that he might occasionally and successively employ the same troops against different enemies, as they approached, and by this means, be in some measure on a par with them, or at least sufficiently strong to stop their progress. The Russians by coming to Franckfurt perfectly answered his purpose, for he was thereby enabled to employ the very same troops, in Moravia, on the Oder, and in Saxony.

Saxony. It is we think owing to this circumstance principally, aided by his powerful genius and activity, that he did not sink under the weight of such power as was brought against him. Though the event of every campaign proved to a demonstration the insufficiency of the plan of operation, yet did the confederates persevere in it to the last, by which the king of Prussia extricated himself with great glory from the greatest danger that ever threatened any sovereign. This perseverance in a system which every campaign shewed to be ill formed and false, is the more surprising, when we can make it appear, that they might have chosen another line of operation, not only free from all the difficulties they met with, but on which they would have found every facility possible; and moreover, by its direction would have forced the enemy to divide and separate his forces in such a manner, that he must have abandoned in a great measure the defence of one or other of his provinces. When I consider the King of Prussia's dominions, and observe the figure of them, I find that the Oder is the great object he must ever have in view. He has many strong places on it, though there is none in the center about Franckfurt, which I think a great fault, because was there a capital fortress in that part, his dominions on that side would be invulnerable; but even as things now are, no enemy can fix himself there, though he gained twenty battles. He cannot separate his army there, and had the Russians taken Custrin, they must have abandoned it, or lost their garrison, had they left one there, for this reason—the king can from Silesia, Brandenburg, and Pomerania, bring one hundred thousand men to Franckfurt in a fortnight, even in winter; the proximity of his strong places, and the number of good towns, enable him to quarter many troops in a small extent of country. For these reasons the Russians and Austrians in the year sixty, far from being able to keep Berlin, were extremely happy after two days stay, to get away, the one to Poland, and the other to Saxony, though undoubtedly they had together near fifty

thousand men. This must always be the case if you attack an enemy in the center of his dominions; whence it follows, that you must begin at one or other of the extreme provinces. In the case before us every attempt from Lusatia or Silesia failed, and always will; wherefore the Russians should have advanced from the Vistula along the sea coast to Colberg, and having taken it, which was a work of fifteen days, made a place of arms of it, and a general depot, which they could supply from Poland by land, and from Russia by water. This operation being finished, they should have proceeded to the Oder, and possessed all the country on the right of that from Landsberg on the Wartha to the sea, where half their army, and even all, being supplied from Poland directly behind, and Colberg, might have taken their winter quarters. The next campaign supported by their fleet, in conjunction with the Swedes, or alone, they might have taken Stettin, and the war was at an end, for Pomerania lost, and Brandenburg open, the king could not pretend to defend Silesia, with a Russian army immediately at his back, and in possession of his capital, which in such a supposition they might have taken and kept. The Lower Oder, I mean from Franckfurt to the sea, is the weak part of the Prussian dominions; happily for his majesty such another confederacy may probably never happen again. The Russians alone can never hurt him, and particularly now. The king of Prussia is raising a considerable fortress near Graudentz, on the right of the Vistula, which commands it.

Though we highly approve the abandoning Prussia for the reasons above alleged, yet we can by no means think it was necessary to have also abandoned all the country between the Vistula and the Oder. Poland is an open and fruitful country, without any fortress at all, excepting Kaminieck in Podolia, about six miles from Chotzim on the Dneister, and consequently in all that tract through

through which the Russian line went, they could not form any magazines, excepting behind the Vistula; consequently, any body of troops, lightly equipped, might, and always may, secure the provisions between those two rivers and the Wartha, &c. If Count Dohna, with twenty thousand foot, and ten thousand horse, consisting of dragoons and hussars, had in the end of April, or beginning of May, advanced to the Vistula, and secured every thing behind him, which undoubtedly he might have done, the Russians would have found it difficult to pass the Vistula, and much more so to advance towards Franckfurt; they could not leave Count Dohna behind them, if he posted himself, when pushed, in or near the road which leads to Posen; because, finding the country before them entirely naked, and their line attacked by Count Dohna, they must have turned towards him and followed him, which would have been so much time lost for them, and in the end would have answered no purpose, for the same difficulties would have always recurred, and at length forced them to retire to the Vistula. The direction of the Prussian frontier on this, is exactly on the flank of the march from the Vistula to Posen, and therefore Count Dohna, by placing himself on that frontier, would be continually on their communications, which most certainly would have forced them to change the direction of their march, and prevented their approaching the Oder; which proves also that the choice was bad, and that no other line here, or any where else, can be good, unless its direction be in front, and so that the enemy has no province, on the left or right, because in such case, by destroying the provinces before you, and acting on your communications, particularly if long, he will most certainly baffle all your attempts. In Poland I am persuaded that an army of thirty or thirty-five thousand men, composed as we have mentioned, and possessed of superior velocity, will act successfully against three times

times the number, composed as the Russian army is. The one will find every thing on the spot; a heavy army nothing any where. Velocity is every thing in war, particularly if the country be open and fruitful like Poland. Such an army as we suppose with two hundred carpenters, and ropes to make rafts, would ruin any European army in a month. The Tartars have overcome and conquered a great part of the world by their velocity alone, whereas our European armies have not in two centuries conquered any one province of considerable extent, because they are too heavy.

The last thing I have to observe is, that the Prussians in their operations against the Russians, have been too fond of fighting.

When you act offensively you must fight, and force those who oppose your march to give way, that you may proceed on your journey; but when on the defensive never run the hazard of a battle, because if the enemy acts on a long line, you may undoubtedly, by placing yourself on his flanks, force him to retire. The Prussians got the battle of Zorndorff; in ten days after, the Russians were as strong as ever, and the first I am sure did not exceed twenty thousand men. Yet could the latter undertake nothing; they even failed before Colberg; Why? because they had no provisions, and were forced to return to the Vistula before the bad weather set in. The following campaign the Russians gained two great battles on the banks of the Oder, assisted in the last by the Austrians under general Laudohn, from which neither they nor the Russians reaped any advantage; and having just passed the Oder, made a tour through Lusatia and Silesia into Poland, and having ruined the poor people, concluded this campaign; which proves that it was wrong to fight them. These examples confirm our doctrine on the subject we have treated in the first volume, viz. that when you are on the defensive you must never oppose the enemy in front, unless (which sometimes may happen) you can take a capital position
across

across his line of operations, which he can neither attack in front, nor by any motions on your flanks, force you to abandon, which was the case with the Emperor in the last short war in Bohemia.

Of the Operations of the Army of the Empire commanded by the Prince of Deuxponts.

AT the end of the preceding campaign this army took up its winter quarters in the circle of Franconia. The head quarters were at Nuremberg, but in the beginning of April they were transferred April. to Bamberg, and part of the troops encamped near Bayreuth; the cavalry however for the most part lay in the neighbouring villages. In the mean time the Prussians appeared on the frontiers of Franconia; and colonel Meyer, supported by general Grabow, advanced as far as Hoff, which the enemy abandoned; however, the Prussians overtook some of them, and took some prisoners, and a considerable magazine, and afterwards retired to Reichenbach. Some time afterwards the same officer marched as far as Kahla, to destroy some arms which were making there for the army of the empire, which he fortunately accomplished, and retired without loss to Reichenbach, protected in his retreat by several detachments, sent to occupy different posts by general Grabow. It is surprising that any general should disperse his magazines in such a manner, that any adventurer may take them away.

During this time the army of the empire remained in its camp between Cronach and Culmbach till the fifteenth of May, when it May. marched towards Bohemia; by Weydenberg, Wunsiedl, Artzberg, and Schirnding; and on the nineteenth encamped near Egra in Bohemia; prince Stolberg and general Lusinski advanced towards Asch and Adorf, in order to cover the march of the army. They had

had left a corps consisting of some few battalions and squadrons under general Bosenfeld at Bayreuth, and a good garrison in Culmbach and Cronach, to oppose the incursions of the Prussian light troops, for they expected no other; in which they were deceived: For prince Henry, who had collected the greatest part of his army at Zwickau, resolved to make an expedition into Franconia to destroy the enemy's magazines and raise contributions. For this purpose, being informed that the enemy's main army had entered Bohemia, he left a body of troops in the mountains to cover Dresden and that part of Saxony; and on the twentieth of May advanced from Zwickau, and on the twenty-third encamped at Taltiz, a village near Ælsnitz on the Elster, between Plauen and Hoff. The van of this army consisting of four or five thousand men, and commanded by Lieutenant General Driesen advanced towards Bamberg, where they arrived the thirty-first, and took the place by capitulation; and having raised very considerable contributions, and destroyed several small magazines, this corps retired, and on the fourteenth of June, joined the main army which was advanced as far as Hoff, which they quitted the day following and marched to Ælsnitz, and from thence to Zschoppau.

The Prussians speak of this notable expedition in more lofty terms, than Xenophon of the retreat of the ten thousand, and even published the plans of the different camps occupied by prince Henry, though in fact it was an insignificant enterprize, in an open country totally defenceless, excepting Bamberg, which is surrounded by an old wall, in many places broke down, which however the imperialists defended so well, as to obtain leave to depart where they pleased.

While the Prussians made this incursion into Franconia, the imperial army remained in the camp near Egra, till the twenty-third of May, when it came to Saaz where it was joined by a strong corps of Austrians, consisting of three regiments of horse, one of dragoons, a regi-

a regiment of foot, and a battallion of Wurtzburg, and some time after was also joined by the Austrians, who had been with the French the preceding campaign, and the rest of the imperial troops left in the circle of Franconia, who assembled at Wurtzburg, and from thence were conducted by General Dombash to the army. Many skirmishes as usual happened on the frontier, between the detachments of the respective armies, and as usual without any real advantage to either; the Prussians say that a corps of the Imperialists entered into Saxony, with a view to surprise Dresden and Pirna, which failed. The Austrians say nothing about it, and as nothing really happened, nor even was there a man killed, the whole story seems a mere invention.

At length the imperial army left Saaz the twenty-fifth of July, and marched in four columns to a camp between Brix and Bilin, General Dombash with his corps, consisting of the Austrians who had been with the French last campaign, and what remained of the troops of the empire at Wurtzburg, advanced into Saxony, along the frontiers of Bohemia as far as Schleitz. On the twenty-eighth, the imperial army marched to Toplitz. July.

The Prussians on these motions of the Imperialists approached the Elbe, and a considerable corps took post at Dippoldiswalda, which made it necessary for General Haddich to advance to Schonwald, a village in the mountains on the left of the great road which leads from Auffig to Dresden, and General Mitrouski to Altenberg, who in going to reconnoitre was made prisoner by a party of hussars. There was a considerable skirmish passed at the defilé called Pasberg, which the army were obliged to abandon for a time, but had no other effect; for being reinforced they advanced in their turn, and drove the Prussians back with very considerable loss; General Dombash made excursions to Halle in Saxony, and raised contributions: he took post at Zwickau in the beginning of August. The twentieth

August.

of this month, Prince Henry quitted the camps he occupied by Dippoldiswalda and Freiberg, and marched to Gros Seidlitz, by which means the two places above mentioned were abandoned. General Haddich marched by Gieshubel to the heights of Pirna, and ordered General Dombath to take possession of Dippoldiswalda and Freiberg, abandoned by the Prussians and with his corps advanced to Frauenstein, on the twenty-seventh of August the army of the Empire camped also by Pirna, the head quarters at Struppen.

The Prussian army marched from the Kohlberg towards Dresden, and fortified itself: the two armies were extremely near, so that the Prince of Deuxponts could not well undertake the siege of Sonnenstein, he therefore ordered several batteries to be raised on some heights from whence he could fire on the enemy's camp; this and the approach of the Austrian army under Marshal Daun to the Elbe, forced Prince Henry to abandon his camp, which he accordingly did, and on the first of September occupied one between Maxen and Gamig, where he proposed remaining until the arrival of a considerable reinforcement, which the king was bringing from the Oder, after the battle of Zorndorff.

This retreat enabled the Imperialists to besiege Sonnenstein, which capitulated in three days; the attack was conducted by General Macguire, the garrison commanded by colonel Grape, consisting of one thousand, four hundred and forty-two men were made prisoners of War, twenty-nine brass and some iron cannon were found in the place: as the operations of this army are hereafter connected with that under Marshal Daun, we must resume our account of the movements of this latter.

After the final retreat of the Prussians into Silesia, Marshal Daun having provided for the defence of Moravia and Bohemia, on the tenth of August, broke up his camp at Hertzmanitz and marched by Horstz, Gitschin, and Turnau to Reichenberg, where he arrived the fifteenth.

The

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ASTOR, LENOX AND
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ORDER of BATTLE of the RUSSIAN ARMY at Zornsdorf, on the 25th of August, 1756.

Generals	—	—	—	Braun.	—	Fermor.	—
Lt. Generals	—	—	—	Tſcherniſchef.	Dolgorucky.	Pr. Gallitzin.	Soltikow.
Major General	—	—	—	Faſt.	Olitz.	Dietz.	Pr. Lubomirſky.
Brigadiers	—	—	—	—	Leontiew.	Sievers.	Kokofin.
				—	—	—	Uwarrow.
				4	Grend. Legion	15	Neus
				5	1 Muſq. Legion	16	Cafan
				6	1 Grenadier Regiment	17	Troitſkoy
				7	St. Petersburg	18	Schluffelburg
				8	Novogorođ	19	Czernikow
				9	Woron	20	Raſtow
				10	Refan	21	3d Grenadiere
				11	Murom		
				12	Somolenko		
				13	4th Grend. Regiment		
				14	2d Grend. Regiment		
				15	2d Grend. Regiment		
				16	Refan		
				17	Woron		
				18	Novogorođ		
				19	St. Petersburg		
				20	1 Grenadier Regiment		
				21	1 Muſq. Legion		
				22	Grend. Legion		
				23	—		
				24	5 Muſq. Legion		
				25	Wiet		
				26	Nifegroch		
				27	Wiburg		
				28	2d Moſkow		
				29	Imperial Cuir		
				30	3d Cuir		
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The court of Vienna had resolved to drive if possible, the enemy out of Saxony, and at the same to enter Upper Silesia and besiege Neiss, for which enterprize General Harsch was making the necessary preparations, and Marshal Daun was ordered to march through Lusatia towards Dresden, and in conjunction with the army of the Empire to attack that place.

Accordingly on the sixteenth, the Austrian army decamped from Reichenberg, and marched in six columns to Ullensdorf, in Lower Lusatia; the seventeenth to Zittau, the nineteenth to Schöna, and the twentieth to Gorlitz, on the little river Neiss; the day following General Laudohn with a strong corps, was detached to take Peitz in Upper Lusatia, and extend his contributions as far as he could in the Prussian territory; this he effected on the twenty-fifth, when the commander surrendered the place, but had leave to retire; a great quantity of ammunition and forage was found in it, the Austrians raised every where great contributions.

Marshal Daun remained at Gorlitz, till the twenty-seventh of August, having a few days before detached the Prince of Baden, with a very strong corps to Schönberg, from whence he could observe the enemy in that part of Silesia, and cover Bohemia and Lusatia.

On the twenty-sixth, the main army decamped from Gorlitz, and marched by Reichenbach, Weissenberg, Bautzen, Marien-Stein, Königsbrück, and on the first of September, encamped between Nieder-Ebersbach, and the village of Beerwalde, where the army remained till the fourth, in order to know the result of a conference which General Lacy had with the prince of Deux-ponts on the other side the Elbe; on his return the army marched the fourth in three columns to Radeberg, and the fifth to Stolpe. General Lacy for fear of being cut off from the army by a strong

September.

Prussian corps which advanced from Sagan towards Lower Lusatia, recalled his detachment and abandoned Peitz, and marched to Hoyerfwerda. The Prince of Baden Durlach who had been all this time at Schönberg, on the approach of the Prussians retired, and marched to Lobau, not far from Hochkirchen. This was the position of the Austrians and Imperialists in the beginning of September; the latter were about Pirna, the Marshal Daun at Stolpe, Laudohn at Hoyerfwerda, and the prince of Baden at Lobau; we have been thus particular, that the reader may see how and where, the new scene we are going to describe opened; we must now return to the king of Prussia: This monarch had ordered Markgrave Charles with about ten thousand men, to march from Silesia to Saxony, by Priebus, Spremberg and Senftenberg, while he himself with a considerable part of the army which had fought the Russians, directed his march thither also, and both joined on the ninth of September at Großenhayn, as also part of prince Henry's army.

The Austrian army in conjunction with that of the Empire, reinforced by some more Austrians under General Serbelloni, had planned the attacking of Dresden; the first was to pass the Elbe above that town, so as to prevent prince Henry's approaching it, and both armies were to attack on different sides. This plan was to have been executed on the eleventh, which the arrival of the king prevented, who on the thirteenth encamped at Schönfeld, over against the Austrians at Stolpe, upon which Marshal Daun recalled prince Baden's corps, which encamped at Wilten in Lusatia; a few days after he was ordered to Putzl, and General Vehla to Bautzen. The Prussians wanted to drive the Austrians out of their strong hold, these on the contrary took every measure to stay there, and prepare for a vigorous resistance if they were attacked.

On

On the thirteenth general Retzow, with a strong corps, took post at Badenberg, where general Laudohn, with twelve thousand men, was advantageously posted on the hills, which however on the approach of the enemy he quitted, and occupied some other heights near Arnisdorf.

Colonel Riese was posted at Weissen Hirsch; attacked by a considerable body of Prussians, he fell back in good order towards general Emerick Esterhazi, who with his hussars covered his retreat to Dittersbach, near the left of the army. Upon this all the Prussian army on the right of the Elbe advanced on the fourteenth to Eschdorff and Schulwitz, on which Reise retired to Porsschen-dorf, and Laudohn to Arnisdorf. The king resolved to attack general Laudohn, and either force him back on the army at Stolpe, or rather as it would seem from the disposition, to cut him off entirely; accordingly on the fifteenth Major general Prince of Bevern, with a detachment, was to march that night, so as to come in the morning on Laudohn's right flank; General Retzow marched to Wolmsdorff, very near general Laudohn; and the king himself, with several battalions and squadrons, marched directly towards Fischback, a village behind Laudohn, between him and the main army at Stolpe. On seeing this disposition Laudohn retired towards Stolpe, so that Retzow's van only was engaged, which, according to the Prussian account, killed above six hundred men, and made three hundred and twenty prisoners. Retzow's corps encamped on the ground Laudohn had quitted. The Austrian account does not differ from this. General Laudohn retired towards Dürre Fuchs, and from thence to Bischoffswerda, being reinforced to sixteen thousand men, and Count Collaredo occupied the heights of Dürre Fuchs before the army, with several battalions.

The king being always determined to drive Laudohn back, and if possible bring the Marshal to a general action, ordered General
Retzow

Retzow to advance to Bischoffswerda, while his majesty marched to Radeberg. But Laudohn, though attacked by three different corps, made his retreat good to Nieder Putzka, where Marshal Daun had posted the Marquis d'Ainse with a strong corps to support him in case he was pushed; both acted upon this occasion with much prudence: D'Ainse advanced, Laudohn instantly sent the greatest part of his corps to meet him, and secured the communications between them, and then followed with the rest without any loss. We mention this manœuvre only to shew how a man must act in similar circumstances. After this transaction the king advanced to Bischoffswerda, from whence he sent a considerable detachment to Bautzen, which they took possession of the thirtieth of September, making there some few prisoners. By this means the Austrians were cut off from Lusatia and Silesia.

October.

Though the two armies were very near, the king did not think it advisable to attack Marshal Daun in his strong position. This General recalled five battalions, and Portugal's regiment of horse, from the Imperial army, the second of October, and sent Prince Baden Durlach towards Löbau, to secure the march he had projected through the mountains to Lusatia, that he might regain what he had lost, and once more oppose in front the enemy's march to Silesia.

Accordingly the fifth of October, at twelve o'clock, part of the left wing struck their tents and marched; and at night the whole army formed in two columns followed, and marched by the Ottendorf forest, Putzka and Neükirken, to Crusta, where it arrived the sixth. On the seventh the army resumed its march to Köttlitz. To cover this very difficult march, the rear, consisting of Laudohn's corps, Colloredo's, the reserve, and several battalions of grenadiers, that is half the army, was conducted by the duke of Aremberg, with great skill and prudence, and one skirmish only happened. Of which the Austrians say—

That

That the sixth, in the morning, a Prussian detachment, consisting of several battalions and two regiments of dragoons, attempted to trouble the march, but they were instantly driven back by Arberg's regiment of foot, commanded by Colonel Count Merode; the hussars took three cannon, and about one hundred prisoners; a Prussian battalion was totally destroyed; our loss in all amounts to three hundred men. The Prussians say nothing of this affair.

On the eighth the Prussian army marched to Bautzen, and on the ninth to Radewitz, and encamped opposite the Austrians, with the right at Hochkirchen, and the left at Guditze or Graditz, and General Retzow took post at Weissenberg, on the other side the small river Löbauer Wasser. On the eleventh Marshal Keith, with a convoy from Dresden, arrived in the camp.

Upon the arrival of the Prussians Marshal Daun made some new dispositions in his camp; General Laudohn was ordered to take post on the enemy's right flank, the infantry at Wuischke, and the cavalry at Rackel; Count Emerick Esterhazy, with some infantry, lay at Nostitz; General Ziskowitz, with five battalions of grenadiers on the hill Stromberg, and Colonel Count Browne, with four battalions, at Clossen, by which the right of the army was covered, as the left was by Laudohn's corps.

The Prussians account of this battle runs thus :

The corps under the king left Blumberg the third of September, and on the ninth of the same month joined the army which the Markgrave Charles brought from Silesia, at Grossenhayn near Dresden; the tenth we marched between Moritzberg and Dresden, and encamped near Schönfeld. The enemy was at Stolpe, and General Laudohn at Fischbach, before his front; from whence he was driven by General Retzow, who made about three hundred prisoners. General Retzow camped at Fischbach, and our army
marched

marched by its left to Ramenau, which motion obliged the Prince of Baden to march towards Bautzen; two days afterwards we drove General Laudohn from Bischoffswerda, where we encamped. Marshal Daun found it advisable to march by his right to Witten; General Retzow had already taken possession of Bautzen, where we also marched, and General Retzow took post at Weissenberg. The Prince of Baden stood at Arensdorff, across the road which goes by Reichenbach and Gorlitz into Silesia, and Marshal Daun was on the heights near Kettlitz. The king's army advanced to Hochkirchen, from whence the Austrians were driven, and encamped on the heights, with his right beyond that village, and the left towards Gröditz. In the night between the thirteenth and fourteenth, Marshal Daun attacked our right wing, and as the night was dark and foggy, the Pandours having drove the light troops posted at the end of our right flank, got into the village, and set it on fire, which obliged the infantry which covered our flank, to quit their post, and abandon the village. The Austrians attempted several times to pass through the village, but were repulsed by our cavalry and infantry; at the same time General Retzow was attacked by the Prince of Baden, whom he repulsed, took nine hundred prisoners, and joined the army, whose left wing was likewise attacked, it was ordered to support the right wing, which was done, and there remained behind only a grenadier battalion (Kleist), which having advanced too far was made prisoner. The post of Hochkirchen was defended from half an hour past four in the morning till ten, when the army received orders to retire. General Retzow joined it, and occupied the villages of Beerlitz and Doberlschutz. We have lost Marshal Keith and Prince Francis of Brunswick, whose death we greatly lament. Field Marshal Prince Maurice was wounded and taken prisoner. Generals Geist and Krockow were wounded. The king

king and most of the Generals received contusions, or had their horses killed under them; our loss amounts to about three thousand men; the night prevented our men on the right from taking down their tents, and so they were lost; we have taken five hundred prisoners, among whom is General Vietelefschi.

The Austrians account is as follows.

The king of Prussia marched from Bautzen the tenth, and encamped with his right on the heights of Hochkirchen, and his left at Kottiz; he took this position to secure the corps posted at Weissenberg, consisting of eight thousand men, which we proposed attacking the eleventh, and cut off from the king, had he remained at Bautzen, and hinder him from going by Górlitz to Silesia. This obliged Marshal Daun to place five batallions on the hill Stromberg, which lies some hundred yards before the right wing, and four batallions in the village Cloffen, by which means, the way to Górlitz was shut, so that the king could not march that road, without attacking and beating our army. These measures were the more necessary, as on the arrival of the king, the corps at Weissenberg advanced, with a view to occupy Stromberg, but perceiving we had taken post there, it returned to Weissenberg. On the eleventh, Marshal Daun reconnoitred the enemy's position, and found, that if he could drive them from Hochkirchen, a certain and compleat victory would follow. As the king had raised several works on the heights of Hochkirchen and placed there a great number of cannon, it was determined to make a corps march through the woods, which should come on the enemy's flank and rear, while another attacked him in front. Though the strong camp occupied by the Marshal made us easy as to the event, if we were attacked in it, he resolved to attack the enemy, who little expected it; and to add to his security, abbatis were made, and works raised in the wood. The thirteenth was fixed upon for

the attack; as the necessary preparations could not be made in time, it was postponed to the day following. The disposition to be observed in the different attacks, was given to the general officers in writing; the artillery proceeded through the woods, and at four in the morning was within musquet shot of the enemy. A little before day the van of the columns, and the troops under General Laudohn, who came behind the enemy's camp, were masters of the village of Hochkirchen, and the enemy's works, and at break of day our infantry was formed in his camp.

Immediately after the Duke of Aremberg attacked the enemy's left, and took the redoubts which protected it, and notwithstanding the enemy made a most vigorous resistance on every side, he was forced to give way to the superior valour of our infantry. He was driven out of Hochkirchen, and pursued by our vanguard, which, contrary to orders, advanced too far; the enemy had time to rally, and in his turn attacked the van and corps of grenadiers, which he drove back with great slaughter, and retook part of the village Hochkirchen, after he had been repulsed three times. As the final success depended on having this village, the Marshal ordered seven regiments of infantry, and sixteen squadrons of carabineers and horse grenadiers to advance and support them, which they did bravely; an Italian regiment suffered extremely; Bathianis took three hundred prisoners. During the attack of Hochkirchen the rest of our left wing was engaged with the right of the enemy, but could not advance with safety until we were masters of Hochkirchen. At length the bravery of our troops, after an obstinate resistance, forced the enemy to abandon this important post, who retired under a continual fire of his artillery. Marshal Keith and Prince Francis of Brunswick were killed in this action, the former commanded the right wing, and was buried with all the honours of war.

While


While this passed in and about Hochkirchen, the cavalry of the left under Count O'Donnel, was beat back, on which the Marshal ordered Count Lacy with five companies of horse grenadiers and carabineers, to attack the enemy's infantry, which advanced against our left; this they did effectually, and re-established the affair, which in fact decided the victory. This is my opinion, and therefore Count Lacy deserves the greatest praise; it was a critical moment, of which he availed himself with skill and valour. The Marshal's chief attention very properly was, to keep the line in good order as it advanced on the right. General Buccow (who commanded the cavalry) and the Duke of Aremberg, notwithstanding the obstacles they met with, from the ground and from the obstinate resistance of the enemy, at length made their way, and obliged him to retire. Prince Lowenstein, with a small corps, was ordered to attack that of Retzow at Weissenberg, to prevent his going to assist the king. This general, with part of his men, went thither, but was prevented by two regiments of horse, which attacked the head of his column. The enemy being driven back on all sides, retired on some hills behind him; about nine o'clock the battle was over, and the enemy retired into the plain near Predlitz, followed by Gen. Laudohn with three regiments of dragoons: we have taken above one hundred pieces of cannon, with the camp and baggage of the enemy. The Austrians lost in this battle something more than one thousand men killed, and four thousand wounded. The Prussians lost, killed, wounded, taken, and deserted, about seven thousand men, of this however I am not certain; never having seen an exact list of their loss.

Though the Austrian army was far superior in numbers to that of the enemy, in the action however they were nearly on a par, for excepting a few batallions sent to support the Duke of Aremberg, the Prince of Baden's corps did not come into action, nor

any of the troops placed in the center, between the Marshal's attack and that of the Duke of Aremberg; nor the corps on the left under General O'Donnel, which consisted of forty squadrons, and all Laudohn's corps then under O'Donnel's orders; Prince Lowenstein did what he was ordered to do, but he could not hinder Retzow from joining the king's left wing; so that in fact Marshal Daun's, and the Duke of Aremberg's corps or divisions only, were truly engaged, and the weight of the whole action fell on them alone. As I was present at this very important battle, and very often since on the ground, I think it will be agreeable to the reader to give my account of it and opinion, which will enable him to form a more exact judgment than from what these two accounts can afford. All accounts of battles, from malice or ignorance, are generally imperfect, and very often false. Moreover, no plan, though ever so well executed, can give an adequate idea of a field of battle; to remedy this, engineers will put every thing into them which makes them perfectly unintelligible, by the confusion and proximity of places and things. The only mode to pursue is, to leave out every thing that is not connected with the operations of the troops, and to give an exact description of the ground; both together will enable the reader to form a competent judgment of the different manœuvres executed in a battle.

The camp occupied by the Austrians was strong in all its parts, and moreover, by the oblique direction of the line, still stronger, the left being close to the wood occupied by Laudohn's corps, could not be attacked; neither could the right, or center, without presenting the flank to the left, and to Laudohn's corps; and besides, the Austrians could in a very short time pass the Löbauer Wasser, and place themselves where Durlach's corps was, across the road which leads towards Silesia, and always arrive before the king at Neifs, which was then the only object he could have in view.

The

The hills on the left all covered with a very thick wood, fall gradually to a narrow valley, through which runs a rivulet; this, according to the custom of this country, is stopped by Damms, in order to form fish ponds; on the other side, the ground rises to Hochkirchen, and from thence falls by an easy declivity for about three miles into a plain, beyond which runs the Spree, and on the other side are some heights. On the ridge of the heights by Hochkirchen was posted the right of the Prussian army, where it made an angle with the center, which went in a right line to Radewitz, where the left made an angle, and ran near Kolitz, so that the line represented the letter Z in this manner . The ground before and behind the Prussians had no woods or trees at all, but many bushes and small inequalities and ravins, which might check a line of cavalry, but not stop it, particularly if it advanced by squadrons and small troops, and supported as in this case by infantry under General Laudohn; by what we have said, and a view of the plan, it appears that the strength of the Prussians lay in the post of Hochkirchen and the neighbouring heights; this being lost, all was lost. It was also the only point which the Austrians could attack, for the center and left ran away in an oblique direction, and could not be approached without exposing the flank to the enemy's right, and as he then stood, the right wing of the Austrians might have been taken in flank and rear by the enemy's corps at Weissenberg. If to this we add, that the right was effectually covered by the rivulet and fish ponds, that it could not be approached but by passing the Damms in columns, within two hundred yards of the camp, and forming the lines under the fire of the infantry, and a great many cannons, which every one knows is impossible, the cannon alone would have prevented any one's passing the Damm; in which case General O'Donnell and Laudohn's corps could not advance, particularly the cavalry; the success of this attack (supposing every body did

did his duty) depended on the most improbable circumstance in the world; namely, that the Prussians who knew it was impossible to approach their right, but by passing these Damm about two hundred yards off; did not in the night, (by day, it was unnecessary) place a corporal with ten men on each Damm, and a detachment of hussars, and parties of infantry beyond their right, towards Meschowitz and Soritz, merely to give notice of the enemy's approach; the cannon directed towards the Damm, would have forced the columns back in an instant into the wood, and no battle would have ensued. This obvious precaution however was so totally neglected, that the officers who conducted the columns, crept before to discover where the centinels of the camp (for there were no out posts,) were, and brought the columns into the enemy's tents unperceived, nor was there a gun fired, till long after the Austrians were in possession of that part of the camp. From this fact I would infer one maxim, viz. that whatever is possible, a general should think probable, and take his measures accordingly, that like old women he may not say; who would have thought it? Marshal Daun reasoned justly; "If I surprise the enemy, the disposition I have made will insure me a compleat and decisive victory; if I find him on his guard, I will not attempt any thing, and the few which may have passed the Damms, and General O'Donnel, may retire before it is quite day." When you look at the plan, and consider the position of both armies during the whole action, when the Prussians to support Hochkirchen formed their line across their camp, one is inclined to ask why O'Donnel's corps did not turn their right flank and rear? Why all these troops placed between the Marshal's attack, and the duke of Aremberg's, did not attack his left flank? This would have put an end to the battle in five minutes. Why finally, the corps under the duke was not supported by all that
under

under the prince of Baden? which would have enabled the former to take the grand battery before the enemy's left in half an hour; why the duke of Aremberg did not advance to Badewitz, after he had taken the battery? which was the more easy, as the Prussians had very few troops on their left; the whole line having marched to the right, to support Hochkirchen, by this means the enemy would have been intirely surrounded, and must have perished, which shews the goodness of Marshal Daun's plan, had it been tollerably executed; but alas, he and the Duke of Aremberg only fought; the corps under O'Donnel, that between the left and the right, and finally that which remained under the Prince of Baden, did not; though they consisted of at least half the army; this corps lost sixteen killed, and fifty wounded; that under Laudohn sixty-six killed, and about two hundred wounded. The cavalry under O'Donnel lost nothing that is mentioned; the whole cavalry lost about one hundred killed, and three hundred wounded, which proves they did not come to action. Those on the right had not an opportunity, those on the left on receiving a few scattered shots from some men hid behind the bushes, retired, and never advanced afterwards. Laudohn's corps occupied some heights behind the enemy, from whence they could fire a few cannon shot, but never engaged, as the reader may observe by the plan. They who know this general, will not suspect him of being backward in fighting. No man sees and seizes a favourable moment better than he does, or executes with more vigour. He has the eye of an eagle, the heart of a lion, the meekness and innocence of a lamb; but great and capital faults were committed undoubtedly, which prevented the total ruin of the Prussian army.

If we consider the state of the Prussian army thus separated, and surrounded by superior forces, it will appear incredible they could

could make any resistance at all. They did however resist, and in a manner that rendered the victory for five hours doubtful. In my opinion this battle does the king, his generals, and his army more honour than any victory he ever gained. In his retreat he was not pursued, but followed at a distance by General Laudohn, who now and then fired a shot after him. General Retzow behaved with great prudence on this occasion. He took post near an old Swedish redoubt, where the king's army assembled, and for about an hour was in great confusion, like a swarm of bees about a hive: about eleven o'clock this battallion began to unfold: a line of cavalry was formed on the left fronting the hills, where Laudohn stood; another of infantry behind this, and a third of what remained of their equipage and artillery. This being done, they marched off in as good order as if nothing had happened, passed the Sprée, and posted themselves on the height beyond it. This crowned the Prussians with glory; I do not remember to have read, or heard of any thing like it, nor do I ever expect to see such another transaction. Thus ended this celebrated surprize and battle which followed; the wisdom of Marshal Daun is no less conspicuous, than the extraordinary vigour and presence of mind of the king, and his officers; courage was great and equal in both, nothing more could be required or expected from a Roman soldier.

The king's army consisted of ten or eleven thousand men he brought with him from Count Dohna's army; as many under the Markgrave Charles from Silesia, and ten thousand under prince Francis of Brunswick, of which he had left some battallions and squadrons, with his brother in Saxony, so that at Hockkirchen it did not amount to thirty thousand men, whereas that of the Austrians, was at least fifty thousand, but not the half was brought into action, so that upon the whole, those who really fought on each side, were nearly equal in numbers. One cannot help lamenting the propensity the
king

king has for fighting when by no means necessary, as in this case; by skilful manœuvres he had opened his road to Bautzen and Silesia, where his presence was necessary to raise the siege of Neiss. Why not go thither? or if he chose to keep the Austrians some time longer in Lusatia, to hinder their returning to Dresden, why not march from Bautzen to Weissenberg, and send Retzow to Reichenbach, on the road to Gorlitz, and camp with his right at Weissenberg, and his left on the heights, where the Prince of Baden was posted? which would have much embarrassed Marshal Daun, and might have offered a more favourable opportunity to attack him, which in no case was necessary. By marching to Hochkirchen he was under the necessity of beating the Marshal, or falling back, to resume another road to Silesia. All this was done, because his majesty loves fighting; he will never comprehend that being on the defensive a general should never fight, if he can avoid it. Had he beat Marshal Daun he could derive no other advantage, but raise the siege of Neiss, which he could accomplish without fighting, which appears from this, that though he lost the battale at Hochkirchen, he went into Silesia, and forced General Harsch to raise the siege and retire. A general should scarce ever fight when on the defensive, but to preserve some important place, and hinder the enemy from taking winter quarters in his country, or force him to abandon it, if he is in possession, which was the case in one thousand seven hundred and fifty-seven at Lissa; and even here if the Austrians had not lost their heads, a victory would have availed the king nothing. They had Breslaw and Schweidnitz, who could drive them from thence in the winter, had they chose to remain there? Nobody. Let us return to our narration.

After the battle Marshal Daun having left a brigade on the field to bury the dead, and take care of the wounded, returned with

his army to Kitlitz, where he remained till the seventeenth, whence he advanced to Belgern, and camped over against the enemy; by this unmeaning and false step he left the road to Silesia open, as the reader may see by the plan. Of which the king availed himself, for having been reinforced by about six thousand men brought him by Prince Henry from Saxony, and furnished with tents and artillery, stores, &c. on the twenty-fourth, he broke up his camp, and taking a little to the left to avoid any obstacles, marched the whole night; and on the twenty-fifth encamped at Ullersdorf, on the way between Muscha and Gorlitz, and on the twenty-sixth arrived at Gorlitz. On the twenty-fifth in the morning, Laudohn's corps, and in the evening the corps de reserve, were sent by Reichenbach towards Gorlitz, and the whole army followed the next day. The van of the two armies met unexpectedly, a sharp skirmish ensued, in which the Austrians had the advantage at first, but that of the enemy being supported by all their cavalry, they retired, but with some loss, towards the Landscron, (a high mountain, which rises like a sugar loaf, about which the armies often encamped during this war;) and on the twenty-eighth the Prussians passed the Neifs, and marched towards Lauban; and on the thirtieth encamped at Litchtenau, on this side Lauban. Marshal Daun, finding it now impossible to hinder the enemy's going to Silesia, sent General Wied with nine battalions, ten companies of grenadiers, and four regiments of cavalry, through Bohemia, to reinforce the army which was then besieging Neifs. This was an idle scheme, for undoubtedly they would arrive too late; and should they arrive, it was by no means advisable for the Austrians to wait the coming of the king, whose army was superior to theirs; Laudohn's corps pursued the enemy's rear guard, and of course attacked it whenever an opportunity offered, in which several actions, it is said, the king lost, killed, and wounded, two or three hundred

dred men, which if true, is nothing to the purpose, for the Prussians prosecuted their march, and on the thirty-first came to Lowenberg; the third of November to Schweidnitz, and the sixth to Nossen, beyond Munsterberg. Laudohn followed the enemy as far as Javer, and camped at Löhn, not far from Lowenberg; and General O'Kelly, who followed him, took post at Lauban. Marshal Daun resolved to return to Saxony, and attempt the taking of Dresden, where we shall follow him. In the mean time we will take a view of what passed in Bohemia and Moravia, after Marshal Daun and the king had left that country. November.

General Harfch was ordered to prepare what was necessary to besiege Neifs, which was then left to its garrison alone, for General Fouquet posted at Landshut, had enough to do to restrain the Austrians, and prevent them from entering Silesia on that side. Accordingly the Marquis de Ville, with a considerable corps advanced towards Neifs in August, he endeavoured to block up the place, and raised contributions. This General attempted to surprize Brieg and Schweidnitz, in which he failed and returned to Neifs. In October General Harfch, with a considerable corps arrived in camp, and took the command of the whole; the greatest part of October, the Austrians were employed in preparing fascines, and other materials for the siege, which however they deferred till they received the news of the victory at Hochkirchen, which they imagined would prevent the king from coming to interrupt their operations; accordingly they camped near the town, and indeed so near, that the artillery of the place obliged them to fall back one thousand paces; on the twenty-sixth, they raised two batteries, and a mortar bed, from which they played against the town, and the sluice to cut off the water, in that however they did not succeed. The siege was continued in the usual manner till the fourth of November, when on receiving intelligence

gence of the king's approach, they raised the siege and retired partly into Moravia, and partly into Bohemia; Kofel which had been blocked up by some Croats, for near four months, was also on the king's arrival abandoned. Thus ended the siege of Neifs, which no doubt might have been taken, had Marshal Daun after the king's retreat out of Bohemia, turned his thoughts that way, instead of losing his time idly and unprofitably during the whole months of August and September, in Lusatia and Saxony; moreover by transferring the seat of war into Upper Silesia, the Austrians so near their depots at Olmutz, would have been enabled to act with vigour and without danger; the country about Neifs, Glatz, &c. is extremely strong, an army of forty thousand men might on every spot find a camp, which the king could not by any attack in front, force them from, nor could any diversion made in Bohemia or Moravia from Glatz, interrupt them a moment, twenty thousand men placed on that frontier, would have been sufficient to cover the country effectually; another advantage would from this measure have occurred, that the king could not arrive from the Oder to Neifs in the same length of time, as from thence to the Elbe and Dresden, so that the Austrians would have had more than sufficient time to take the place. In all this war, an infatuation to take Dresden prevailed in the courts of France and Vienna, to which Marshal Daun in spite of his better judgment, was forced to give way, and sacrifice the interests of the state to a groundless and chimerical opinion; by endeavouring to reconcile as much as possible the interest of his sovereign, with the orders he received to attack Dresden, he undertook two operations at once, viz. the siege of Neifs, and the delivery of Saxony, and of course failed in both, whereas had he carried his whole force against one or other point, he would have succeeded.

But

But to resume our narration. Marshal Daun having left Generals Laudohn and O'Kelly to follow the king, returned to resume his enterprize against Dresden; on the sixth of November, he passed the Elbe at Pirna with sixty thousand men, and summoned that town which he expected would surrender on his appearance. Prince Henry finding it impossible to maintain his communication with Leipswic, had passed the Elbe and left General Schmettau with twelve thousand men to defend Dresden, a city of considerable extent but ill fortified. The Austrian General on the seventh (the very day the king had raised the siege of Neiß) approached so near to Dresden, as to leave no room to doubt of his intentions of attacking it, he hoped, perhaps to carry it by a coup de main under cover of the suburbs; the houses of which (particularly from the Pirna gate to that of Wildstruf) are so high as to overlook the ramparts, and are close to the edge of the ditch; this circumstance compelled the Governor in common prudence, to provide for the safety of the fortress, and garrison intrusted to him, by depriving the enemy of so commodious an approach to his walls; this could only be done by burning the suburbs, a necessary measure in his circumstances, but a most disagreeable and invidious one; he endeavoured therefore by repeated representations, both to the court of Dresden and the Marshal, to avoid coming to that extremity; but finding no disposition in Daun to attend to any thing, he or the Saxon minister could say to him on the subject, and that on the contrary his out posts were driven in, and the redoubts that covered the suburbs, attacked and carried by the Austrians, whose batteries began to annoy the town, and who threatened every hour to carry the suburbs, and through them the fortress itself by assault, he at length executed what he had long threatened, and set fire to the combustibles which had
already

already been prepared, and placed in several of the houses for that melancholy occasion; this however was not done till the very last extremity, (as by the written certificates of the magistrates and other authentic papers sufficiently appears) nay so loth was count Schmettau to employ this dreadful expedient, that he perhaps risked the event more than in strict prudence he ought to have done, the enemy having penetrated, in the attack of the redoubts (though afterwards obliged to retire) so far, as to have left an Austrian soldier killed on the very draw bridge of the Pirna gate.

It was at three in the morning of the tenth, the signal was given for firing the suburbs; the six battalions who occupied them and the redoubts, retired into the town by the three gates, which were immediately barricaded, and after six o'clock not a single Prussian appeared in the suburbs, notwithstanding all that has been published to the contrary.

After the burning of the suburbs the Austrians remained quiet. Itzenplitz's corps was strongly posted close to Dresden, and colonel Wunsch, with some battalions, was on the heights of Weissenhirsch where O'Donnel should have been, if they proposed doing any thing on that side the Elbe.

In this state things remained till the sixteenth, when Marshal Daun broke up his camp, and retired to Pirna, and from thence by Gieshübel into Bohemia.

Much was wrote on the subject of burning the suburbs of Dresden, which did not deserve a moment's attention; but men, when unsuccessful in their measures, will complain of every thing. Near three hundred houses were burnt or damaged.

While this was doing in Saxony, the king, whose arrival at Nossen had raised the siege of Neiß, and obliged the Austrians to retire as we have seen; on hearing that Marshal Daun was before Dresden, quitted.

**ASTOR, LENOX AND
TILDEN FOUNDATIONS**

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October.

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quitted his camp on the ninth of November, and taking his march towards Saxony, on the fifteenth arrived at Lichtena, near Lauban, and the eighteenth at Bautzen, which obliged Marshal Daun to quit Saxony, and abandon Pirna and Sonnenstein, which put an end to the campaign.

Generals Laudohn and O'Kelly who were in Lufatia, on the approach of the king, retired to Zittau, and from thence into Bohemia; on the twenty-first of November, the king and his army arrived at Dresden, and soon after put his troops into winter quarters, having finished a very fatiguing but a glorious campaign; his numerous enemies had gained no advantage over him, whereas he had regained the very important fortrefs of Schweidnitz. We must return to the Imperial army and follow it to its quarters, and conclude our account of the campaign, with some reflexions on the whole.

As the operations of the Swedes were not of any great importance in themselves, and totally unconnected with those of the Austrians and Imperialists; we shall at the end of this volume, put altogether their operations during the several campaigns.

After the surrender of Pirna, the army of the empire was preparing in conjunction with Marshal Daun to besiege Dresden; as this event was prevented by the king's arrival, this army remained near Pirna, and Prince Henry's, which had been reinforced by some troops sent him by the king, at Gamig near Dohna. The Imperial army which drew its subsistence from Voigtland, was soon frightened, the convoys being intercepted by parties sent from Gamig, quitted the camp near Pirna, after Marshal Daun had left Stolpe, and gone from the Elbe, and on the fourteenth of October marched to Gieshubel, and General Haddick with a considerable corps, was posted at Freiberg and occupied Zwickau and Chemnitz, to secure the arrival of the transports; General

General Haddick was attacked in his post by General Hulsen, who marched from Dippoldiswalda thither with a strong corps, and forced him to retire; this last encamped on the heights about the place.

Soon after this affair a considerable change was made in both armies, occasioned by the battle of Hochkirchen; on the eighteenth Prince Henry with several regiments, left Gamig, and marched by Dresden, to join the king at Doberchau, near Bautzen; at the same time General Dombasch, with two regiments of foot, and one of horse, was recalled from the Imperial army to that of Marshal Daun. General Itzenplitz took the command of the Prussian army after Prince Henry had quitted it. General Hulsen having abandoned Freiberg, the Imperialists took post there again. Both armies continued in the same position the remaining part of October; the weakness of the Prussian army, and the distance of the king, brought as we have seen Marshal Daun back to Dresden in the beginning of November. The army of the empire was ordered to advance farther into Saxony, and if possible to take Torgau, Wittenberg, and Leipswic; accordingly the Imperialists quitted Gieshubel the third of November, and on the sixth arrived at Freiberg; this movement, and the approach of Marshal Daun, determined General Itzenplitz to quit Gamig, and march to Kesselsdorf. The Imperialists remained at Freiberg till the twelfth. In the mean time General Haddick was sent to attack Torgau, where he was met by General Wedel, on which he retired to Eilenburg, where the Prussians, under Count Dohna, who was come from Pomerania, followed him, and forced him, with some loss, to retire to Freiberg. On the twelfth the Imperial army had advanced towards Leipswic; but on Haddick's retreat they retired also towards Zwickau, when the dispositions for winter quarters

quarters were made; and on the twenty-fourth the army separated and marched towards those assigned them in Franconia.


Having occasionally as circumstances offered, given my opinions on the occurrences of this campaign, it remains for me to conclude my account of it by one reflection only, and this arises from observing the nature and direction of the line of communication between Silesia and Saxony; this goes from Dresden by Bautzen, Gorlitz, and Lauban, into Silesia, and is of a curvilinear direction. It is evident that the Austrians can take no position on this line or beyond it, so as to prevent effectually the Prussians from going from the one into the other; for if they are on the line the Prussians may leave them there, and pass beyond their right or left as they may be posted: and if to prevent this they advance a considerable way beyond it, then the Prussians may march along this line behind them, or by acting on their line of operations intercept their convoys, or even enter Bohemia and destroy their magazines, and thus force them back. It was owing to this circumstance that the king was enabled to support both countries during the whole war, by marching from the one to the other as occasion required, and also when necessary into Brandenburg; for it is impossible to take any position in Lusatia, which will entirely prevent him. But Marshal Daun instead of going to Stolpe, should have marched to Hoyerswerda, this would have obliged the two corps which came from Silesia to join the king to have marched higher up, as far as Cöthlen at least, and they and the king must have gone down to Torgau if he wanted to pass the Elbe; if not, the Marshal might always have fallen back to Bautzen, and by skilful manœuvres gained time enough to have enabled General Harsch to take Neiß, which was then the only object in view. I know very well the Marshal could not absolutely hinder the king from marching into Silesia; but he might by these movements have gained time, which was

every thing; or by forcing him to pass the Bober at Sagau, or lower down, he might have marched himself by the road the king actually took, which is by much the shorter; and consequently the Marshal would have been at Nossen before him. A few days provisions would have been sufficient.

Upon the whole it appears, that the Austrians cannot absolutely hinder a Prussian army from marching from Silesia into Saxony at all, or from this last into the former, unless it is on the left side of the Elbe; then I think they may, particularly if they are masters of Dresden. The great fault of the Austrians during the whole war was this, they had not, it should seem, any fixed plan of operations; they wandered from one place to another, waiting events, and when these turned out even more favourable than could reasonably have been expected, they were at a loss how to avail themselves of them, and in such a situation that they reaped no advantage from them; new schemes, new projects were made and none executed; such a vague and undetermined mode of making war, renders it everlasting, and finally it ends in doing nothing at all.

In war all the data are clearly given and known, the respective forces are easily calculated, from whence a propable opinion may be formed, and some certain object fixed and determined on, which must be invariably pursued without any the least deviation; in the case we have before us, the Austrians should have said—The enemy must employ a certain number of men in Saxony, and an army against the Russians on the lower Oder, these whether they gain or lose a battle, cannot remain long in that country. Our forces are entire and in great numbers, we have a powerful army, what shall we undertake? what can we execute? let us do that without loss of time, for the enemy will be soon back. We must not, cannot expect any decisive event from the Russians; they come from far, and cannot execute any solid enterprize; they
make

make a powerful but not a durable diversion in our favor, that is all they can do; let us avail ourselves of it, be prepared for any event and lose not a moment in executing what has or ought to have been determined on before the campaign: this the Austrians neglected doing, which might have been fatal to them, had not the present Empress of Russia mounted the throne, and recommended peace.



C A M P A I G N 1759.

THE plan of operations for this campaign, was exactly similar to that of the last; the Russians with a powerful army, were to advance towards Franckfurt on the Oder, where they were to be reinforced by a corps of fifteen or twenty thousand Austrians; what they were to do afterwards, I do not know, nor do I believe it was settled. They were in all probability to be guided by events; the Austrian army was to cover Bohemia and Moravia, and wait till the approach of the Russians drew the enemy's attention that way, and gave by that means, the Austrians some favourable opportunity to act and execute some solid enterprize.

The army of the empire was to approach the Elbe, and attack Dresden.

The Prussian forces were posted chiefly in Silesia under the king, another army under prince Henry was in Saxony, to oppose that of the empire; a third finally in Pomerania, destined to act against the Russians; all these forces put together did not exceed one hundred thousand men, viz. sixty thousand in Silesia, twenty in Saxony, and as many in Pomerania; whereas those of the Austrians alone exceeded that number, those of the Russians, amounted to near eighty thousand men, and the Imperial army with the Austrians who were with it, to at least forty thousand*.

The king of Prussia resolved to remain on the defensive, until the approach of the enemy made it necessary for him to act.

* See Note D.

As the Russians first mounted the stage, and opened the scene of action, the order of things requires we should begin our narration with them; we shall therefore relate the march and operations of that army, from the beginning, to the end of the campaign, and add our reflections on the principal events only, and such as really contributed to the good or bad success of them, which with the map annexed, will, we trust, suffice to give the reader a pretty clear idea of the conduct of the war.

The Russian army consisted of twenty squadrons cuirassiers, at three hundred men each, six thousand; fifteen squadrons horse grenadiers, at three hundred men each, four thousand five hundred; eight squadrons horse grenadiers, at one hundred and ninety-six men each, one thousand, five hundred and sixty-eight; thirty-six squadrons hussars, at two hundred and twelve men each, seven thousand, six hundred and thirty-two; cavalry nineteen thousand, seven hundred; cossacks five thousand: twenty-four thousand, seven hundred;—infantry seventy-six battalions, at seven hundred and five each, fifty-three thousand, five hundred and eighty; in all, seventy-eight thousand, two hundred and eighty men—with two hundred and thirty-two pieces of artillery: this army was divided as usual into three divisions, the first was commanded by Froloff Bagrey; the second, by Lieutenant General Ransanow; the third, by Count Romanzow; all these troops had been in quarters behind the Vistula, and extended throughout the kingdom of Prussia; the light troops even during the winter, often advanced to the frontiers of Pomerania, with a view to plunder, and rise contributions, in which they generally succeeded more or less, notwithstanding the vigilance of the Prussians cantoned in that country, who were commanded by General Schlabendorff. In the end of February, General Platten took the command, and had his head quarters at Stolpe; it was resolved by the king of Prussia

February.

Prussia to send a corps into Poland, to destroy the enemy's magazines, which lay scattered over the country, before the front of the Russians, in small defenceless towns and villages, guarded only by parties of twenty or thirty men, contrary to all rules of prudence, which require, that no depot whatever should be placed before the front, or in defenceless towns; they must always be behind the army, or on the flank, in towns, and well defended; for an army cannot like a traveller, find inns on the road, to refresh and nourish it.

To put this project in execution, Major General Woberfnow was ordered to assemble a corps, near Groß Glogiau in Silesia, which consisted of six battalions, and twenty-five squadrons, and on the twenty-fourth, he marched towards Poland. In their way the Prussians took prince Salkowski in his palace, and carried him and his guard (about two hundred men) into Silesia, on pretence that he was connected with the Russians. From Lissa in Poland the Prussians marched to Posen, where they found a magazine, which they destroyed; at the same time General Platten sent a detachment of cavalry under Colonel Platten, along the Wartha towards Meseritz, where they destroyed a considerable magazine; after which the Prussians who began to want provisions, on the fourth of March quitted Poland, and having accomplished in a great measure their object, returned to Silesia.

March.

The Russian account of this transaction says, that Colonel Dalcke who had been sent, with a detachment on the road towards Posen was informed, the Prussians had entered Poland in several columns, one under the king in person, another under Count Dohna, &c. and were advancing towards the Vistula, all which, however false, was believed, upon which Colonel Dalcke was reinforced, and ordered to follow and observe the enemy in his retreat, but nothing happened worth mentioning. This alarm obliged

obliged the Russians to take precautions, in case the enemy did really approach the Vistula, and the better to observe the enemy, a considerable corps under Kramachokow who commanded the Cossacks, was sent towards New Stettin in Pomerania, where a very sharp encounter happened, in which captain Hohendorff, who had three hundred men infantry, and some cannon, and captain Wuffow with one hundred dragoons, had the advantage, having forced the Russians to retire with loss. Wuffow was killed, and much regretted. The disposition made by these two captains, would do honour to any general officers; one does not find many such captains. I mention this affair, in itself of no great consequence, to shew there are men of genius in the lower rank of officers, whom a General should know, protect and employ.

Immediately after this skirmish, the Russian army was ordered
April. to prepare for its march, about the sixteenth of April. Count Fermor who commanded it, passed the Vistula on the twentieth, and took up his quarters at Munsterwalde, where the army assembled,
May. and on the seventh of May encamped by Swetz, and from thence advanced gradually towards Posen, on which Count Dohna likewise assembled his army near Landsberg in Brandenburg, and recalled all the detached corps, even that which lay at Stolpe to cover Pomerania; on which the Russian Colonel Tokells took possession of Stolpe, and the Russian light troops plundered without mercy every place they could get into, particularly in Pomerania, which was almost defenceless.

The king resolved to oppose the progress of the Russians in Poland, rather than permit them to advance unmolested as last year to the Oder; for this purpose General Hulsén, with a considerable corps was ordered from Saxony to go and join Count Dohna at Landsberg, whose army consisted of twenty-six battalions, and sixty squadrons, about twenty-five thousand men in all; the Russians, according to their account, had at Posen forty thousand

thousand. On the twenty-third of June the Prince left Landsberg, June.
and marched by Schwerin (or Swierszina,) Birnbaum (or Mienzy-
chod,) &c. to Wroncki, where they camped the twenty-ninth; and
on the first of July resumed their march towards Poznan (or Posen,) July.
where the enemy lay strongly encamped with this town, and the
Wartha behind them. Being arrived at Rogozno, General Woberf-
now, with five batallions and three regiments of cavalry, marched
on the second by Lwowek to Poznan, with a view to reconnoitre
the enemy's position. General Panin had ordered Lwowek to be
occupied by four regiments of foot, two of cavalry, and two thou-
sand cossacks, who on perceiving the Prussians, instantly retired to
the army, which immediately run to arms, and remained perfectly
quiet without firing a shot, and gave General Woberfnow
several hours to look about him; which having done, he retired to
Muravanna Gotzlina, where the first line of the army was arrived.
The enemy's right being thought too strongly posted to be attacked
with advantage, the Prussians passed the Wartha by Obernich, and
camped by Objeczrze and Prezlavia, and give the following ac-
count of their subsequent movements: " Being informed that the
" Russians were in motion, and were going to camp at Casimierz.
" On the fifth of July, in the morning, we marched and arrived
" at this place before the enemy, which obliged him to stop be-
" tween Tarnowa and Jancovitz*, where we proposed marching the
" same night, and attack him in the morning of the tenth; but
" he had moved off in the night, and marched to Wilczyno with
" a view to seize the heights on our right flank, but we antici-
" pated him; and on the eleventh, in the morning, took possession
" of them in presence of the enemy, whose front was covered by
" marshes, ravins, &c. The twelfth the enemy moved on his
VOL. II. S " left,

* Colonel Tempelhof calls this place Wienkowitza, I imagine it may be Woyanowice.

“ left, and endeavouring to come on our flank, we made front,
“ and wished to bring him to battle, but in vain. On the
“ thirteenth we observed some movements on the enemy’s right,
“ his front however remained in its full length. Being informed
“ that the enemy directed his march towards Pniew, we marched
“ in the night towards Neustadt, that he might not get a march
“ before us. Here provisions began to fail us, there was nothing
“ to be found in the villages, not even a brick to build our ovens.
“ On the fourteenth we found the enemy camped between Pinne
“ and Conin; we marched that day to Peter, and the fifteenth to
“ Meseritz.”

The Russians account of these operations says, “ Brigadier Thrafnachokow reported that fourteen regiments of Prussians were in march from Schwerin to Birnbaum; the twenty-fifth a strong corps arrived at Franstadt. On the twenty-ninth the first division of our army arrived in their camp, and on the same day the new commander in chief Count Soltikow. On the third of July General Woberfnow, with nine thousand men, came to reconnoitre our position. On the eighth of July the army having the heavy artillery and baggage behind, marched in six columns to Jankovitz; the Prussian army was posted between Morowinow and Babinkow, covered by marshes and fish-ponds: the ninth Count Totleben passed the Damms, and attacked a Prussian post of two regiments of hussars with success, on which the Prussians took arms, and not thinking themselves secure in this post marched by Kazimierz to the village Bittin, where they camped. On the eleventh our army marched directly towards the enemy’s camp, which, on our approach, they broke up, and hastened to occupy another very strong one between the villages Perske and Senkowe; we followed, and camped with our left at Bittin, and our right at Molodosko, four miles from Jankovitz. The Prussians fired at our out posts; but
“ our

“ our howitzers, which threw bombs, made them cease. On the
 “ twelfth we approached the enemy in order of battle, who was for-
 “ med on the heights; and we cannonaded each other. The strong
 “ position the enemy occupied, prevented our attacking his line.

“ In the night between the thirteenth and fourteenth the enemy
 “ marched to Pniew, where we instantly followed him. We observed
 “ by all his motions he was afraid of being cut off from Silesia;
 “ wherefore we marched always on his left flank, by which means
 “ we came behind him. The sixteenth we marched from Sumerschkä
 “ to Borowki; the seventeenth to * Ibonschino; the nineteenth to
 “ Babimost; the twentieth to Kelschen, and the twenty-second to
 “ Palzig: which brought on a battle the day following, between
 “ Zullichau and the village Kay.” During this time Colonel Hordt
 with a detachment of cavalry, made an expedition towards the
 Vistula behind the Russian army, and with great success, having
 destroyed several magazines which contained above sixty thousand
 bushels of corn, of various species, and made some prisoners,
 which proves, that a corps of some strength might have done so
 much, as would have checked and perhaps stopped the Russian army
 intirely; at least we think that if the Prussian General, instead of
 opposing them in front, (which at last brought on a general Action)
 had, with his whole army posted himself on their left flank, and
 from thence sent a corps behind them, the Russians could not have
 proceeded and left him there; so that by falling back gradually, as
 they advanced against him he could have prevented their approach-
 ing the Oder at all. An enemy so superior as the Russians were
 must not be opposed in front unless some uncommonly strong camp
 offers, which he cannot by an attack in front, or manœuvres on
 your flanks force you to abandon: we have often said this; but
 when the conduct of the general requires it, we must repeat it,

* Colonel Tempelhoff says they went that day to Zbaszyn.

and it cannot be too often repeated. It is the foundation, and principle of a defensive war.

We have been very particular in our account of the manœuvres of the respective armies; because nothing is more entertaining than the motions of two armies in sight of each other, where the least oversight leads very often to fatal consequences, and where a few hundred yards gained or lost decide the final event of the whole. What passed on this occasion bears a strong resemblance to the operation of the two armies commanded by those great Generals, Turenne and Montecuculi.

The Prussians having fallen back to Zullichau, and encamped behind it, on the twenty-second at night Count Dohna received permission to retire being ill, and General Wedel came from the king's army in Silesia to take upon him the command of the army. The day following, (the twenty-third of July,) was fought the battle which goes by the name of Paltzig, Zullichau, and Kay, which are near the ground on which it was fought. The account which Count Soltikow gives of it, is distinct, and appears clear and exact. While he praises his own people, he does the enemy that justice, which their dispositions and singular bravery deserves. The Count says——

“ Perceiving by the enemy's manœuvres, and learning by deserters, which came in to us in great numbers, that far from meaning to cut us off from the Vistula, his chief view was to hinder us from cutting off his communication with Silesia; that he might be at liberty to join the king against Marshal Daun, or be soon reinforced and enabled to act against us. To increase his fears on this head, we always marched on his right flank, and at last unobserved, we came before him. On the sixteenth we marched from the village Sumercha, to the Hill Bokrowka; the seventeenth to Ibonschino; the eighteenth the army halted. On the nineteenth General Merd-
vinow



vinow reported he was arrived with his corps at Folitsche, twenty miles from Posen; the nineteenth we marched to Babimost; the twentieth we marched four miles to Holzen. Here we had accounts from Count Tokeli that our light troops were advanced towards Zullichau. The twenty-first we halted to wait for General Merdvinow. The enemy's cavalry attacked our piquets, who were forced to retire. One of their squadrons being advanced too far, and separated from the rest, was cut to pieces. The twenty-second we reconnoitred the enemy's position, and our own army leaving the heavy baggage at Holzen, marched to the village Guelrig, or rather Paltzig. The twenty-third (on which your Majesty's army gained a compleat victory over the enemy) we marched at break of day on our right, in order to come before the enemy on the road, which leads to Crossen, and Frankfurt on the Oder. In the mean time, it was reported from all parts that the enemy intended to attack our baggage. Though I would advance nothing without some foundation, I think however, that these reports were propagated by the enemy themselves, in order to stop our march. So I continued my march to the road, without forgetting the baggage, accordingly I sent a considerable corps to guard it, and the main army continued its march; and being arrived at the village Nicken, halted to take some rest. Some squadrons of the enemy's cavalry appeared before the first division, but were soon driven back by our cannon, and disappeared. We did not imagine we should come to action that day, as the enemy had always avoided it, and on our approach quitted their camps, however strong, and generally in the night. As it was of the greatest consequence to him to regain the road to the Oder: so he had sent the cavalry above mentioned, seemingly to reconnoitre us, but in fact, to cover the march of his army behind them, I therefore ordered mine to resume the march; and being arrived with my right wing on the road, I ordered it to
extend

extend itself quite to the wood, which goes to the Oder, and my left leaned on another wood by Paltzig, which was behind the center of the army; while we were occupied in taking this position, our light troops skirmished with the enemy; who on his side, was advancing in columns. While they were passing the defilés and forming the line on our side of them, our artillery made a prodigious havock among them; and had they not continually relieved those in front with fresh troops, and the pass not been of such great importance to them, they must have immediately fled. After the cannonade had continued an hour, the enemy approached us, sustaining his troops continually by fresh ones within musket shot, and the fire of the musketry began; his attack was so desperate that it seemed he was determined to gain the victory, or lose the last man in his army. However his despair (or rather vigour and bravery as I call it) availed him nothing against the great valour and dauntless firmness of your majesty's troops; having received reinforcements through the wood, he attacked our right wing with uncommon vigour, three times, and was repulsed with great slaughter. When we consider the loss he had already sustained, it is surprising he should have renewed the attack, but without doubt he flattered himself thereby to gain the victory. He had ordered four regiments to pass through the woods to attack our right flank, which was covered by two of our regiments, that of Siberia, and that of Permia, which repulsed the enemy three times, but had suffered much so that there were great openings in their line, on which the enemy's cavalry leaped among them (this is the expression Soltikow uses, which shews the vigour with which they attacked,) but owing to the help of God, and your majesty's good fortune, our artillery prevented these four regiments from coming well out of the woods, and drove them back; they were pursued by General Demiscow,

Demiscow, with two regiments of horse, so that few escaped. In the mean time, three regiments of infantry entered into the lines on the right, and filled the opening; in this manner the enemy's right, was driven out of the field. However he did not give up the affair, he sent the rest of his cavalry through the village Nicken to attack our left flank, but General Tottleben who was returned from the baggage, put it on fire, so that the enemy could advance no farther; he made also two attacks on our left, and was repulsed, so that he was forced at length to retreat on all sides, followed by our cavalry and light troops, and the Schuwallows*. We have lost the brave General Demiscow, several officers, and about eight hundred and seventy-eight men, of which and the wounded I here send the list. The enemy's loss is very considerable, General Wobersnow killed, General Stutterheim, Manteuffel, and Canitz wounded, above four thousand men killed, and two thousand prisoners, besides a great many deserters. We have taken fourteen pieces of cannon, and many standards, colours, &c. and lost no trophies.

The enemy made his way through the woods to the Oder, while the infantry passed over bridges, and the cavalry through the fords higher up towards Glogau. On the twenty-sixth, we marched towards Crossen, where we arrived the twenty-eighth; General Villebois was sent with a strong corps to Frankfurt, and being informed that the enemy was encamped about eight miles off, prince Gallitzen was sent to reconnoitre him, but on approaching, they quitted their camp, and retired towards Glogau; a small party I sent to Marshal Daun, through Silesia, met in the way a captain of horse, with twenty-five men, sent to me by
General

* These are constructed like the howitzers, with this difference, that instead of being cylindric within, they are elliptic, with the greatest diameter horizontal, and the lesser perpendicular, by which their shot are supposed to spread more in the enemy's line; I prefer the howitzer, for its simplicity.

General Laudohn, who are since arrived here. The General says, that he, with twenty thousand men is on the march to join me, and that in four days he will reach the Oder; and I have therefore resolved after to morrow, to march to Franckfurt, of which I have given General Laudohn notice, that he may direct his march thither, to draw prince Henry another way, and prevent him coming from Saxony and joining the king. Our army is only sixty miles from Berlin."

The Prussian account of this battle, is as follows.

" On the twentieth of July, part of the Russian army came to Zullichau, and the remainder the day following; their object was to come to Crossen before us, and so to cut us off from Franckfurt. The twenty-third in the morning, General Wedel reconnoitred the enemy's camp at Langen Meil, and finding it in motion, the Prussian army in order to come before them, marched off in two lines, the one by Kay, and the other by Mose, upon which the Russians occupied all the heights beyond Kay, as well as the ravins, &c. Scarce were the Prussian columns come out of the hollow way by Kay, when they fell in with the enemy's light troops, which they dispersed, but these were continually reinforced, and the action became more general. The Russians had placed a great quantity of artillery on the heights opposite to the ground we advanced upon. It was necessary to attack these batteries; accordingly General Manteuffel with six batallions, attacked them, and took forty pieces of cannon, but was wounded, and carried out of the field. The Russians made preparation for a retreat, in which they were protected by the remaining artillery, on the heights behind those we had taken; whereas ours not being able to advance through the marshy ground, we were obliged to do every thing with the musket alone, which it was hardly possible could be successful; moreover, this ground did not permit us to advance regularly and form a line, so that our attacks were insulated,

lated, and with the batallions separated, and not sufficiently supported; General Wedel here ordered four regiments of cavalry to advance through the woods, and attack the enemy's right flank; and though these drove all before them at first and made their way through the woods, yet partly by the superior force of the Russians, and our troops wanting timely support from the second column, and partly from the ground not permitting us to form a greater line; we were obliged to give way and retire: the attack began a little before four in the evening, and finished at seven; so that the action did not last above three hours; our left was posted on the heights by Kay, where it began, and then extended to Paltzig. The enemy occupied all the heights before us, where he remained. General Woberfnow was killed in the attack of the cavalry, and much lamented for his good qualities, as a gentleman, and a soldier; we have lost some cannon. The enemy during the action burnt five villages without any necessity."

The loss of the Russians, officers and men, was near nine hundred killed, and above four thousand wounded. That of the Prussians, above twenty thousand killed, above forty thousand wounded, and twenty thousand missing, by the infantry; and by the cavalry, four hundred killed, as many wounded, sixty missing, and one thousand three hundred horses killed and wounded—in the whole above nine thousand, that is more than a third of their army, which proves, that they fought with vigour and firmness.

Reflections on these Transactions.

In general it is highly necessary to oppose an enemy beyond your frontier, and advance as far as possible to meet him, because many advantages arise from this method. For in the first place, you gain

time, which is every thing in a defensive war : secondly, by consuming all subsistence behind you, the progress of the enemy is retarded so much, that when finally you are driven back by superior forces ; if you can find some strong camp on your frontier, from whence you cover it, he will find it difficult, or perhaps impossible to collect provisions, sufficient to undertake a siege, or execute any capital enterprise, which of course will force him to retire, (and this is particularly true, with regard to the Russians, for the reasons alledged already.) However this rule has its exceptions, and the case before us is one. The Prussians knew that the enemy was to be reinforced by a considerable corps of Austrians, that the junction could be made only above Franckfurt, and that it must be executed almost instantaneously, because the Austrians could not pretend to remain above one day in that country : as the king from Silesia might come behind them, and cut them off from Bohemia, and Saxony. From whence it follows that the Prussian army, should never have lost sight of Franckfurt, which would have prevented the projected junction, and probably the calamities which arose from it : any position about Guben behind the Oder, would have effected this object ; whereas by losing the communication with Franckfurt, they suffered Laudohn to arrive there unmolested at the very moment it was necessary. Having once lost his communication with that place, the Prussian general instead of giving battle should instantly have retired, and endeavoured by forced marches to have regained it, which he might still have done ; for Laudohn arrived on the eighth or ninth day after the battle : this was a capital fault, to have suffered himself to be pushed, I may say, out of the road to Franckfurt, and still a greater, not to have regained it, as he might have done, and prevented the junction till the king arrived, which would have forced Laudohn into
Saxony :

Saxony; and the Russians of course, to avoid another useless battle, would on their part also, have retired without loss of time.

The Prussians having lost the road to Franckfurt and Crossen, were obliged to fight on improper ground, where they could not form a line, or make their cavalry act, which was remarkably good. They were brought on bad ground, and destroyed by the artillery alone, which no cavalry can resist for a moment. It must not therefore be exposed to it, nor ever appear on any ground where it cannot advance full gallop. The partial attacks which the Prussian account blamed, are however in my opinion the best; whenever the enemy cannot avail himself of the intervals between them, which was the case here, and is so generally against the Russians, who manœuvre slowly, and stand on the ground which they occupy, and seldom or ever break their line to advance against any particular point, however advantageous it might be; partial attacks are more vigorous, and if properly supported, generally succeed: you can bring the main part of your line to act against particular points: whereas the other parts of the enemy's line must remain inactive, if the ground permits you to hide your disposition, and make several false attacks to prevent him from breaking his line to support the points really attacked. When the ground is open, and you cannot cover your motions, of course all your attacks must be linked together, and no openings left between them, for if the enemy is able, and his troops manœuvre well, instead of bringing his forces entirely to oppose your attacks, and breaking his line for that purpose, he will instantly order his second line, and his reserve (which should always be divided into three parts, behind the right, the center and the left) to support the points attacked; and with his best troops attack those places between your attacks, which seem the weakest, his second line always advancing to support these detachments, so that you cannot

come on the flanks of such corps as advance before the front to attack you. Whether this succeeds entirely or not, you cannot push on your attacks, though successful. Whereas if your enemy remain on the ground (as the Russians always, and indeed most other troops too generally do) without attempting by such detachments, as I have described, to create a diversion on that part of your army unemployed in your attacks, he will probably be forced in one point or other, because his motions necessarily depending on yours; if his attention is drawn to more points than one at the same moment, he will not dare to reinforce any part of his line, till one of your attacks shall have become decisively serious, and then it is often too late to do it with effect; his line is pierced, his reinforcements arriving successively, are successively beaten, and his army being broken, brigade after brigade, the day concludes with a compleat and bloody route, in which he probably loses most of his artillery, and perhaps his camp and baggage, and thus becomes unable to resist whatever operation you may be disposed to undertake in consequence of your victory. The Russians hold this conduct, because they do not, as I said, move with celerity, and confide much in their artillery; others perhaps trusting too entirely in the strength of their position; but besides, few generals and few armies are equal to the system of defence I propose. Few generals have genius to discern what points may, or may not be attacked, or defended with advantage, or catch the moment it is to be done. Few armies are so constituted that they can, if I may so say, execute the general's orders with the same rapidity he has conceived the propriety of them. The prodigious quantity of artillery which they drag after them (in which, like the Russians, most troops place too much confidence) chains them to the ground on which they stand, or renders their motions too slow. They cannot follow

follow their general; he must follow them, and his talents when most required (in battle) are lost.

The Russians during this part of the campaign conducted themselves with great wisdom, and in the action behaved with a firmness peculiar to themselves. The object was Franckfurt, because it was there alone they could be joined by Laudohn, and therefore from their first march from Posen they moved uniformly on their right, and close to the enemy's left flank, which wise manœuvre, united to his fears of losing the communication with Silesia, at last brought them on the road which leads to Franckfurt, forced the enemy to engage in an unequal combat, where he was defeated, and accomplished their end with great glory.

After the battle of Paltzig, the Russians marched on the twenty-sixth to Crossen, and there remained till the thirty-first; and on the third of August arrived at Franckfurt, in whose neighbourhood General Laudohn, with above eighteen thousand men, and forty-eight pieces of artillery, besides those belonging to the regiments, arrived the same day; the bridge over the Oder was re-established, and another of pontoons thrown over that river higher up, to maintain the communication between the Austrians and Russians.


In the mean while General Wedel passed the Oder after the battle, and camped within a few miles of Crossen, between that place and Glogau. The king ordered Prince Henry, who commanded in Saxony, to march with the greater part of his army into Silesia, which accordingly arrived at Sagan on the Bober the twenty-eighth of July, where it was joined by another under the Prince Frederick of Wurtemberg, who with six battalions, and fifteen squadrons, had been sent to observe General Haddick, but finding himself too weak, had by the king's orders returned to Sagan.

The king leaving his army in Silesia under Prince Henry's command, on the twenty-eighth of July came to Sagan, and put himself

self at the head of the corps assembled there. When Marshal Daun detached General Laudohn to join the Russians, he ordered General Haddick, with a considerable body, to advance towards Pribus in Lusatia to reinforce him, and cover his march towards Franckfurt, which having done, Haddick himself with about twelve or fourteen thousand men remained at Guben. The king who had directed his march from Sagan to Somerfeld, where he arrived the first of August with one of his columns, was informed of his position, and fearing he might make another expedition to Berlin, resolved to attack him, which he did on the second, and drove him back with the loss of the greatest part of his baggage; he seems to have been surprized, otherwise such an event could not have happened. On the third the king resumed his march to Muhlrose, where he was joined by Wedel's army the fourth. Soon after happened the battle of Kunnersdorff near Franckfurt: the accounts published by both parties of this important action, relate also all the manœuvres which preceded, and led to it, we shall therefore give them as they are, that the reader may judge for himself. The two first are given by the Prussians, and the last by the Russians.

“ The king having united his forces at Muhlrose the fourth, he marched on the fifth to Wulkow on the Oder, the ninth the van camped at Lebus, and the army at some distance behind; both armies, were now separated by the Oder, and fronted each other; here General Finck arrived from Saxony, with a strong corps of twenty-four batallions and ten squadrons, upon which the king ordered bridges to be thrown over the Oder, which was done lower down near Ritwein, between Lebus and Custrin the ground before the army where it then stood being improper, and moreover too near the enemy. On the tenth the army received orders to march, and on the eleventh we passed the Oder, the infantry over the bridges, and the cavalry through the fords, and advanced about four miles further

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further on, but the troops were so fatigued with the heat and dust, that it was thought prudent to postpone the attack till the next day; that night we remained in the open field, without tents; the van was at Bischoffsee, about two miles from the enemy, who remained very quiet in his camp well fortified. The twelfth at three o'clock we marched towards Reppin, and formed ourselves in order of battle in the wood, and then advanced against the enemy's right, (it should be the left.) This was likewise done by the corps under General Finck. The fire from the batteries, began soon after ten, and produced good effect; having continued near an hour, eight battalions of the van advanced against the enemy's entrenchments, and notwithstanding they were on high ground entered them, without any loss, and took forty-two pieces of artillery: upon which General Finch, with the rest of the van, marched against the great entrenchment by Kunnersdorff. At first this did not succeed, because it was not supported by any artillery; but when we had brought some heavy cannon on the hill we had taken, which was the highest, General Finck, protected and supported by them, attacked once more the entrenchments, and succeeded; we had few men killed, but many wounded; which done, the General advanced through the village Kunnersdorff: behind which lay an entire line of redoubts, the greatest part of which were taken, and the enemy driven back on all sides. They defended themselves however, with great bravery, and many of them threw themselves on the ground, as if they had been dead; and when we had passed them, got up, took their arms, and fired at our backs: our cavalry was kept back by the prodigious fire of the enemy's artillery loaded with grape shot, (particularly the howitzers) and could not advance to support the infantry as well as it could be wished. The Russians however retired all together towards the last hill, and seemed resolved to defend it. At the same time they
seemed

seemed to despair, for they began to plunder the baggage. We had taken above one hundred pieces of cannon; and the Russians continually flying, till six o'clock, we could flatter ourselves with hopes of a glorious victory: the Russians had thrown themselves behind an abbatis by the Judenberg, where they defended themselves, protected by fifty pieces of cannon; and in this moment the Prussians fortune failed them, and turned her back upon them, to which many circumstances contributed. The excessive heat of the day, had very much fatigued the troops, and not a drop of water being to be found was one, but not the only cause of our bad fortune. After the taking of the third line of entrenchments, the Prussians did not as before, advance in good order, but in broken troops, the disadvantage of which, any one may imagine. General Laudohn saw this disorder, and with some regiments of grenadiers, which as yet had not been engaged, knew how to avail himself of it; while we were making our last attack in great confusion, he advanced, and hindred the Prussians from taking the last entrenchment. The cavalry is always victorious when the ground permits it to act freely against tired infantry. The death of General Putkammer, and the wounds of General Seidlitz were also the cause that our cavalry was brought into disorder. It attempted to enter the entrenchments, but did not succeed. The king did all that was possible to bring his troops into order and exposed himself so much, that he had two horses killed under him, but they were so tired, that they fell on the ground unable to stand: so that nothing remained to be done, but retire as well as they could. Had the Prussians remained in good order on the third height they had taken, and postponed the last attack till next morning; when it might have been made with more advantage; it is probable the flying enemy would have abandoned his posts in the night—but when an event has happened, it is easy to judge how one might have

“ have done better. It is said that General Finck proposed this to
 “ the king who did not approve of it : we can however say for cer-
 “ tain, that after we had taken Kunnersdorff, if instead of advancing
 “ by our right, as we did, we had advanced by our left, we should in
 “ great measure have avoided the fire of the enemy’s great battery,
 “ and with much more ease have taken the last hill. During the bat-
 “ tle, about twelve o’clock, General Wunsch had taken Franckfurt,
 “ which circumstance likewise obliged the enemy to exert themselves.
 “ It is easy to imagine, our retreat could not be made in good order ;
 “ the Russians however pursued us only a little way. The loss of
 “ the Prussians consists of about three thousand killed, two thousand
 “ taken, and eleven thousand wounded, above one hundred cannon,
 “ and near three thousand horses. The fourth our army repassed the
 “ Oder, and camped near Retwein.” Every body says, and the
 Prussians believe, that nothing remained to be done but take the
 Judenberg : a person who was on the ground since the battle
 however assures, that before the Judenberg and close to it, was a
 whole line of batteries, which appeared evidently long after the
 battle, which the Prussians must have taken, before they reached
 the Judenberg. Moreover this line was naturally so strong that
 it could not be forced, which must have been done, after taking
 the abbatis on the side ; where, into the bargain, the height is so
 steep and craggy that it is as inaccessible as if it was pallisaded.
 This circumstance in the heat of the battle, was overlooked by the
 Prussians, at least, it does not appear in any place ; which shews
 how imperfectly men see and judge of ground.

The second account runs as follows.

“ Though the king’s army was not half so numerous as that of the
 “ enemy, and they occupied a very strong camp, fortified and co-
 “ vered with cannon, circumstances did not permit his majesty to
 “ defer the attack any longer.

" On the eleventh the army passed the Oder, four miles above
 " Custrin; the twelfth, at eleven o'clock, the attack was made with
 " such success that we took three batteries, in which were above
 " eighty pieces of artillery. The greatest part of the Russian army
 " fled, and for six hours, the victory was ours, which the enemy be-
 " lieved; but as part of their troops collected in a great battery,
 " which lay on the Judenberg, stood their ground; so at the same
 " time, the Austrian cavalry attacked ours, and beat it; Seidlitz
 " who commanded ours, was wounded and carried out of the field.
 " The enemy's cavalry then attacked the infantry and brought it
 " into disorder. The king did all that was possible to re-establish
 " the affair, and brought on the troops three times again, and ex-
 " posed himself to the greatest danger; but in vain; the men were
 " so fatigued, they could not advance, which obliged his majesty
 " to order the retreat, and abandon the advantages he had obtained
 " at first."

Count Soltikow's account is as follows—

" In my last I had the honour to inform your Imperial Majesty,
 " that the twelfth your army had gained a complete victory over the
 " enemy, commanded by the king in person. I now beg leave to add
 " the particulars: on the eleventh we were informed the enemy had
 " passed the Oder. I did not think it necessary to change any thing
 " in the position we had taken, but to remain on the height we oc-
 " cupied near Franckfurt. Our right came almost to the banks of
 " the Oder, our left went to Kunnerstorf as far as the woods. It
 " would seem from hence that our army had its back towards the
 " enemy, but the nature of the ground, required we should form as
 " we did; when the enemy advanced to Geritz, it was plain he
 " would march about us, our right composed of the first division, was
 " commanded by Count Fermor, the van by General Villebois; the
 " second division under Count Romanzow, made the center; and the
 " new

“ new corps under Prince Gallitzin, made our left : for want of
 “ room the Austrians could not enter into the line, and were there-
 “ fore posted behind the right. I endeavoured to place the cavalry
 “ so as not to expose it to the enemy’s artillery ; from the nature of
 “ the ground, the affair must be decided chiefly by the infantry.

“ On the enemy’s approach our light troops, commanded by Count
 “ Tottleben retired and took post before the front of our right ;
 “ though from the disposition of the enemy, it appeared he intend-
 “ ed to surround our left. I made no alteration in mine afterwards.
 “ On his nearer approach he seemed to intend attacking also our
 “ right, probably to cover his real intentions which was to attack
 “ our left : having erected two batteries on that side against our
 “ flank ; and at the same time ordered some infantry and cavalry to
 “ advance through a valley, about ten he extended his left ; having
 “ raised some batteries against our right which was covered by a
 “ marsh, over which is a bridge : this Count Tottleben put on fire,
 “ so that the enemy could not approach our right ; though by this
 “ I brought the enemy’s whole fire against my left. I reaped how-
 “ ever this advantage, that I could make my dispositions as circum-
 “ stances required ; accordingly the enemy attacked our left, exactly
 “ against the flank ; where a regiment of grenadiers of the new corps
 “ was posted ; and after a vigorous resistance was obliged to retire,
 “ the enemy having brought the greatest part of his fires against
 “ this point : on which prince Gallitzin, who commanded there,
 “ ordered two regiments from the first and second line to advance,
 “ and form a line, these were supported by two other regiments
 “ from the new corps, so that they made front across the camp,
 “ where the flank was. During this manœuvre, the enemy who
 “ were advanced to the ground left by the regiment of grenadiers
 “ which retired, had an opportunity to take our heights, and open
 “ his columns ; so that these regiments were likewise driven back,

“ and the enemy took two of our batteries, formed his army in one
“ column, which took all the ground about our new line ; and
“ though he had suffered much in these attacks, his line extended
“ towards our right, against which he had likewise brought a great
“ quantity of artillery. To oppose these great forces, I ordered
“ General Panin to advance and support those regiments which re-
“ tired ; and as the narrowness of the ground did not permit any
“ more than two regiments to form the line in flank, he did so
“ with a regiment of grenadiers, while Count Campitelli brought
“ on the German grenadiers ; behind these he (General Panin)
“ formed another line of two regiments, and soon afterwards
“ another of two more, and General Laudohn ordered two Ger-
“ man regiments to advance and support his grenadiers, so that
“ upon the whole there were six or seven lines, one behind the
“ other, the ground on which they stood, allowing no more than
“ two regiments in each line ; of course the enemy was stopped
“ by this mass of infantry, and it was doubtful which side should
“ prevail. The enemy ordered his cavalry to advance, though the
“ ground did not permit them to act with vigour and advantage,
“ on which Count Romanzow at the head of ours, and General
“ Laudohn with the Austrians attacked the enemy, and forced him
“ to give way ; at the same time prince Lubomirsky with three
“ regiments of infantry, and prince Wolkonski with two more
“ taken out of the other lines wheeled about and brought the ene-
“ my's infantry into confusion : however he did not give it up, for
“ he formed a new column, with which he endeavoured to come
“ behind our second line, to put us between two fires, and prevent
“ our right from marching to support the left, but General Berg
“ with two regiments taken out of the second line of the right, ad-
“ vanced to meet him, and being supported by our cannon and
“ howitzers drove him back, to which the Austrian artillery con-
“ tributed

“tributed very much; we then concluded the battle was over, for
 “though the enemy endeavoured to bring his troops into order,
 “he was forced to retire. About five o’clock two regiments ad-
 “vanced from the van, while General Berg with two more attacked
 “the enemy in flank, and forced him to run away; he was retiring
 “before; General Laudohn at the head of all the cavalry pursued
 “him on the left, and the light troops on the right, so ended this
 “famous action, having lasted from eleven in the morning to six in
 “the evening.” The Russians had killed, wounded and missing,
 about fourteen thousand men; the Austrians about two thousand;
 and the Prussians lost eighteen thousand, near three thousand
 horses, and one hundred and seventy two pieces of cannon, they
 lost also General Putkammer who was killed, and eleven other
 generals wounded. The plan which we give of the battle, and
 the different accounts of the same, read with attention will enable
 the reader to form a proper judgment of it.

REFLECTIONS.

In the conduct of this action we must observe, that the Russians
 as usual fought well, and manœuvred ill; when finally they saw
 that the enemy brought his principal forces against their left wing
 and that flank, they should instantly have done then what they
 afterwards did, when it was almost too late. They should have
 brought up their van, their reserve, and the greatest part of their
 second line, together with the Austrians, and formed another left
 flank, eight or ten lines deep, which they might have done, as the
 ground was narrow, and did not exceed seven hundred yards.
 These lines would have extended their left towards the Oder, more
 or less as the ground opened and permitted it. This they might
 have done with the more confidence, as the front of their camp,
 particularly

particularly on their right, was very strong, being covered intirely with impenetrable marshes: and secondly, because they in fact saw that all the enemy's forces were directed against their left. Having neglected this precaution for above five hours, they were on the point of losing the battle, and their army. For the Prussian General Wunsch had during the action taken Franckfurt, and their baggage in it, so that they had no retreat, but over a bridge a little above that town, which broke down, and had it not, an army totally routed, so near the river, and the enemy close to their heels, or rather upon them with their bayonets in their backs, must have been drowned, cut to pieces, or surrendered at discretion. Happily for the Russians, General Laudohn advanced with his Austrians, and stopped the enemy until a disposition could be made, and supported successively by many regiments of Russians and Austrians, who formed several lines across the camp, which great mass the Prussians could not move, and immediately gave way on all sides. The attack made by the enemy's cavalry was repulsed, and he attacked in his turn, and beat; the battle was then won.

As to the king and his troops, they behaved with wonderful vigour and activity, and deserved to win the battle: why did they not? in the first place, because the enemy was much stronger, having at least seventy thousand men, and a prodigious quantity of artillery, particularly howitzers of different species, which are of great use in the field, in a close country, and against cavalry; secondly, the ground was extremely strong by nature, and moreover well covered by entrenchments; so that the Prussians, particularly their formidable cavalry, could not move, and act with their accustomed vigour and celerity, which gave the enemy time to make the last disposition on his flank, and this was decisive as we have seen. The Prussians, greatly diminished by their various attacks, and much fatigued with the uncommon heat, and moreover, as it always

ways happens after a long and obstinate engagement, being thrown into disorder, and of course unable to resist the shock and weight of so great a mass as was formed against them, were obliged to give way, at first gradually, being sustained by the cavalry, but this being beat, they fled precipitately, and abandoned every thing, their own artillery, and that taken from the enemy: whether they ought or could form on the ground they had taken already, and were in possession of before the last attack they made against the Judenberg, with their left on the heights, and their right towards Franckfurt, of which they were masters, I do not know; though I think they might, in which case the enemy must have retired in the night over the Oder, and the battle was completely won. It was the last attack which was fatal to the Prussians; had they avoided it, I am strongly inclined to believe the enemy could never have driven them from the ground they occupied, and the less so, as the king might have sent a strong detachment towards Franckfurt to join that under Wunsch, which must have come on the Russians left flank and rear, had they advanced to drive him out of his ground. To support the last attack the king sent a strong column along the high road to come even behind the flank of the enemy's second line, as it is marked in the plan. Now I ask, why at first setting out he did not send a strong, or rather his chief column that way, from whence he would have reaped every advantage possible, particularly had he ordered a great part of his artillery to be placed against the enemy's front towards the right, and made some false attacks there, which would have hindered them from drawing troops from thence to support their left. We think that neither the Russians, nor any army upon earth, however strongly posted, if one or other wing is surrounded, and vigorously attacked, while another strong corps supported by cavalry, acts upon and behind the flank, can resist a moment; and I am convinced, that if the king had firmly adhered to this disposition, ad-

vancing

vancing coolly and deliberately with his infantry (for cavalry alone must act with rapidity, infantry is instantly thrown into confusion if you pretend to hurry it), he would have driven the whole Russian army into the Oder, or obliged them to disperse and fly in the night up that river on the right of it. The ground permitted him to do this at the last attack, and consequently it might have been done at first; would have saved a great number of men, and, we think, insured a complete victory. The contrary happened, merely from having neglected it.

* We must here again lament the king's violent inclination for battles; which as we have often observed, are seldom necessary, and in a defensive war must always be avoided. In these two battles the king lost thirty thousand men, and two hundred pieces of artillery, though neither was necessary.

Had Wedel's army been reinforced to thirty-five thousand men, and retired successively before the Russians, passed the Oder, and taken post behind the Neiß between Guben and Franckfurt, with a strong detachment there and at Crossen; General Laudohn could never have joined the Russians, and these would most certainly not have passed the Oder; though they never decline fighting, they never engage freely in action. They would have gone over the Wartha towards Landsberg, and from thence through Pomerania home, as they did the preceding year, or perhaps gone up the right of the Oder a little way, plundered the country, and gone by Posen to the Vistula. The king in the mean time might have posted himself with an army behind the Bober to observe the Austrians; and Prince Henry in Saxony to oppose the army of the empire; by such a disposition his majesty would have spared his men, and most effectually protected his country, and saved Dresden into the bargain. The positions we mention are so decisive, that I am convinced the king with one hundred and thirty thou-

* See note F.

thousand men, will be able to protect his country against double the number.

Fifty thousand on the frontiers of Bohemia, with their center at Glatz, move to the right or left, as the motions of the Austrians require, and if these penetrated into Upper Lusatia, those move up the Queiss and Bober towards Naumbourg, Sagan, and Christianstadt; forty thousand near Frankfurt, which will protect Pomernia, and all beyond the Oder; and forty thousand men in Saxony, which nobody can drive out. If the king had posted himself with forty thousand men only, on the heights behind Frankfurt, and left eight or ten thousand more in Saxony to protect Dresden for the present, and his brother at Sagan, to observe Marshal Daun who was advanced to Pribus, I say the Russians would never have passed the Oder, and exposed themselves to the hazard of an action, with that river behind them; and if they did, the king might have had many opportunities to fight them with advantage, or by occupying a strong camp, with Berlin behind him, and Custrin on his left flank, stop them short, and force them to retire. The idea which then prevailed of joining Marshal Daun, which his motions seemed to confirm, was ridiculous in the highest degree. These two armies amounted to, I suppose, near one hundred and forty thousand men; neither had a strong place or any depots, they could not consequently keep together twenty-four hours, nor even subsist separately a week. If such a project ever was made, they would have been both ruined, the king on one side, and Prince Henry between the Austrians and Bohemia. There was no opening for them but to fly into Saxony, and from thence probably for the same want of subsistence into Bohemia. The truth is, the Russians felt they had nothing to do beyond the Oder; that in passing it, they greatly exposed themselves, and finally that they could not stay any where beyond it. These be-

ing the circumstances and position of the respective armies, they could not remain ten days where they were, and of course must have left Laudohn to seek his way through Poland, and retired through Pomerania home, or march on the left up the Oder, bring him part of his way home, and having plundered the country in their way, return to Posen, on the Wartha. For my own part, I am thoroughly convinced of this reasoning, but the reader will take the map in his hand, and judge. Why then, O King, fight? Indeed this reasoning is so well founded, that the Russians, though they had got two great victories, were checked by the king, who had not above twenty-five thousand men, and obliged after they had passed the Oder, to skim (if I may so say) Lusatia, and part of Silesia, repass the Oder, and having escorted Laudohn on his way home, be content to return to Posen, which proves there was no necessity for fighting, and that they must have done this, without ever being able to pass the Oder at all.

The king continued at Retwein for some days; but on the approach of General Haddick, who was coming with a considerable corps to join the Russians, his Majesty thought it prudent to take some advantageous camp, to hinder their advancing into Brandenburg towards Berlin; accordingly on the fifteenth he marched by Lebus to Madlitz, between Frankfurt and Furstenwalde, and on the eighteenth to this last place, that he might with greater convenience receive the artillery and stores he expected from Berlin.

The Russian army having been joined by General Haddick on the fourteenth, passed the Oder the sixteenth, and encamped near the village Loffow. On the twenty-second Count Soltikow had an interview with Marshal Daun at Guben, whose army camped at Tribel in Lusatia, and consequently the two armies might have joined had they chosen, which the Russians undoubtedly

edly refused, for the reasons above mentioned; they had nothing, and were only supplied by the Austrians for some little time, while the communication was open between them, as I was informed. On the twenty-eighth of August, the Russians occupied a camp at Hohenwalde, and jointly with the Austrians blew up the sluices of the canal by Muhlrose, which joins the Spree and the Oder, a cruel and unnecessary work, worthy Goths and Vandals. On the twenty-ninth they encamped at Grahnau in Lower Lusatia; upon which Frankfurt after it had paid fifty thousand dollars, (about eight thousand pounds) was evacuated. The thirtieth the Russians camped at Liberosé, Haddick covered the march on the right and Laudohn the rear; here they remained till the fifteenth of September. The king kept very close, and almost in sight of them during the whole march. On the thirtieth of August he camped at Waldau opposite the Russians; on the first of September, and the day following at Lubben, separated from them by a small morass, where he remained till the Russians resumed their march, which they did on the fifteenth of September, not being able to continue there any longer for want of provisions; when they went to Guben, from thence on the eighteenth to Starnzeddel, and on the nineteenth to Sommerfeld; Laudohn advanced to Christianstadt, where he was reinforced with eight or ten thousand men, under Count Campitelli. The king followed close to the enemy, on his right; he had already sent a corps under General Finck to Saxony, and being arrived at Cotbus sent four battallions more there. The Russians seemed inclined to take Glogau, that they might have a place of arms in Silesia, but as they were not in a condition to besiege it in form, and it had a good garison, and the king close to them, they wisely abandoned

September.

this project, (if ever they had seriously formed it)*. The twentieth they came to Christianstadt, passed the Bober the twenty-first; the twenty-second they camped at Langen-Hermsdorff; the twenty-third at Freystadt; the twenty-fourth at Benthén; the twenty-ninth passed the Oder below Benthén, having the king always close to them on their right; he advanced with some battalions in hopes of coming up with their rear in passing the Oder, but found them all on the other side, upon which his Majesty marched to Glogau, and ordered a strong detachment to take post at Rutzen, where they fortified themselves. On the fourth of October. October the Russians marched to Schwafén, Laudohn made the rear guard. The Russians made several batteries against the Prussian corps above mentioned, but could not drive them away. On the seventh they marched to Gros Ofsen, by which it appeared they proposed going towards Breslaw, and arrive there before the king. This obliged his Majesty to return over the Oder the seventh, and march also towards Breslaw, he therefore ordered a strong corps to advance to Ratschutz: a bridge was thrown over the Oder, where this detachment passed, and had a smart encounter with the enemy's light troops, the whole army passed in the night and camped by Sophienthal. The Russians by this position were prevented from going to Breslaw, and so remained at Gros Ofsen till the twenty-eighth, when they marched to Hernstadt on the Bartsch river, which was the direct road to Breslaw, but the king had occupied this pass, which was of great consequence, as the enemy could no longer go to Breslaw, without a long and difficult march through morasses, &c. The king on seeing the enemy advance

* They never had it in their power to make the attempt, the king by the position he took at Milkau barred their road to that place, and by his well placed detachments rendered it impossible for them to come near enough even to bombard it.

to Hernstadt, marched thither also to support that important pass: both armies were near each other; General Laudohn burnt the town with his artillery. The reasons he gives are by no means sufficient to justify such unnecessary barbarities. He was led by passion, on seeing himself and the Russians disappointed in their views against Breslaw, by taking which place it was hoped, the Russian army, or at least a great part of it, might be prevailed upon to stay with the Austrian. This was the last exploit of the Russians. On the twenty-fourth they began their retreat towards Poland. The king continued in his camp some days after the retreat of the enemy, to make some dispositions. General Hulsén with the greatest part of the army was ordered into Saxony; General Schmettau remained in Silesia, with a corps. The king being ill with the gout went to Glogau, but finding himself better, on the seventh of November he set out for Saxony. General Laudohn took his march through Poland towards Upper Silesia, and on the twenty-fourth of November arrived with his cavalry at Cracaw, and on the first of December marched to Teschen. General Fouquet had left Landshut, and crossed the Oder at Breslaw, from whence he advanced to the frontiers to observe Laudohn, and keep him from making incursions in his way, into Silesia, and kept close to him, which brought on several skirmishes but of no consequence. Both parties being quite fatigued with such operations at that season of the year, and having great need of rest agreed to a sort of truce, on condition that neither should undertake any thing, during the winter, and so went into quarters; I wish this was always done. For expeditions undertaken during the winter can be of no great service, and ruin the troops who want rest.

I shall conclude my observation on the Russian campaign, by saying it proved, that an army whose line of operation is considerably too long can execute no solid enterprize, though it be ever
so

so powerful: and that a handful of men well conducted (as the Prussians were, who certainly did not amount to a third of the Russian army) will infallibly stop their progress, and finally force them to retire, without doing any thing; these two campaigns and the following prove these truths to a demonstration.

C H A P. III.

Of the Operations of the Austrian Army, commanded by Marshal Daun in 1759.

April.

THIS army took up its quarters during the winter in Bohemia; the weather being very severe in the spring it did not assemble till the end of April. In the months of March and April several skirmishes happened on the frontier, from Moravia to Landshut, but as usual of no real importance. General Beck took and dispersed a post of about four hundred men the Prussians had at Greiffenberg. This blow however was not left unrevenged at Comnottau, in the circle of Saatz, and on the borders of Bohemia towards Saxony. The Austrians under General Gemmingen had a corps of near three thousand men, which were intended to cover that country, and particularly some magazines dispersed about in the usual careless manner; these Prince Henry resolved to attack and destroy: accordingly the fourteenth of April he left Dresden, and on his way divided his troops into two columns, the one he led himself, and the other was commanded by General Hulsen. The former entered Bohemia by Peterwald to Linnay, not far from Lowositz, where Prince Henry remained while his light troops advanced further into the country to raise contributions, and destroy the magazines, which they did with great success; and having joined the main

main body at Linnay, returned on the twentieth to Saxony. The other column met with greater resistance, on the Passberg, where they found the Austrians entrenched with two regiments of infantry and some cannon, whom after a long action they dispersed, took fifty-one officers, and near two thousand prisoners, (among whom General Rheinhard,) three pair of colours, two standards, and three cannons. In this expedition the Prince ruined all the magazines as far as Budin on Egra River, in the circle of Leutmeritz, &c. to a very great amount. In the middle of May the Prussian May. army assembled and camped near Landsbut. The Austrian army had occupied a strong camp behind the Elbe, between Jaromitz and Königshoff; the head quarters were at Schurtz. Here Marshal Daun resolved (according to the plan established) to wait until the approach of the Russians, or of the Imperialists, obliged the king to abandon his position. The Austrians made several attacks on the enemy's posts during the time the two armies remained in their respective camps, but without any considerable success. The Prussians had drawn a great part of their forces out of Saxony to oppose the Russians who were advancing towards the Oder, so that the Imperial army was at liberty to act almost unmolested on the Lower Elbe, about Dresden, which was the object. The motions of this and the Russian army made it necessary for the Austrians under Marshal Daun to march into Lusatia, in order to support the operations of the one and the other; accordingly on the twenty-eighth of June they quitted the camp of Schurtz, and marched in June. two columns to Neudorff; another corps composed chiefly of the troops which General Harsch had commanded, made the third column, and the same day arrived at Horzize, under the Duke of Arcemberg, so that the whole army was, for the convenience of the march through that mountainous country, divided into three corps. On the twenty-ninth the first marched in two columns, the one arrived

arrived at Gitschin, and the other at Lömnitz. The corps under General Laudohn marched on the right between these columns and the enemy. The first of July the two columns marched, the one to Turnau, the other to Bredl, followed by that under the Duke of Aremberg, who came that day to Gitschin; the second the army arrived at Riechenberg, where the Duke of Aremberg also arrived, and the whole army was brought together. General Laudohn advanced at the head of two thousand horse to reconnoitre the frontiers of Silesia about Marckliffa. On the fifth the country beginning to open, the army marched in five columns to Friedland; and the sixth, in four columns to Marckliffa, the head quarters at Gorlitzheim, where it remained till the twenty-ninth of July.

The king being informed of the Austrians march towards Lusatia, sent General Seidlitz with a considerable corps to Lahn, part of which had an encounter with a detachment of Laudohn's under Count Caromeli; in which this last had some loss. On the fifth of July the king, with his whole army, marched to Lahn, and afterwards to Löwenberg. About the middle of July he sent a corps under the Prince of Würtemberg to Sprottau, to observe the Duke of Aremberg, who had been sent with the reserve to occupy Lauban.

Marshal Daun's object was to send General Laudohn with a strong corps to join the Russians at Frankfurt. To which end he made the following disposition: he recalled General Haddick, who was on the frontiers of Saxony, and ordered him to march through Bohemia, into Lusatia, where he arrived the twenty-second of July, and General Laudohn joined him, and both marched together to Pfoerten, where they came the thirty-first of July, and Laudohn proceeded on his way to Frankfurt, where he arrived happily the fourth of August, and joined the Russians some days after, as we have already related. Another corps under General Macguire was sent towards Saxony, which took post the twenty-seventh at Bischoffswerda, to observe the motions of General Finck, who had left Dresden, and was marching towards Torgau. This was the position of the respective armies till the end of July, when Marshal Daun, on receiving the news of the battle of Paltzig, where the Prussians were beat, thought it necessary to proceed further into Lusatia, and come nearer the Russians, which it was thought would facilitate the operations of both armies. General Beck, who was in the neighbourhood of Lauban, marched to Naumberg on the Bober. The left wing of the army went to Lauban, and the right remained at Marcklissa.

The loss of the battle of Paltzig made it necessary for the king to reinforce Wedel's army in such a manner, as would stop the progress of the enemy on that side; accordingly the king resolved to march thither in person, and Prince Henry was ordered with the greatest part of the army in Saxony to march to Sagan, on the Bober, where he arrived the twenty-ninth of August. The day following the king began his march to the Oder, and Prince Henry was left to command the army in Silesia.

August. On the eleventh of August Marshal Daun having left a considerable corps under General Boccow at Marcklissa, to cover Bohemia, and observe the enemy on that side, the Marquis d'Ainse at Lauban, and General Macguire at Görlitz; marched to Pentzig, the twelfth to Rothenburg, and the thirteenth to Pribus. General Beck occupied Serau, and sent detachments to Christianstadt and Crossen. The Prussians had a post at Grunberg, which General Beck attacked and made prisoners.

On the nineteenth the army marched to Triebel, where it remained till the thirtieth. From which Marshal Daun made several considerable detachments; General Macguire, with about twelve thousand men, was ordered into Saxony to join the Imperialists under the Prince of Deuxponts; General Haddick was ordered to take Peitz, which he did. Various other corps were left on the Queis and Bober, to keep up the communication with Bohemia.

During this time Prince Henry continued in his camp near Löwenberg, not knowing well what the object of the Austrians was, and having no communication with the king, he could receive no orders from him; he detached General Ziethen along the Bober towards Sprottau, from whom he received information that the Austrian army was at Triebel, upon which he ordered General Fouquet to join him at Lowenberg, where he left him, and with the main army advanced to Sagan, at which place he arrived the
twenty-

twenty-ninth of August, and General Ziethen passed the Bober, and took post on the hills behind Sorau, with a great wood behind him, which goes quite to Sagan. On the thirtieth the Austrian army marched to Muska; on the thirty-first to Forst, and the day following back to Triebel. The second of September the van-guard went to Sorau with an intention to attack General Ziethen, who on the approach of the Austrians retired unmolested through the wood to Sagan, passed the bridge and joined Prince Henry, who was encamped on the other side of the town. On the third however the whole Austrian army went to Sorau, with what intention it is impossible to judge, for he could not think of bringing Prince Henry to battle, or of entering Silesia on that side; I therefore think it was to prevent Prince Henry joining the king, or going into Poland behind them, which the Russians were afraid of, and so this motion was made merely to make them easy on that subject. Their fears were ill grounded, for as the armies then stood such a junction was impossible, and the other movement not to be performed.

Prince Henry observing that the Austrian army was sixty miles from the frontiers of Bohemia, from whence they drew their subsistence, very naturally thought by marching back towards Lauban, Marshal Daun would be obliged to return instantly towards Bohemia, and take some post on the line of communication between Silesia and Saxony, and by that means maintain his communication with that country and his magazines in Bohemia: on the fifth of September accordingly this Prince left Sagan, and marched behind the Bober to Lauban, and on the ninth arrived at Neustadt not far from Lauban, on which General de Ville, who had been left at Marcklissa to cover Bohemia, left that place, and the fifth came to Lauban, which gave the Prussians an opening to send General Stutterheim over Marcklissa, to ruin the Austrians

depots at Friedland and Gabel, which he compleatly executed. On the approach of Prince Henry, de Ville left Lauban, and retired to Görlitz, and the Prussians took possession of Lauban. On the ninth de Ville's corps had been considerably reinforced: however as Prince Henry made a motion towards his left flank, de Ville quitted his camp near Görlitz, and retired to Bautzen. The Prussians advanced and camped on the Landsron beyond that town.

This manœuvre of Prince Henry of course obliged Marshal Daun to leave Lusatia, and run back towards Bohemia; accordingly on the ninth of September he left Sorau, and marched through a very close and difficult country by Spremberg to Bautzen, where he arrived the thirtieth. The rear of one of the columns was attacked by the Prussians under General Krokow, who with one thousand horse had been sent to observe their march; he took in this affair, about two hundred prisoners and a great number of waggons. Both armies continued for some time in their camps, the Prussians about Görlitz, and the Austrians at Bautzen; Marshal Daun had resolved to advance against Prince Henry, with what view I dont know, or can even conjecture. Accordingly the army marched the twenty-third to Riechenbach, and the day following the attack was to have been made, but Prince Henry avoided it by retiring. At this time the few Prussians which were in Saxony under General Finck, were hardly pressed by the Imperialists, who had taken Dresden; wherefore Prince Henry resolved to march into Saxony; to accomplish this design and avoid fighting, on the twenty-third at night he left Görlitz, and marched the whole night; in the morning he came to Rothenberg, and having halted a few hours proceeded to Klitten*, where he arrived at midnight on the twenty-fourth; the next morning he proceeded to Hoyerfwerda, where General Vehla with about two thousand

* A village on the Tahmer, between the Gros and Kleine Heyde.

men was encamped, never dreaming the enemy could come there, he was surrounded, surprized in his camp, and taken with all his men, four or five hundred only with one or two cannon however, I dont know how, escaped and came to Bautzen; there Prince Henry remained to let his troops recover themselves, till the twenty-eighth, when he marched by Elsterwerda to Torgau, where he arrived the second of October, and on the fourth joined General Finck at Strehlin.

October:

Prince Henry in quitting Görlitz had begun his march towards Hulbau, but soon turned off to the left. However Marshal Daun was deceived by this, believing he was gone to Silesia, and so the Marshal continued his march to Görlitz, where he was informed of the real route Prince Henry had taken, upon which he returned the twenty-fifth of September towards Dresden, and encamped at Kesselsdorff, beyond that city. From this time to the end of the campaign, the operations of the Austrian army were connected with those of the Imperialists. We must therefore relate the transactions of this last until the arrival of the Austrian army in Saxony, at the end of September, and then conclude with their joint operations, till the end of this campaign. But before we proceed to that part, we beg leave to make some observations on what we have seen done by the respective armies in Lusatia.

REFLECTIONS.

Of all the follies that ever entered the head of any Minister or General, that of bringing one hundred and forty thousand men, with at least forty thousand horse of different species, into a country where ten thousand could not subsist a fortnight, and where there

was

was nothing to do, is the greatest. This was now the case, and had neither Prince Henry nor the king interfered, these immense armies could not have remained in Lusatia a week longer. The Russians must have taken their march one way or other towards Poland ; and the Austrians must have returned towards Saxony and Bohemia, because they could not subsist where they were, nor had they any thing to do there at all ; there was nothing to be done, I repeat it. In justice to the memory of Marshal Daun, I must explain the motives of this very absurd measure. The Court of Vienna during the whole war, wanted to engage the Russians to pass the Oder, and leave a part at least of their army with them, because they saw the Russians came late into the field, and for want of subsistence retired very soon, to take their quarters behind the Vistula. The Russians for very obvious reasons would and indeed could not, come into this project. However having gained two great victories they consented to pass the Oder, and advance a day or two's march into Lusatia, on condition, first that Marshal Daun should send them another considerable reinforcement, (which was done, for general Haddick joined them,) secondly, that the Marshal should advance with his whole army to hinder Prince Henry joining the king. This was the motive which brought Marshal Daun into that country. We have seen the effects of such preposterous measures.

Prince Henry has gained great reputation by his conduct on this occasion, which is the only foundation, that is known to the world of that glory which he enjoys. He has acquired the name of a consummate general. Many people place him above the king. Why I cannot conceive ; for, in the first place, the measure he pursued in marching back to Lauban, and placing himself on Marshal Daun's line of communication, was so very obvious ; that had he not done it, he must have passed for ever for a block-head ;

head; the operation itself could meet with no obstacles, for there was nobody in his way; de Ville had a corps, Prince Henry had an army. As to his going afterwards to Saxony, I have already shewn, that the Austrians can take no position in Lusatia, which will prevent the Prussians from going out of Silesia into Saxony, and vice versa. The king when he saw the Russians direct their march over Guben towards Silesia, might have spared himself, and his troops, much unnecessary trouble, if instead of following them himself, he had left it to the care of Prince Henry (then behind the Bober;) and marched to Bautzen, which would have brought Marshal Daun thither, and moreover hindered him from going into Saxony, which perhaps would have enabled his Majesty to save or retake Dresden.

What happened on this occasion confirms the doctrine we laid down in our first volume, concerning the line of operation, and a defensive war. If the enemy's line is considerably long, instead of opposing his progress in front, and running the hazard of a battle, you must act on his line, which will force him to fall back.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Operations of the Imperial Army.

THE Imperial army had lain in Franconia during the winter, and were making dispositions for opening the campaign as soon as possible, collecting magazines on every side; and had occupied Erfurth, which they proposed making their place of arms, the ensuing campaign. This Prince Henry resolved to hinder, and concerted

concerted his measures with Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, who on his side agreed to send a small corps towards Fulda and Herschfeld, on the enemy's left flank, while the Prussians advanced in front. The project was accordingly executed in the end of February and the beginning of March. The posts of the Imperial army were every where drove back; so that the Imperialists lost what magazines they had collected. On the twentieth of March the prince returned to Saxony, and the corps of the allies to their quarters.

April. In April Prince Henry made an incursion into Bohemia, as we have seen, and retired into Saxony. In May he marched again against the Imperialists, and drove them back beyond Nuremberg; and having ruined a great number of their depots, retired again into Saxony.

Upon this the Imperial army assembled, and about the middle of July advanced towards Leipzig, which was given up to them, without a siege, the fifth of August; from hence they proceeded to Wittenberg, which they took in the same manner; from hence they went to Dresden, already blocked up by General Brentano, and took it the fourth of September without any opposition, by capitulation. While they were occupied at Dresden, General Wunsch with nine battalions and as many squadrons, from the garison of Leipzig, Wittenberg, and Torgau, advanced to Wittenberg, which the Commandant gave up, without firing a shot; upon which he advanced to Torgau, where he arrived the thirtieth. In the night he stormed the place, and General Kleefeld beat a parly at eleven o'clock, and capitulated. Immediately after, he marched towards Dresden, which he found had surrendered; upon this he retired to Torgau. During his absence General St. André who had been left at Leipzig, came to Torgau, with a view of taking it; Wunsch attacked him, beat him, and took his camp.

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This action did General Wunsch much credit; his corps consisted of eight battalions and six squadrons, whereas that of the enemy, was at least three times the number. The Imperialists retired towards Dresden; General Wunsch marched to Leipzig, and took it; the garrison was made prisoners of war. By all this one sees, that a brave man, with few troops, who have confidence in him, can do great things; and that numbers are nothing in the hands of an ignorant General. Wunsch had not above three thousand men; the Imperialists had thirty thousand at least. We have thought it needless to trace particularly the marches and encampments of the Imperial army, because they had no enemy before them to make any disposition necessary. They could, and did advance unmolested and unobserved; for even Wunsch did not arrive in Saxony until they had overrun the country, and were before Dresden, which as we have just seen, they took also without any opposition. The Commandant, General Schmettau, who had about three thousand men in that town, might have defended it some days, which probably would have saved it.

This conquest seemed to lead to that of all Saxony, but from bad conduct, or from the real difficulty of things, the Austrians during the whole war could get no further; for though occasionally they advanced towards Torgau, Leipzig, &c. yet at the end of every campaign they were finally forced to fall back to Dresden. The only advantage they reaped from the possession of this place was, that they could canton a part of their army in Saxony about Dresden, and in the Ertzgebürg during the winter, cover Bohemia on that side, and take the field sooner than usual; they could also assemble their army in Saxony without difficulty, being masters of the passes which lead out of Bohemia into that country.

General Wunsch with his small corps was alone in Saxony, as we have seen, till the middle of September, when General Finck

with twelve batallions, and eighteen squadrons, arrived there, and posted himself by Eulenburg, where he was joined by General Wunsch. The Imperial army had recalled all its detachments, and was encamped about Dresden. The Prussians advanced to Rothschönberg, and camped behind a great and deep ravin, and the Imperialists camped on the other side. The Prussians retired to Meissen, and were followed by the Imperialists, who harrassed their rear with advantage; and on the twenty-first of September attacked them, of which action we have the following account by the Imperialists.

“ The Prussian corps under General Finck, consisting of about
“ eighteen thousand men, had their left near Meissen; their right on
“ the heights of Korbitz; their front was covered by some villages
“ and a deep ravin. The Prince of Deux-Ponts resolved to attack
“ them. The rain rendered the march so difficult, that General
“ Haddick, who was to have attacked the enemy’s right flank,
“ thought it necessary to halt, and let the troops rest, and clean
“ and load their musquets, which had been rendered unfit for service;
“ the rest of the army did the same. On the heights about
“ Neustadt the enemy perceiving our disposition, sent a considerable
“ corps to support the villages before his front; General Macguire
“ however attacked these villages, and after a vigorous resistance
“ took them. In the mean time General Haddick advanced;
“ Finck opposed him, with the greatest part of his corps, and at
“ first had some advantage; but Prince Lobkovitz advancing with
“ his cavalry, drove that of the enemy back, and penetrated into their
“ infantry, and after an obstinate engagement forced them to fly on
“ all sides, leaving their cannon behind them. The night prevented
“ our pursuing them. We remained on the field of battle this night,
“ and part of the following day. Haddick’s corps retired to Taubenheim,
“ that he might join the army. We have
“ taken

“ taken several pieces of artillery, and three hundred prisoners. “ Our loss amounts in killed, wounded, and missing, to about “ sixteen hundred men.” The Prussians on the contrary say, that they kept the field, which seems true: for the Imperialists retired to their former camp after the battle. The idea of sending General Haddick with a strong corps against the enemy’s right flank, was just, and had it been well executed, would have been decisive, which induced General Finck to bring the greatest part of his force against it, well knowing that if in this he succeeded, he had his retreat secured, and little to fear. Upon the whole it appears, that the Prussians, though greatly inferior in numbers, behaved on this occasion with much firmness, wisdom, and bravery.

The Imperial army remained in its camp at Wilsdruff, where it retreated after the battle till the twenty-seventh, when on receiving advice that the Prussians under Prince Henry were advancing, and preparing to pass the Elbe at Meissen, it was thought advisable to retire to Dresden, and cover that city.

Upon Prince Henry’s marching into Saxony Marshal Daun did the same, and on the twenty-fourth of September took his camp at Kesselsdorff. As General Finck remained at Meissen, Marshal Daun made the necessary disposition to attack him on the second of October, which did not take place, because this general very wisely retired towards Torgau, and joined Prince Henry at Strehla; the Austrian army however advanced, and on the sixth arrived at Oschatz, about three miles from the enemy; who had placed General Rebentisch with a corps on the heights of Eulenberg, to keep up the communication with Leipzig.

DE DAUN, on the 4th of October 1759, at Heyda in Saxony.

SECOND LINE.

RESERVE.

[illegible]

[illegible]

The Prussians could not well be attacked in front, and therefore the Marshal ordered a corps towards Dahlen beyond their right, which if they waited in their present position, would come on their flank, while the army attacked them in front; Prince Henry sent General Wunsch to observe the corps above mentioned, and met him at Dahlen, upon which he retired towards Eulenberg to support Rebentisch, if necessary. Both retired. The Austrian corps advanced beyond Schilda; all these manœuvres of course obliged Prince Henry to retire to Torgau, from whence General Finck was sent to take possession of Eulenberg. The twenty-second of October the Austrian general advanced to Schilda, he sent a strong corps to Strehla under the duke of Aremberg to prevent the enemy receiving any thing down the Elbe*; another corps under General Gemingen to Eulenberg, which the Prussians abandoned. Marshal Daun was very intent on driving Prince Henry from Torgau before he received the reinforcements, which were on their march from Silesia, for which purpose the duke of Aremberg was ordered to take post on the Elbe, behind the Prussian army, which he accordingly did on the twenty-fifth, when his corps arrived undiscovered at Domitsen. Upon which Prince Henry marched with Finck's corps that way, and met General Brentano at the village Vogelgesang, where they had a skirmish till night, but of no consequence: to keep up the communication, between this corps and his, Marshal Daun sent a very considerable one, under General O'Donel towards Eulenberg, Prince Henry was alarmed at these dispositions which seemed to portend a battle; which he could not sustain if attacked in front, flank, and rear at the same time. Having observed that the duke of Aremberg's corps was quite insulated and could not be supported if immediately attacked, before he or the other Austrian corps took other positions; he resolved to send that very night General Wunsch with his corps.

* Two battalions and two cannon, were enough, and too much, because the country behind was in the hands of the Austrians, and consequently nothing could go that way to the Prussians at Torgau. The Author.

over the Elbe, with orders to march down that river, repass it at Wittenberg, join the corps under Rebentisch who was not far from thence; and together attack the duke, while Prince Henry himself with part of his army did the same on his side, by which means the duke being attacked in front, flank, and rear, and having the Elbe behind him, must have laid down his arms. On the twenty-ninth the two first met the duke at Pretzch, (happily he had left Domitsch) attacked, beat him, and drove him back to Düben on the Mulda, with loss of some cannon, many killed and wounded, and about one thousand men prisoners, among whom was General Gemingen. Of this strange transaction the Austrians give the following account.

“ It was resolved by Marshal Daun that the duke of Aremberg
 “ should leave the Elbe, and march to Kemberg, and General
 “ O'Donel to Düben, and having consulted together, proceed
 “ where they should think most useful to the service. O'Donel
 “ took his post accordingly at Düben, on the twenty-eighth; and
 “ the day following, the duke began his march to the place as-
 “ signed him; General Brentano conducted the rear, and came to
 “ Pretzch, where they were met by Wunsch's corps and General
 “ Finck behind them, here a sharp action ensued; the duke con-
 “ tinued his march; but on coming to the heights by the village
 “ Schnellin, he was met by Rebentisch's corps, whose cavalry ad-
 “ vanced immediately, but was kept back by some infantry till the
 “ duke could get with his corps on a height by Sackwitz, where he
 “ formed in order of battle, and determined to attack the enemy
 “ before him; but observing that General Brentano to avoid being
 “ hemmed in between Wunsch and Finck's corps, was returning
 “ to Güben, and that the three Prussian corps were closing upon
 “ him on all sides, he thought it best to retire also to Güben.
 “ General O'Donel advanced with his corps towards Kemberg, to
 “ aid the duke, but having, as he said, heard late of the affair,
 “ did

“ did not come in time, or even near enough to see the enemy;
“ and though the duke of Aremberg did all that could be done
“ to secure his retreat, with as little loss as possible; he could not
“ prevent the enemy taking some baggage and a cannon or two,
“ and making many prisoners: when we consider the proximity
“ and position of the enemy, it is wonderful the whole corps did
“ not perish. The woods which cover the country helped to
“ make a tolerable retreat.

The Prussians account is as follows:

“ The enemy wanted to cut off our communications on the Elbe
“ behind us; for which purpose on the twenty-eighth of October
“ Marshal Daun sent the Duke of Aremberg with sixteen thousand
“ men to Domitsch, which is on the Elbe, upon which Prince
“ Henry at the head of Finck's corps, marched that way. Our
“ column was to pass through Vogelgesang, which the enemy en-
“ deavoured to set on fire, but in vain, our cannon drove them off;
“ night coming on, we could not pursue them. The next day the
“ prince reconnoitered the enemy, whom he found encamped very
“ advantageously, and so it was not thought proper to attack him
“ in this post; upon which General Wunsch was detached the same
“ night to Wittenberg, and joined General Rebentisch, who was
“ at Bitterfeld; these two corps were to come by the road of Pretsch
“ to attack the enemy in the rear, Finck's corps in front, and Ge-
“ neral Wedel with another was to go through the woods, and cut
“ off his retreat to Düben, all which was to have been executed
“ the twenty-ninth. But the enemy having marched that morn-
“ ing at break of day towards Pretsch, where he was going to en-
“ camp, met Wunsch and Rebentisch who were coming that way.
“ Prince Henry advanced to Pretsch, but could do nothing.
“ When the enemy saw himself between two corps, he retreated to-
“ wards Düben, one column went by Schoniedberg unpursued, the
“ other

“ other was followed with a continual cannonade by Rebentisch,
 “ by the route of Graffenhayn. General Gemmingen who com-
 “ manded the rear, was attacked near Sackwitz by General Platen,
 “ with his own regiment of dragoons and Gendorff’s hussars, and
 “ beat. He himself and above a thousand men were taken prison-
 “ ers, and one cannon; we found much baggage in the woods.

“ After this action the Austrians under O’Donel retired to Eulen-
 “ berg, and the Duke of Aremberg to Kulen, on the left of the
 “ army, with his advanced posts at Thalnitz*.”

REFLECTIONS.

THE absurdity of sending a considerable corps behind an enemy, where a patrol of twenty men cannot go without danger, is so very obvious, that one wonders it ever happened; yet this and a thousand other ridiculous manœuvres are daily made. No corps can be posted behind an enemy, within a good march at least, unless it is supported by the whole army, because it cannot remain there an hour without danger; and unless you propose attacking the enemy instantly on one of his flanks, so that your right or left communicates with that corps; and moreover, you also manœuvre against his front, or part of it at least. Whether Marshal Daun intended attacking the enemy or not, he should have brought his left to Eulenberg, and posted General O’Donel’s detachment between it and the Duke of Aremberg, which would have saved him and his corps. There was no danger in this, because Prince Henry could not leave his camp and pass between the Marshal’s right and the Elbe. What the Marshal did was the more dangerous, as he

* Or perhaps Delitzsch.

knew the Prussians had a corps behind the Duke of Aremberg, not a day's march off, and that Prince Henry covered with the woods, might bring any part of his forces unmolested, (which really happened,) to attack him in front, while the other came behind him. General O'Donel, instead of going fair and softly towards Kemberg, should have instantly marched where the action was, which he knew very well from the firing, which was loud enough, but he took quite another road. Besides the danger of the plan pursued, it was foolish and useless; for Prince Henry had his communication open on the right of the Elbe as far as Berlin, and great depots at Torgau itself. So that no manœuvre on the left of the river where both armies stood, could oblige him to quit his position, unless you fought him and drove him by force out of it.

The season being far advanced, and the weather very cold and severe, Marshal Daun after this transaction determined to march
November. back to Dresden; accordingly on the fourth of November the army left Schilda, and returned by the same road it came to Dresden, where it arrived the seventeenth of November, followed close at the heels by the Prussians, who had sent a considerable corps beyond the Mulda, which acted constantly on the Marshal's flank, and some of the parties sent by this corps were got to the neighbourhood of Dresden before him; this made him hasten his march, which was so well conducted that he did not suffer any loss worth mentioning, though many skirmishes happened, which naturally are more advantageous to the pursuers, than to the pursued.

During this retreat the king came to the army, which advanced to the heights of Kesselsdorff, separated from the Austrians by a brook, or rather a torrent, when it rains, called the Weisstritz, which falls into the Elbe below Dresden.

The

The king thought it dangerous to attack the Austrians in this strong position, but determined to force them to quit Dresden, by cutting off their communication with Bohemia. For which purpose, he sent General Finck with a great corps by Freyberg to Dippoldiswalda; and from thence to Maxen, exactly behind the Austrian army, from whence he could send detachments into Bohemia, and had this general been suffered to stay there, the Austrians must have abandoned Dresden, passed the Elbe, and marched by the passes of Rumburg and Gabel, into Bohemia. But Marshal Daun and those about him in whom he confided, were not men to be frightened out of the country. So far from it, that it was resolved instantly to attack this corps, and in such a manner, as to leave it no issue whereby to escape, and so open the communication with Bohemia. They were resolved to repair the fault committed at Pretsch, and do the business more effectually than the Prussians did theirs. As the country about Dresden, has been the scene of many military transactions, I think it will be useful to those who may be brought to act hereafter in it, if I give a description of it; which I am the more inclined to do, because I found on the present occasion, that the Austrians and Prussians were equally unacquainted with it.

Dresden lies on the Elbe in a vale; on the left of the river the ground rises gradually for about three miles, till you come to the village of Rainchen, which stands on the highest spot. Immediately at the foot of it runs a narrow vale, from the left towards the right as you stand with your back towards Dresden; in this vale is the village of Possendorff, through which the high road from Dresden to Dippoldiswalda, and Freyberg goes; the vale runs to the right into a hollow ground, where is the village of Potzschappel, from whence you go up a steep hill to Kesselsdorff, where the Prussians van was encamped and their army directly be-

hind it. To Potzschappel come many springs, which form the Weisfritz; this runs through a very narrow vale to Plauen, and cannot be passed any where but at Plauen, and lower down under the cannon of Dresden, for which reason the camps of Plauen and Kesselsdorff were thought extremely strong. Beyond Pössendorff on the other side of the vale we first mentioned, the ground is also very high, on which stand Rabenau, Carsdorff, and other villages; about half a mile further on to the right of the road, which goes to Dippoldiswalda, begins a great forest called the Tharandischerwalde, which goes for many miles towards Freyberg, and beyond it. This forest is impenetrable for troops; which obliged the king to order General Finck to go a great way about by Freyberg, to Dippoldiswalda, and so on to Maxen.

The quarter master general Count Lacy, to whom the Author was then attached by duty, as he is now by gratitude; having traced the camp at Plauen went to follow some Prussian hussars, in hopes of taking some of them, and get intelligence of Finck's corps; coming on the heights near Pössendorff, he observes, that the enemy might march down Kesselsdorff, to Potzschappel, and on either side to the heights on which he then stood, or the other opposite by Rabenau; both which posts would enable him to cut us off from Bohemia, and the more, so as the distance from Kesselsdorff to the heights, is not half an hour's march. On coming to head quarters he informed the Marshal of these circumstances, and the Marshal immediately ordered General Sincere, with a very great corps of infantry and cavalry, to take post on the heights this side the vale of Pössendorff; this was done on the nineteenth*. The Marshal being informed that General Finck was at Dippoldiswalda, determined to attack him there; accordingly having

* Tielke says General Sincere was detached on the eighteenth. See note H.

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ordered General Sincere's corps, to be reinforced by some cavalry, on the nineteenth it marched to Dippoldiswalda; it snowed very much. On coming there, we found Finck was gone that very morning to Maxen; his baggage, escorted by a batallion of light infantry, was then marching through a village called Rheinhartsgrimme, and getting with all haste into a little wood beyond it, through which goes the road to Maxen. This of course required a new disposition, which was as follows.

A corps was to be left at Dippoldiswalda, to keep our rear secure; that under Sincere was to march next morning to seek the enemy; General Brentano was to advance from the neighbourhood of Dresden, and come behind the enemy; and finally the Imperial army was to proceed on the right of the ravine of Dohna, and come on the enemy's left flank, so that having the Elbe behind, all hopes of escaping were cut off. The Marshal at the same time gave all the necessary orders to the army, in case that of the enemy made any motions.

On the twentieth at break of day the troops got under arms, and formed, expecting the order to march. At length the Marshal accompanied by many generals and officers, came to the line, but no orders for marching were given, because these gentlemen, who pretended to know the country, raised many difficulties to dissuade the Marshal from marching. They said the roads were impracticable; happily, Major Fabri (now a lieutenant general in the Emperor's service, a zealous and an excellent officer,) had been reconnoitring that way; he arrived and reported to the Marshal that the roads were good, and that in less than two hours, the troops might be formed on the hill behind the wood; upon which the Marshal ordered him to conduct them, and they marched accordingly. The country between Dippoldiswalda, and Maxen, is as follows. A little beyond the former place, is a village, Rheinhartsgrimme,

hartsgrimme, and beyond that a wood about half a mile in extent, (represented as impassable, though the enemy had passed the preceding day,) upon coming out of it; to the right is a hill, which commands the wood and the road, within one hundred yards, the road goes along the side of it, close to a ravine on the left; from the top of the hill runs a narrow plain, for about a mile, which is bounded by another hill, much higher, which commands it. On this the Prussians were placed with Maxen behind them; within one hundred yards of this hill, which is steep, the plain which leads to it is broke by two small ravines to the right and left, which leaves a passage only of about forty yards, through which the Austrians must advance, within one hundred yards of the enemy's line, covered by many batteries. The Austrians passed the wood unmolested, the grenadiers took possession of the hill before it, and halted there till the artillery was brought upon it, and the rest of the troops arrived; then proceeded to the enemy, with a very narrow front, a batallion or two. On the right the artillery moved, and did the enemy much damage: on coming to the narrow pass above mentioned, the front was still more contracted, by which a moment's time was lost, however in a few minutes they got over it, and with extraordinary rapidity entered the enemy's redoubts; here they halted, till the whole came up and formed on the ground, where the enemy had stood, and which runs in a slope quite to the Elbe about Pirna. While this was doing on the side of the Austrians, the Prussians retired to Maxen, and formed a new line on some heights behind it; the Austrian grenadiers advanced, drove them out of Maxen; the rest followed, keeping to the left to avoid breaking the line, and to come on the enemy's right flank; and after a faint resistance forced him to retire; the Austrians pursued him, from hill to hill, till night put an end to the affair for the present. In the night the Marshal was informed

informed that the enemy approached Dippoldiswalda, upon which he ordered a body of troops to occupy the post at Rüppchen, where Sincere's corps had been, before it marched to Dippoldiswalda, with orders to advance if necessary, to support the troops which had been placed there, and to prevent the king from sending any succours to Maxen, through the valley, which was found to run from Kesselsdorff by Pössendorff, to the last place; and another on the heights of Maxen, likewise to support Dippoldiswalda, in case the enemy advanced that way; these dispositions being made, the Marshal was prevailed upon to go into a house at Maxen to rest; in the morning before day break he came to the troops, and ordered some cannon to advance, and fire towards the place where the enemy was supposed to be; in a little time a trumpet was heard to sound, the fire ceased, but nobody appearing, it began again. A trumpet sounded a second time, and the fire ceased. The day was breaking, and soon after came General Rebentisch, and surrendered the troops prisoners of war. They were so entangled, that it was near twelve o'clock before they could be brought out of the hole, where they had lain pell mell the whole night. They were carried to the great Garden, near Dresden. The corps consisted of nine generals and about twelve thousand men, seventy pieces of cannon, &c. Thus ended this extraordinary affair, with little loss on either side during the battle. I was present, and therefore the reader may rely on the veracity of this account. I have omitted several particulars, as names of the regiments, &c. because I thought them no ways necessary to explain the action itself; ground and disposition are the only things to be considered, unless, as it sometimes happens, a particular manœuvre, on either side contributes to the decision of the business, which was not here the case.

The

The Prussians did not upon the whole behave on this occasion as they generally do, which is easily explained, if we consider the human heart. From the first moment the Austrians appeared, General Finck must perceive he was lost; he had before him a strong corps of which he could not know the numbers, behind his right, at no great distance, the Austrian army; and a corps under General Brentano approaching him on that side; behind him was the Elbe, on his left the ravine of Dohna, on the other side of which within musquet shot, was a great part of the Imperial army, which fired on his flank during almost the whole action, and annoyed him not a little. In such a situation, it is no wonder if he despaired; neither he nor any general on earth, could have escaped the catastrophe which befell him. If the reader will recollect we said, that close to the wood through which the Austrians passed there was a hill, very high and steep; and rendered uncommonly difficult to mount, by the great quantity of snow which fell the nineteenth and twentieth, succeeded by a severe frost; he will think as I do, that if General Finck had posted four battalions and some cannon on this hill, with parties in the wood, the Austrians would have found it difficult, or perhaps impossible to advance that way, which would have protracted the affair, and given time for the king to send reinforcements to disengage him, or for him to march in the night on his right, through the woods towards Rabenau, between Dippoldiswalda, and Dresden. The situation of Marshal Daun could he have been stopped here, was very critical, inasmuch that any motion either Finck or the king, made on that side, would have forced him to abandon the enterprize, and seek his own safety; but this not having been done, no obstacles could possibly have prevented his success. Had the king known the country; first, he would not have sent General Finck to Maxen, without occupying the heights at Rabenau, not a mile from his camp,

camp, and not much more from Maxen, by which neither one or other could be attacked, but in front. Had he known the country, he would have sent a corps through the valley on the twentieth towards Maxen, which would have greatly embarrassed Marshal Daun, and cut off the troops he had left at Dippoldiswalda. It was not known then by the Austrians, that the valley so often mentioned, runs from Kesselsdorff to Maxen; and when it was known, General Lacy trembled at the danger which might have happened, and instantly ordered some works to be raised on the heights of Rabenau, which commanded the vale towards Potzschappel and Kesselsdorff, which the author of this work executed the two following days; so that these works and the corps placed at Dippoldiswalda, made it impossible for the enemy to make the least motion on that side, which enabled the Marshal to extend his quarters in Saxony behind these posts, as far as the mountains which separate that Electorate from Bohemia. I have been very particular in the description of the ground, because in a mountainous country, if it is not perfectly known, every step an army takes may be attended with the most fatal consequences, of which we have before our eyes, a very striking example.

In all this transaction, and those which lead to it from Torgau to Maxen, two things are remarkable, and serve to confirm our principles; first, that no army however strong, can keep its ground if you advance against it in front, and at the same time send a powerful corps to act on its flank and rear.

Secondly, that if you do not keep up the communication, between the army and such corps, they will be lost, if the enemy is at all an able officer. This last axiom having been neglected, the Austrians narrowly escaped the fate of General Finck at Pretsch, under the Duke of Aremberg; and the Prussian corps was entirely destroyed. We cannot therefore but wonder that so great a cap-

tain as the King of Prussia, having the example of Pretsch before his eyes, should within a fortnight have repeated the fault: it is possible in war, as in most other situations, to over-do a thing, and drive the nail further than it can go. The King of Prussia has been guilty of this fault more than once. He had won the battle at Franckfurt, had he known when to stop; he did not, and the victory was torn out of his hands. Let us resume our narration.

December. The king sent a small corps under General Dierke, up the right of the Elbe towards Meissen, which Marshal Daun ordered General Beck to attack, who executed his commission compleatly. On the third of December, this general directed his march so that he came on the Prussians left flank, attacked, and drove them to the Elbe, where having no bridge, they were all taken with their general: another proof that no corps or army should camp with a wing on a river, morass, or precipice, because if they are attacked on the flank, and beat, they are lost.


After the affair of Maxen, the king had applied to Prince Ferdinand for a reinforcement, which accordingly arrived under the Prince of Brunswick at the end of December, and was posted on the right. The king advanced to reconnoitre the Austrians, on the side of Freyberg, and finding them well fortified made no attempt; and in the month of February the Prussians returned to Meissen.

The Imperial army having left the greatest part of the Austrians, who had joined them, with Marshal Daun, quitted the field the seventh of December, and marched through Bohemia, and Voightland, into winter quarters in Franconia; the head quarters were at Bamberg. So the campaign ended on this side.

In the summer, General Harsch, with a very powerful corps, or rather army, entered Silesia, twice, on the side of Landshut, where
the

the Prussian General Fouquet, with very considerable forces, was encamped, who repulsed the former both times, and the last with some loss, the Austrian General having embroiled himself among the mountains, which he did not sufficiently know.

Having made my observations on the plan of operations, and on the several transactions, which occurred during this campaign, I hope the Reader will comprehend, why the Austrians and their allies, with near two hundred thousand men, did not gain any considerable advantage over the Prussians, who never had above half the number, and why the victories of Paltzig, Franckfurt, and Meissen, were not followed by any solid success; it was certainly owing to the bad plan, which the Austrians had formed for this campaign. Had the governor of Dresden done his duty, he might have held out a few days at least, and this would have been sufficient, to have saved that important place. And so the campaign would have ended exactly where it began.



Note A.

COLONEL Tempelhoff (an officer of distinction in the Prussian service, and from that circumstance perhaps a better authority than General Lloyd, for the detail of the Prussian operations,) gives a very different, and I think a more intelligible, and accurate account of these movements; according to him, General Fouquet did not join the king's army at Gibau, but at Krenau, which happened not on the twelfth of May, but on the sixteenth and the three following days; consequently this junction was subsequent, to the second expedition the king made against General De Ville's corps, not previous to it: his majesty had advanced from Littau to a camp near Prosnitz, (not Czetkowitz) situated between Studenitz and Stareckowitz, his head quarters at Schmirnitz, where he arrived on the eleventh with nineteen battalions, and forty-eight squadrons, here he joined the Prince of Würtemberg, whom he had left with two battalions of foot, ten squadrons of dragoons, and as many of Werner's hussars, and having detached General Seidlitz on the evening of the twelfth, with two regiments of dragoons, and three hundred hussars to Tobitschaw, to collect forage and provision, which General Lentulus was to bring to the army; for which purpose he followed Seidlitz, with a battalion of grenadiers, and three hundred cuirassiers, escorting a number of bread waggons and pack horses; his majesty the better to secure the object of this detachment, determined to drive back De Ville's corps, and on the thirteenth marched himself, with three battalions of foot, twenty-three squadrons

squadrons of cuirassiers and dragoons, and fifteen of hussars directly to Prödlitz ; General De Ville being apprized of the king's approach, broke up his camp, and sent away his baggage to Raufnitz, which he had time to do before the enemy's columns could get at him, through the Defilés, which lay before his front ; he himself (though at first he made a shew of maintaining his post, probably the better to secure his tents and baggage,) retired on the king's approach in good order, first to Wischau, and then to Raufnitz, with the loss only of sixteen killed, and forty-one prisoners. The king's cavalry advanced as far as Wischau, the infantry occupied Prödlitz, the king himself returned to Schmirfitz, leaving the detachment to the Prince of Würtemberg, who, having seized a magazine of meal and forage, which the enemy had left in Wischau, and sent it under the escorte of his infantry to the camp by Schmirfitz, retired himself, and went back to his old post near Prosnitz.

Note B.

A CLOSE attention to dates, and an accurate detail of the *series* of events are so absolutely necessary, to enable a reader to comprehend clearly, and reason justly upon military operations, (but most especially when as in the present instance, every position occupied, every movement executed, was good or bad, according to the relative situation of the enemy,) that I trust, I shall be excused if I add another long note, containing a few more details, borrowed likewise from Colonel Tempelhoff's work.

On the king's first arrival in Moravia, the infantry of his own corps was cantoned in Littau, and the villages lying beyond the Mora on the side of Olmutz; that belonging to Marshal Keith's division was partly encamped near Starnau, partly in cantonments in the villages between Neustadt, Littau, and Starnau, the whole cavalry encamped; Marshal Keith's ovens were in Sternberg, covered by the free batallions of Le Noble, and Salenmon; those belonging to the king were in Littau. On the fifth, the king drew ten batallions from Keith's corps to his own; it was with a part of this reinforcement, and six regiments of cavalry and dragoons, that his majesty marched to support Werner's detachment, in the first expedition made against De Ville. The sixth on learning the approach of Laudohn, the king drew twenty-three batallions, and thirteen squadrons into the camp of Aschmeritz, near Littau, while the Prince of Würtemberg's corps posted at Prosnitz, kept De Ville in check.

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On the eighth of May, this was the disposition of the Prussian forces. In the camp of Aschmeritz, twenty-five batallions, thirty-three squadrons under the command of the king himself.—In that near Newstadt under Lieutenant General Forcade, eight batallions, twenty-four squadrons—In the camp near Starnau, under the Markgrave Charles nine batallions, sixteen squadrons—In Sternberg, two free batallions.—In the camp of Proßnitz under the Prince of Würtemberg, two grenadier batallions, and thirty squadrons. On the nearer approach of the Austrians, the king called in Lieutenant General Forcade, with six batallions, and five squadrons, and the Markgrave Charles replaced him with seven batallions from Starnau; on the eleventh the king marched as we have already seen, with nineteen batallions, and forty-eight squadrons to Proßnitz, leaving Marshal Keith with fifteen batallions, and as many squadrons, in the camp of Aschmeritz; these alterations were made in consequence of intelligence received, that Marshal Daun was directing his march by Brinn.

The above disposition lasted with very little variation, till General Fouquet arrived with the artillery, &c. when the siege began.

Note C.

IF our author had had an opportunity of referring to a most excellent account of this battle, published by Captain Tielke, an officer in the Saxon service, who was present at it, and had been assisted by the inspection of the accurate and very detailed plans with which his work is illustrated, he would, I think, have found himself at no loss to conceive and to convey to his readers a very perfect idea of all the movements subsequent to the action, as well as the circumstances of the action itself; he would have found that the king's first attack on the enemy's right not having succeeded, he with his usual quickness and ability immediately changed his plan, and leaving General Seidlitz with the cavalry under his command, to protect the retreat of the broken grenadiers, and favour their rallying, advanced with his right wing to renew the attack on the other extremity of the Russians square, where he was more successful; for though he met with a vigorous resistance, he finally drove the enemy quite beyond Zorndorff and the marshy rivulet, towards the sheepfold, where they formed again in a square, as marked in the plan No. III. so that the two armies changed places, that of the Prussians making a sort of wheel to the left, upon their own center. The ill success of the king's first attack was owing (as at Collin the year before) to his orders not having been obeyed with sufficient punctuality by the general who commanded the first line of infantry, who by not sufficiently inclining to his left as he advanced, lost (as the king himself observes in his memoirs) the protection of the marshy rivulet which ran towards the enemy's right flank; and what was worse, found himself dressed

C c

with

with the eight batallions of grenadiers, behind whom he ought to have been formed to sustain their attack.

The circumstance which most puzzles our author, viz. the movement of the Russians on the twenty-seventh to Gross and Klein Cammin, by which they marched along the greatest part of the Prussians front, and turned their left wing, he would have found accounted for by the nature of the ground, and a thick fog which concealed their march. With respect to his majesty's conduct subsequent to the action, perhaps the general's criticisms may be better founded: in the first place, if instead of throwing back his left wing towards Zicher, when he encamped in the afternoon of the twenty-sixth, he had extended it to the heights between Wilkersdorf and Tamsell, and employed his numerous and victorious cavalry in scowering the plain between that and the Drewitz wood, encamping as in s s, he would have cut off General Fermor from his heavy baggage, parked near Gross Cammin, and the four thousand grenadiers which guarded it, must have fallen; or if the king thought such a position would have too much extended his line, his majesty had still another effectual way of cutting off the final retreat of the enemy, even after he had retired under cover of the fog to Gross Cammin; for it appears evident, that by marching from his left through the intervals of that chain of ponds, which run from Wilkersdorff towards the Massin wood, and so striking into the road by which his first and second columns marched to the field of battle on the twenty-fifth; the Prussian army might have taken up a very strong position as in x x behind Batzlow and Blumenberg, the front covered by those two villages, and the left upon the Wartha, in which situation the Russians would have found them encamped across the only roads by which it was possible to retreat to Landsperg.

But a general's operations are not always to be tried merely by strict principles of tactics; other reasons of war, and powerful ones too, totally independent of those, will often operate irresistably; and this seems to have been particularly the case with his Prussian Majesty,

Majesty, in the present instance ; the loss he had sustained in this terrible action, was very considerable, and though much inferior in numbers to that of the Russians, was (considering his circumstances,) much more severely felt by him, than by them ; the most complete victory over them, even though it should amount to a total destruction of their army, was to him but a partial advantage, a temporary deliverance from an enemy, that threatened to penetrate into his country on one frontier, but he had already done enough, on the twenty-fifth to check that ; Marshal Daun on another side threatened, by wresting Saxony out of his hands, to cut off at once all the sinews of the war ; to oppose him with success called for the exertion of all the strength his majesty could muster : another action therefore with the Russians, however it might terminate, would have been highly detrimental to the general state of his affairs, if attended with any thing like the loss he suffered in the first, and that was much to be apprehended if he had driven them to despair ; besides every man the king lost was a soldier formed, a loss but ill supplied by the best recruit, and yet even so to replace them was to him an object of difficulty. The Russians on the other hand were little better than a vast band of peasants, brave but ill disciplined, who if they had been destroyed to a man, would by the opening of next campaign have been easily replaced, and till the next campaign he knew he had at any rate nothing to fear from them. Custring was succoured, they could not subsist any longer upon the banks of the Oder, still less could they attempt to pass it, they must therefore retire homewards ; and his majesty well knew they were not in a capacity to undertake any solid operation in their retreat, with the smallest prospect of success, particularly as they would have a Prussian corps to follow them continually, and wait upon all their motions ; for these reasons probably he did not push matters so far as he might, and perhaps would have done, had he had no other enemy to contend with.

Note D.

COLONEL Tempelhoff's account differs from this both with respect to the gross amount of the Prussian forces and the proportion in which they were distributed; and as these are points on which the Prussian officer, was more likely to obtain accurate information than our author, and as the following distribution is very circumstantial, our readers, I hope, will not be sorry to find it inserted in a note.

The army in Silesia under the king himself, consisted of the following regiments.

INFANTRY.

<i>Grenadier Battalions.</i>	2 Markgrave Charles
1 Diringshofen	2 Linstdt
1 Billerbeck	2 Münchow
1 Haack	2 Prince Henry
1 Kleist	2 Prince Ferdinand
1 Rathenow	2 Bonstadt
1 Nimshefki	2 Manteufel
1 Busch	2 Kalkstein
1 Bähr	2 Rebentisch
1 Benkendorf	2 Old Brunswick
1 Carlowitz	—
1 Manteufel	<i>Free Corps.</i>
1 Unruh	1 Leckolbe
1 Heyden	1 Angenelly
1 Bieverling	1 Salenmon
—	1 Du Verger
<i>Musqueteer Battalions.</i>	—
2 Itzenplitz	Grenadiers Battalions 14
2 Prince of Prussia	Musqueteers - 36
3 Guards	Free corps - 4
2 Lattorf	—
1 Retzow	Total — — 54
2 Wedel	—
2 Forcade	—
2 Stutterheim	—

CAVALRY.

<i>Cuirassiers.</i>
3 Gardes du corps
5 Gens d'Armes
5 Carabineers
5 Schmettau
5 Bredow
5 Schoneich
5 Seidlitz
—
<i>Dragoons.</i>
5 Normann
5 Czettitz
5 Y. Plathen
5 Wirtemberg
5 Krockow
—
<i>Hussars.</i>
10 Ziethen
10 Möhring
10 Seidlitz
—
Total 88 Squadrons.

A corps.

(198)

A corps under the command of General Fouquet in Upper Silicia, consisted of the following regiments.

INFANTRY.

Grenadier Battalions.

Naumeister	-	1
Buddenbrock	-	1
Rath	-	1
Arnim	-	1

Musquetteer Battalions.

Mosel	-	-	2
Queifs	-	-	2
Young Brunswick			2
Markgrave Henry			2
Fouquet	-		2
Young Kreutz	-		2
Lattorf Garr. B.			1

CAVALRY.

10 squadrons Bareuth dragoons | 10 squadrons Werner hussars.

Total { Battalions 17
Squadrons 20

The army in Saxony, under Prince Henry, was composed as follows.

INFANTRY.

Grenadier Battalions.

Lubath	-	-	1
Oesterreich	-		1

Bornstadt	-	-	1
Schwartz	-		1
Old Billerbeck	-		1

Musquetteer

Musquetteer Batallions.

Bemburg	-	-	3
Goltz	-	-	2
Brandeis	-	-	2
Leftwitz	-	-	2
Bredow	-	-	2
Hülſen	-	-	2
Knoblock	-	-	2
Grabow	-	-	2

Finck	-	-	2
Salmuth	-	-	2
Putkammer	-	-	2
Hoffmann	-	-	2
Netwied	-	-	2
Kurfel	-	-	2
Bulow	-	-	2
Kaſſel	-	-	2
Hauſen	-	-	2
F. C. Monjow	-	-	1
F. C. Wuſch	-	-	1
F. C. Colignon	-	-	1

CAVALRY.

Cuirassiers.

Life regiment	-	5 squadrons
Prince of Pruffia		5
Prince Frederick		5
Horn	-	5
Krokow	-	5
Kyau	-	5

Dragoons.

Meinicke	-	5 squadrons
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Huffars.

Kleiſt	-	10
Belling	-	5
Putkammer	-	10

Total } Batallions 43
 { Squadrons 60

The

The following regiments were under General Count Dohna in Pommerania.

INFANTRY.

Grenadier Batallions.

Neffe	-	-	1
Loffow	-	-	1
Petersdorf	-	-	1
Kleist	-	-	1
Burgsdorf	-	-	1
Kremzow	-	-	1

Musquetteer Batallions.

Bevern	-	-	2
Prince Maurice			2

Lehwald	-	-	2
Dohna	-	-	2
Kleist	-	-	2
Kanitz	-	-	2
Dierke	-	-	2
Old Kreutz	-	-	2
Treskow	-	-	2

Free Batallions.

Hordt	-	-	2
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CAVALRY.

Dragoons.

Schorlemmer	-	10 squadrons
Old Plathen	-	5
Plettenberg	-	5

Hussars.

Ruesch	-	7 squadrons
Malakowsky	-	8

Total { Batallions 26
Squadrons 35

Reca-

R E C A P I T U L A T I O N .

Colonel Tempelhoff reckons seven hundred men to each Prussian batallion, in this campaign; and one hundred and forty to each squadron, so that the respective strength of the three armies would be as follows.

The king's (including General Fouquet's corps.)

Batallions 72	—	50,400
Squadrons 108	—	15,120
		<hr/>
Total		65,520
		<hr/>

Prince Henry's army in Saxony.

Batallions 43	—	30,100
Squadrons 60	—	8,400
		<hr/>
Total		38,500
		<hr/>

The army under Count Dohna, in Pommerania.

Batallions 26	—	18,200
Squadrons 35	—	4,900
		<hr/>
Total		23,100
		<hr/>

Vol. II.

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Total

(202)

Total of the Prussian forces, employed as above mentioned.

Batallions 141 — 98,700

Squadrons 203 — 28,420

Total 127,120

Note E.

AS there is much finesse, and much matter of instruction, as well as curiosity in the king's dispositions, for this important battle, our readers we trust will not be sorry to see them conveyed in his majesty's own words, a literal translation of which is here subjoined.

" If the enemy remains in his present position, the army will
 " march early to-morrow morning, in columns of lines by its
 " left flank; but the generals, Finck and Schorlemmer, will re-
 " main with the troops under their command at their posts.
 " At break of day, General Finck will make all the drums of
 " his corps beat the reveillé, and moreover cause much noise to
 " be made in his camp; as soon as the day-light appears, all the
 " general officers belonging to Finck's corps with a great swarm
 " of attendants, led horses and hussars, must reconnoitre the
 " heights upon which the enemy's left wing is posted; they must
 " carry spying glasses and assemble frequently together in a circle.
 " This may last a full hour, and is intended to draw the whole
 " attention of the enemy to this part of his position; Lieutenant
 " General Finck must therefore occupy likewise the heights
 " before Treffen, both with infantry and cavalry, taking care
 " however not to expose the troops to a heavy fire of artillery.
 " At six o'clock, Lieutenant General Finck will advance with his
 " corps, and occupy the heights before the Bischoffsee, (where
 " at present the grand guards of Kleist are posted,) with a battery
 " of heavy cannon, and also a corps of infantry to support it.

D d 2

" But

" But General Finck must not begin his attack before the king
 " shall have engaged the enemy, and he hears the fire of the small
 " arms; then if the enemy should change his front, or attempt
 " any other movements, he must take advantage of them.
 " General Schorlemmer will support this infantry with his cavalry,
 " and repulse the enemy, should he attempt to pass the Defilé of
 " Croffen and Beckermill.

" The army itself will march in two columns by its left;
 " the grenadier batallion Oesterreich, will be at the head of
 " the first column, or first line, and General Seidlitz will have
 " the head of the second column, or second line. The duke
 " of Wurtemberg will follow with the cuirassier regiments, under
 " his command, and the hussars of Kleist upon the right flank of
 " the first line, namely, that of the Markgrave Charles's regi-
 " ment. During the march across the heath, the right wing
 " of the army must be somewhat advanced, and the left kept
 " back. When the army shall have marched off, the duke of
 " Wurtemberg will post himself with his cavalry behind the right
 " wing of the second line; Kleist's hussars must extend beyond
 " that flank; General Seidlitz with his cavalry, will place himself
 " behind the left wing of that line.

" But should the enemy not remain in his present position,
 " but should march to Reppin in the course of the night; then
 " the army will march thither at three o'clock in the morning,
 " in three columns. The king imagines the enemy will in that
 " case, place his right at Reppin, his left at Nollendorf, and
 " cover his front by a small rivulet, but which is no ways a
 " considerable obstacle. The infantry will march in two lines,
 " the cavalry will form the third, the whole marching by their
 " left. Lieutenant General Seidlitz, will be at the head of the
 " column of cavalry, after him will follow the divisions of the
 " duke

Vanguard.

First Line.

Second Line.

110	fg. Puttkammer h.	General
5	— Krokow	
5	— Old Plathen	
	—	
1	bat. Tanne	
1	— Loffow	
1	— Bayer	
2	— Grabow	
2	— Diericke	
2	— Sylow	
2	— Bülow	
2	— Dohna	
1	— Butche	
1	— Nöffe	
	—	
5	fg. Schorlemmer	
110	— Kleiß	

General FINCK's corps.

5 squadrons Ziethen
5 ——— Möhring
5 ——— Spahn
5 ——— Meinicke

2 batallions Lehwald
2 ——— Zastrow
2 ——— Bevern
2 ——— Hauten

5 squad. Y. Plathen
5 ——— Belling

Count FLEMMING's corps.

7 sq. Malachoufky
7 — Ruesch

2 bat. Wunsch
1 — Kollignon
2 — Gablenz
2 — Bernburg
2 — Treskow

Note F.

OUR author's criticisms here seem perfectly just, at least as far as they regard the king's first dispositions. His majesty according to the list contained in the foregoing note, had fifty-four batallions in the field, exclusive of the grenadiers, and Bredow's dragoons, (who on this occasion appear to have acted on foot), his cavalry consisted of one hundred and four squadrons.

The ground between the Bäcker Mill and the Cunnerdorf Wood, does not appear to be above three thousand six hundred paces wide: from the Great Mill, across the Cunnerdorf meadows, to the little rivulet which separates them from the Elßrug belonging to Franckfurt, is about one thousand two hundred: if the king therefore had increased Finck's corps to sixteen batallions, he would still have had thirty-eight remaining to support his advanced guard, which should have attacked the Mühlberg or Windmill Hill, in conjunction with the sixteen batallions under Finck; these should have passed the Hüner Brook, not only at the Great Mill, but wherever a bridge could be thrown; and being supported by the thirty squadrons of hussars and dragoons, which were attached to them, might perhaps from the very first moment, have ensured the victory; for Colonel Tempelhoff says, "that the want of cavalry, and light artillery, prevented the Prussians from profiting by the first success of their grenadiers, and gave the enemy time to rally, and make a new disposition." Supposing now the king's thirty-eight batallions, had been formed twenty in the first line, and eighteen in the second, which would have more
than

than sufficed to occupy the space above mentioned, sixty-nine squadrons of cavalry being in two lines behind them, and a regiment of hussars on their left flank to patrol the woods, and keep a look out after the Cossacks; in this order they might have followed the progress of their grenadiers, sustaining them as they advanced, till stopped by the chain of Ponds, which stretch from Cannersdorf quite into the wood, here the Prussians being once masters of the village, six batallions would have been sufficient to have masked the Pond heads, and prevented the enemy from returning, particularly if sustained by fifteen or twenty squadrons of dragoons and hussars, the remaining thirty-two batallions then, and forty-nine squadrons, might by inclining constantly to the right, have effectually seconded the efforts of the grenadiers and Finck's corps, who by turning the *Kuh Grund* or Cow Bottom, (the hollow way where Laudohn first effectually stopped them) would have come on the flank and in the rear, even of that formidable mass formed across the camp, which must therefore probably in the end have given way; the ground does not appear to have been impracticable, for (as General Lloyd observes very justly) the last attacks actually took place there. Could the king at the same time have spared any part of his troops and artillery, to have marched in the night through the wood, and made a false attack upon the enemy's right flank, as our author proposes, it would probably have drawn Count Soltikow's attention that way, and very much facilitated the above mentioned operations, but his majesty was so extremely inferior in numbers, that, perhaps, he could not afford to spare such a detachment.

It is not unlikely this would have been the very disposition the king would have made, had he been acquainted with the ground, but alas, he was not; and he was deceived, as Colonel Tempelhoff assures us, by an officer, who having been constantly quartered

quartered during the peace at Franckfurt, was supposed to know the ground, and who had described it to his majesty as a perfect plain, between the woods and the village, making no mention of the ponds; it is very probable the king did not know of these till after the battle, for his majesty was during the greatest part of the action, at the extremity of his right wing, which he himself led into fire; and Tempelhoff says, they are so situated as not to be distinguished till you come close to the brink of them. Hence the circumstance of all the cavalry being thrown into the left wing, with which it is evident the king thought to turn Cunnerdorf, and menace the front and right wing of the enemy; hence the orders for that impracticable movement of the cavalry, in which Seidlitz was wounded, it was obliged to file off over pond heads, where the king thought they could advance in line; his majesty was without doubt deceived in the idea he had formed of the ground, and his dispositions having been made upon false *data*, were consequently defective.

With respect to what our author, in common with many other military critics, suggests of the propriety of his majesty contenting himself with his first advantages, and halting on the ground he had already gained from the Russians, without driving them to desperation by his last attack, I shall give the reader Colonel Tempelhoff's arguments on that head, always chusing to give him better authority than my own, whenever I find the subject has been treated of before. He says in his observations on the battle of Cunnerdorf—

“ Many men are of opinion, that the king after having stormed
 “ the enemy's batteries on the Windmill Hill, and after he had
 “ cleared the whole field of the Russians quite down to Cunnerf-
 “ dorf, ought to have halted, and been contented with the advan-
 “ tages he had already obtained. The enemy, it is said, would

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“ have

“ have retreated in the night, and have abandoned the whole camp
 “ to the king ; this battle would then have proved as decisive
 “ in its consequences, as that of Zornsdorf ; and whilst the enemy
 “ filled the gazettes of their party, with fruitless disputes about
 “ maintaining the field of battle, his majesty would, as on the
 “ former occasion, have reaped all the fruits of an undisputed
 “ victory.

“ This opinion is for the most part founded on the false sup-
 “ position, that the enemy was already driven back as far as the
 “ Judenberg, and had there formed his last disposition. Had
 “ this really been the case, it would indeed have been highly
 “ dangerous to hazard still another attack, with troops who had
 “ been so long already in the severest fire that perhaps was ever
 “ seen, and had exhausted their strength by their exertions du-
 “ ring the hottest day ever felt, having fought with prodigious
 “ resolution, valour and steadiness, and that attack too, such as
 “ might well have startled the freshest troops. According to these
 “ suppositions the enemy would have stood on a perfect mountain,
 “ his left flank would have been covered by the hollow, in which
 “ General Laudohn's corps had spent the night under arms, which
 “ is not only very deep but extraordinary steep on both sides ; his
 “ right flank also would have been to the full as difficult of access ;
 “ for the hills on which the enemy would most probably have
 “ posted it, are also very steep, and those too in the center are not
 “ to be climbed without much difficulty. But these hills lie from
 “ three to four thousand paces behind Cunnersdorf ; and if the
 “ king had driven back the enemy as far as this, I doubt much
 “ whether he ever would have been in a condition to make any
 “ further resistance ; it was upon these hills, that in the com-
 “ mencement of the action his right wing was posted, so that to
 “ have driven him as far back as here, would have been to drive
 “ his

" his army up quite from left to right, that is to say, to drive it
 " on an heap. But in fact, the enemy was very far indeed from
 " suffering such an overthrow; the left wing, and the center of
 " the Prussian army, had not advanced above a few hundred paces
 " beyond Cunnerdorf, the right wing stood in a close disorderly
 " heap behind the Cow Bottom, and Finck's corps on their right
 " hand in the hollow, having the heights of Elßbruch before them,
 " which they were never able to surmount, though they ran up
 " to them with great intrepidity; on the other hand the enemy
 " still maintained his ground on the Spitzberg, to which he en-
 " tirely owed his deliverance.* Besides, where should the king
 " make this halt? If it was to be done at all, the moment chosen
 " for doing it, was when the grenadiers had stormed the Wind-
 " mill Hill, and had made themselves masters of a considerable
 " part of the enemy's artillery; this in truth is saying, the king
 " ought to have halted in the very moment, when he had every
 " appearance on his side of attaining the most complete, the most
 " decisive victory, a victory which would have for ever delivered
 " him from the enemy, that of all others, the most severely
 " pressed him during the whole war. Nothing is more unjust, than
 " to judge of the merits of a general by the event of an action;
 " how many battles have not been lost by men, who had weighed
 " their enterprize with the utmost attention, had formed it on
 " the best principles, had made their dispositions according to the
 " most approved rules, and in the execution had neglected nothing
 " by which their success might be ensured; while the adversary,
 " who perhaps had done no more than draw out his troops in
 " order of battle, according to the Roster, gains in the same
 " degree that the other loses, and is indebted to some unforeseen
 " circumstance, some accident, which perhaps he was not even
 " informed of, for the reputation of having acted like a great and

“ very able general. If a man would form a just and impartial
 “ judgement, he must go upon the field of battle, he must imagine
 “ himself in the situation of the generals and the troops, on either
 “ side, both the assailants and those on the defensive part, and
 “ combine all this according to the true principles of war.

“ After the grenadiers had stormed the Windmill Hill, there
 “ were but eight battalions as yet in action, all the rest of the
 “ army had not lost a single man; they saw victory before them,
 “ the most considerable difficulties surmounted, and the enemy
 “ in the greatest disorder. And was this a moment for the king
 “ to order a halt! should he now forgo at once all his prospects
 “ of a most complete victory! should he stop short in the midst
 “ of their career, his brave troops who with rapid steps were
 “ moving up, and pressed forward to victory, and thus make
 “ before their eyes an open avowal, that he feared his enemy?
 “ would not that have been to shew a mistrust of the courage
 “ of his troops, nay, in plain words to declare them mere cow-
 “ ards? Then the enemy had behaved himself so miserably in
 “ the defence of this very strong post, that the king might with
 “ good reason expect his further resistance to be no better, and
 “ therefore without difficulty to be surmounted, by the zeal and
 “ bravery of fresh troops? Though I myself was present at the
 “ action, yet I had not till last summer a competent knowledge
 “ of the field of battle, and even now I find not the least reason,
 “ which could prevent the king from pushing on his attacks,
 “ after the storming the first entrenchments of the Russians.
 “ The right wing of the Prussian army stood on the heights,
 “ which command the whole field quite to Cunnersdorf; nothing
 “ presents itself there to the eye, which should prevent a further
 “ attack: the whole ground quite to the village is a plain, no
 “ more intrenchments remained to be stormed, the village itself
 “ was

" was unoccupied and burnt ; the enemy under the embarrassment
 " of changing his front, cooped up in a narrow space, where he
 " could take no advantage of his superior numbers ; the Prussian
 " army in a position by which it was enabled to attack him at
 " once, in front, in flank, and in rear ; and would you have had
 " the king by an absolute inaction forego all these advantages,
 " which were before his eyes ? In that case it would have been
 " better, not to suffer himself to be engaged to fight at all. The
 " king was however so circumstanced, that he had now more
 " than ever, good reason to put somewhat to the risk, for the
 " sake of preventing the Russians, from undertaking any thing
 " further this campaign. A strong corps of Austrians encamped
 " in Lower Lusatia under General Haddick, threatened the
 " Marches and Berlin itself, and was in a posture to join the Russians,
 " wherever it should be thought adviseable. Saxony was totally
 " unprotected, the army of the Empire having it in their power
 " to take Torgau and Wittenberg, cities which could make no
 " defence, but which if they should fall into the enemy's hands,
 " would leave the road clear for him to Berlin. Dresden, where
 " the chief depots, were of all the stores necessary for maintaining
 " an army in Saxony, was in danger of sharing the same fate with the
 " other cities of this electorate ; all communication with the army
 " in Silesia cut off, and it besieged as it were by the Austrian
 " grand army under Marshal Daun. Had the king now remained
 " on the left of the Oder, and confined himself to a strict defence
 " to cover Berlin, and to prevent the further progress of the
 " Russian army in the march of Brandenburg, he would have
 " found himself compelled to retire by degrees quite back to Ber-
 " lin ; especially if General Haddick had been reinforced from
 " the grand army, and had directed his march thither : all this
 " must evidently have happened, unless one can suppose it possible
 for

“ for the Austrian Generals, to have been so short-sighted as not
 “ to have seen their own advantages. Had his majesty on the
 “ contrary, continued on the other side of the Oder and fought
 “ to cut off the supplies, which the Russians drew out of Poland,
 “ he could not however prevent them from passing the river, and
 “ detaching both Haddick’s and Laudohn’s corps to Berlin, which
 “ they might have done without too much weakening themselves,
 “ and the contributions this detachment would have levied on
 “ their way back, would have ridden them of all embarrassment
 “ arising from want of provisions; besides, such a disposition
 “ would have totally disabled him from securing Saxony, and
 “ having no magazines along the Wartha, he could not long have
 “ remained in that neighbourhood. He could not in these cir-
 “ cumstances, accomplish much by the most skilful marches, or
 “ the best chosen positions, whereas the gain of a decisive battle,
 “ would at once have delivered him out of all his difficulties;
 “ hence it was not rashness to hazard it, prudence absolutely
 “ required it. It may be said, the king would be obliged after
 “ the loss of a battle, to do that with an army diminished by one
 “ half and under much worse circumstances, which he might
 “ have done before: certainly; but was not the situation of the
 “ enemy also considerably changed? The Russian army, which,
 “ including the corps of Austrians, might consist before the battle
 “ of about sixty thousand, was now less by eighteen thousand, the
 “ men had expended all the ammunition which they carried in
 “ their pouches, and had been obliged to take a considerable part
 “ of what they had with them in their stores; it must be con-
 “ sidered too, that if these were sufficient to supply their army
 “ once, that was all, they could supply them no more. The
 “ Prussians indeed were in the same case, but these wants might
 “ be supplied in a few days, from their magazines in Custrin, in
 Stettin,

“ Stettin and in Berlin. The Russians on the contrary, were
 “ too far distant from their depots, for this to be done in so short
 “ a time; they must therefore of necessity remain sometime in-
 “ active, which the king might take advantage of, to repair his
 “ shattered forces. One may from hence in some measure, ex-
 “ plain why the Russian Generals did not perform all that the
 “ public expected from them, which has commonly little, or no
 “ idea of the difficulties attending military operations. Had Field
 “ Marshal Soltikow after the battle, ventured to move forward
 “ too hastily, he might reckon upon being once more attacked
 “ by the king; and then had his good fortune deserted him, but
 “ a small part probably of the Russian army would have escaped;
 “ he had therefore the most urgent motives to be wary in his
 “ conduct, and not totally to sacrifice the remnant of his troops,
 “ who had so bravely fought at Kay and Cunnersdorf. He might
 “ with great reason expect that his allies should also do something,
 “ and not leave him to bear alone the whole burthen of the war.
 “ Besides, the whole Russian army was convinced that the Count
 “ of Vienna, meant only to make a tool of them, and cared little
 “ how many or how few of them returned home, provided they
 “ themselves reaped the fruits of their labours. A natural con-
 “ sequence of this idea, was that the enemy had no longer any
 “ great inclination to fight, and rather longed for their return
 “ into winter quarters in Poland. One may assume it as a fact,
 “ without doing any violence to probability, that the king was
 “ well acquainted with the dispositions of the Russians; now
 “ these had already existed before the battle, and Frederick’s
 “ penetration could easily discover the future consequences, which
 “ must result from them. Whilst therefore his enemies expected
 “ the march of the combined army to Berlin, the irruption of
 “ Marshal Daun into Silesia, the recovery of Saxony, the siege
 “ of

“ of Magdebourg, Stetten, and so on, and his friends shuddered for
 “ him; his genius on the very morrow of the battle, shewed
 “ him that nothing of all this would happen; hence also with
 “ his usual serenity and temper, which never left him in the
 “ midst of danger, he was enabled to send word to Duke Fer-
 “ dinand by the same officer, who had brought him the news
 “ of the victory of Minden. *I am sorry the return of so good a*
 “ *piece of news should not be more lucky. But if you get safe back,*
 “ *and dont find Daun in Berlin, and Contades in Magdebourg, you*
 “ *may assure Duke Ferdinand from me, that there is no very great*
 “ *loss sustained.* Thus a great man may always with safety
 “ risk more than another, being sure that in the greatest
 “ calamities his resources will not fail him. This accounts
 “ for the exploits of an Alexander, and a Cæsar, and explains
 “ to us the principle upon which Gustavus Adolphus ventured
 “ into Germany, and Condé hazarded the battles of Rocroy,
 “ Freyburg, Nordlingen, and Senef, and how Frederick was
 “ enabled to extricate himself with glory out of a seven years
 “ war, carried on against the most powerful forces of Europe.”

Such are the arguments Colonel Tempelhoff uses, in support
 of the king's conduct on this occasion; and indeed, I think com-
 pletely justifies his majesty, from the imputation of having rashly
 attempted to push his advantages too far, which our author in
 some measure lays to his charge, though it must be observed, he
 does not venture to speak very decisively on this point.

With respect to the difference of sentiments between the Colo-
 nel and our author, on the necessity of the king's fighting at all,
 I have given the arguments on both sides of the question, and
 shall not presume to deliver any opinion of my own, but leave it
 to the reader to judge for himself.

Note G.

THESE hardy, skilful, and rapid movements, by which, with a twice beaten corps, not one third of the enemy's army, the king of Prussia contrived to prevent him reaping any advantages, from a most bloody victory obtained in the midst of the summer, on the most exposed part of his frontier; render this part of the campaign of one thousand seven hundred and fifty-nine too interesting not to make it a desirable thing for our readers to follow his majesty step by step through all these marches; we shall therefore add to the journal of the Russian movements, which our author gives us, a similar one of each position taken up by his majesty, extracted from a military magazine published at Berlin, a work of acknowledged merit and authenticity.

“ On the enemy's leaving his camp at Mühlrose, and occupying another at Liebrose, the king on the thirtieth of August marched with the army in three columns to a village called Borne, near Beeskow, from which last the enemy was immediately dislodged; the town was then occupied by a free batallion, a body of hussars were posted behind it, and the army itself encamped by Borne, with this village between the two lines.

“ On the thirty-first the army broke up once more and marched in three columns to Waldow; in this camp the right wing was placed at the village called Kannichen, facing the Spree Walde, and the left at Waldow, before which last place Kleist's and Puttkammer's hussars, and the free batallion of Collignon were
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“ posted in a wood for the better protection of the left flank of the
 “ army.

“ On the second of September the bakery was established at
 “ Lübben, under the protection of two battalions and about one
 “ hundred and fifty dragoons. The enemy having by his march on
 “ the fifteenth to Guben discovered beyond a doubt his intention
 “ of going into Silesia, the king broke up his camp on the six-
 “ teenth, and marched in two columns by Lübben to Vetschow,
 “ and on the seventeenth to Cöthbus, where he encamped behind
 “ the town, having his front covered by the Spree; here the
 “ Prussians took a Russian officer and twenty men prisoners. The
 “ eighteenth was a halting day, to give time for the second line to
 “ join, which had been left behind in the camp of Waldow. On
 “ this day his majesty detached Colonel Kleist with ten squadrons
 “ of hussars, and the regiment of old Plathen, together with two
 “ battalions of foot, under the command of Colonel Linden, to
 “ Spremberg; and Major General Linstädt with two battalions and
 “ eight squadrons of hussars to Forste. On the nineteenth the
 “ whole army marched to the last mentioned place, and took up a
 “ camp with the front covered by the Neisse. Colonel Kleist on
 “ the same day marched from Spremberg to Mosqua, to cover the
 “ right flank of the army in case of necessity. On the twentieth
 “ the army marched to Linderode, and Colonel Kleist from Mosqua
 “ to Sorau, from whence he marched again that night, and ad-
 “ vanced with his cavalry to drive the enemy out of Sagan, which
 “ he effected compleatly, cutting many of them to pieces, and
 “ making the rest prisoners. On the twenty-first, at ten in the
 “ morning, the king arrived at Sagan with the whole cavalry; the
 “ infantry followed soon after, and encamped with the left wing
 “ at Eckersdorf, and the right on the Galgenberg (or Gallows Hill)

“ near

“ near the town. Many of the enemy’s patrols (who was un-
 “ apprized of our rapid march), were made prisoners.

“ The king’s movements after the battle of Frankfurt, to cover
 “ Berlin and afterwards Silesia, from the invasion of the Russian
 “ army, are worthy the highest admiration, the conduct of his
 “ adversary on the contrary, is subject to much just censure. The
 “ enemy’s generals ought to have exerted all their efforts to oc-
 “ cupy the post of Sagan, before the king’s arrival, and to that
 “ end, they should have detached a corps of ten thousand men
 “ thither, which from the natural strength of that post, might
 “ have stopped the Prussian army long enough to give time to the
 “ Russians, and General Laudohn to reach Glogau. Such a con-
 “ duct in the enemy’s generals, would have obliged the Prussian
 “ army to take a long detour, and if they had sought to turn this
 “ corps in the neighbourhood of Sprottau, it need only march
 “ by its left, and place itself behind the Sprottau river, in which
 “ case its communication with the grand army, could not possibly
 “ be cut off.

“ On the twenty-third the king marched with the army in two
 “ columns to Suckau, a village not far from Neustadt; the Cos-
 “ sacks which had penetrated as far as here, were driven back.
 “ Both wings of the army were posted on heights, the center was
 “ cut in two by the village. The vanguard on their arrival in the
 “ new camp, saw the heads of the enemy’s columns on the heights
 “ of Wendischborau, they halted as soon as they perceived the
 “ Prussians, and pitched their camp on the above named heights.

“ Several prisoners reported that the enemy’s intention was to
 “ have encamped on the heights near Milkau, and that their ge-
 “ nerals had received no intelligence of the king’s march. His
 “ majesty’s object in taking the camp of Suckau seems to have
 “ been, to march by his flank to the heights of Milkau, when-

“ ever the enemy should attempt to pass the defilé of Neustadt, to
 “ attack their army on its coming out, and thus utterly destroy it.

“ On the twenty-fourth the enemy having put his troops under
 “ arms at the head of his camp, the Prussians did the same, and
 “ upon patrols being sent out to discover what his intentions were
 “ in this, they learnt that he was about to occupy a new camp,
 “ traced out between Nenkersdorf and Malschwitz.

“ It being by this time certain that the enemy would not pass
 “ the defilé of Neustädt, the king made the army advance to the
 “ heights of Milkau, at which village their left flank was placed,
 “ while their right came to Baune, by this advantageous posi-
 “ tion, the enemy was shut out of the road to Glogau, and now
 “ took up a camp between Neu-Tschoe, and Keltfch. In this
 “ position both armies remained some time under arms, each
 “ expecting to be attacked, but at length the tents were pitched,
 “ and both camps strongly fortified.

“ On the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth the king was
 “ joined by Generals Maier, and Queist, with three squadrons,
 “ and seven batallions; this reinforcement enabled his majesty to
 “ extend his right wing to Nenkersdorf, before which village an
 “ entrenchment was thrown up.

“ On the twenty-ninth several movements were observed in the
 “ enemy's camp, the object of which could not at first be dis-
 “ covered, but as we discerned during the night, many fires on
 “ the other side the Oder near Carolath, it was plain that he
 “ had passed that river with a part of his forces. On the thirtieth
 “ the enemy continued in motion, and the king determined to
 “ attack his rear guard; for this purpose on the following morning
 “ (October the first) he marched with six batallions, fifteen squa-
 “ drons of dragoons, and ten of hussars, and marched by Neustädtel
 “ as far as Keltfche, the enemy had however already passed the
 “ Oder,

“ Oder, and his majesty made prisoners only some trainers and a
“ part of the baggage train. Major General Plathén was detached
“ that same day by his majesty, with six battalions, two regi-
“ ments of cuirassiers, two of dragoons, together with the hussars
“ of Kleist and Malachowski to Glogau, to occupy a position at
“ Klein Zaerbau, a village near that town on the other side the
“ river. This corps was reinforced the next day by all the dra-
“ goons and hussars, a picket of one thousand cuirassiers, and
“ eleven battalions of foot, it formed in such a manner, that
“ both flanks were covered by the Oder; and in this situation
“ protected that town from a bombardment, and was at hand to
“ cut off the enemy from the Hund pass, and thus prevent him
“ from penetrating any further into Silesia.”

Note H.

AS the reader will perhaps be desirous of comparing the narrative and sentiments of our author, on this very remarkable transaction, with those of Captain Tielke, and at the same time may possibly not have that book to refer to; I shall trouble him with this one more note, extracted from Lieutenant Christian's translation, of that very interesting author.

“ On the seventh of November the Austrian army under Marshal Daun, was advantageously encamped upon the heights of Plauen, the ravin and gorge of which were in its front.

“ This ravin is lined by very high and steep rocks, in some places perpendicular, in the midst of which runs the Weiffritz; a few rugged roads, scarcely passable, lead up to the heights, which are easily defended.

“ The gorge begins at Plauen, and continues almost without interruption to the village of Potzchappel; from thence it extends to a mountain called the Windberg, that commands all this country, and covers the flank of this valley. Though the rocks cease to line the ravin at this part, the heights are notwithstanding rather steep, and the roads and passages troublesome and difficult.

“ This extensive ravin opens towards Dresden, and terminates on the left of the Weiffritz, in a gentle slope at the Fauxbourg. On the right, this height (at whose foot stands the village of Plauen) forms a ridge resembling a parapet, which reaches from Plauen to the Fauxbourg, and is called the Haneberg.

“ The

“ The whole of the Imperial cavalry encamped in the plain between Plauen and the Fauxbourg, with its right flanked by the latter, and its left covered by the village of Plauen.

“ This advantageous position of the Imperial army, rendering its attack difficult, dangerous, and almost impracticable, his Prussian Majesty, in order to force it to retreat, endeavoured to cut off its forage, and communication with Bohemia. For this purpose he sent Colonel Kleist, with a light corps, into Bohemia, who destroyed some magazines, and raised very heavy contributions. On the fifteenth General Finck was detached by Freyberg to Dippoldiswalda; the king advanced in person with the main army to Wilsdruff, and pushed his advanced guard, commanded by General Ziethen, to Kesselsdorf. The sixteenth Major General Wunsch had already advanced to Maxen, with the half of Finck's corps as an advanced guard, and the eighteenth succeeded in driving Major General Kleefeld of the army of the Empire from his advanced posts, from Dohna to Cotta.

“ To this corps of the enemy, posted at Maxen, Marshal Daun immediately opposed a body of light troops, commanded by Major General Brentano; and as the Prussian forces near Dippoldiswalda and Maxen amounted to thirty-five squadrons and eighteen battalions (see the order of battle), Marshal Daun was obliged to secure the rear of his army, by posting another corps at Ruppchen, under the command of Baron de Sincere, General of infantry.

“ The eighteenth Lieutenant General Finck followed General Wunsch to Maxen with the remainder of his corps, and, to secure the road to Freyberg, left four battalions and a regiment of cuirassiers at Dippoldiswalda, under the command of Major General Lindstaett: these troops however rejoined the corps
“ at

“ at Maxen the same night, in consequence of an order from the
 “ king, sent to General Lindstaett by a chasseur. General Finck
 “ afterwards detached Major General Wunsch, with five batallions
 “ and five squadrons towards Dohna, and on the nineteenth
 “ dispatched Major General Platen, with three batallions and
 “ a regiment of dragoons, towards Reinhardtsgrimme, posting
 “ himself with the remainder of the troops near Maxen.

“ By this position the whole of the Imperial army was prevented
 “ from entering into cantonments, its forages were also much
 “ straitened, and the Prussians enabled to make incursions into
 “ Bohemia at pleasure.

“ This situation determined Marshal Daun to reinforce the
 “ corps under the command of Sincere, in order to dislodge Ge-
 “ neral Lindstaett from Dippoldiswalda, that he might afterwards
 “ more easily dispossess the Prussians of the posts of Maxen and
 “ Dohna. It was supposed General Lindstaett would defend Dip-
 “ poldiswalda, being judged stronger than he really was.

“ Sincere's corps consisted of

The Hufards - of Scezeni.

Dragoons - of the Staff and Young Modena.

Cuirassiers { Serbelloni, Pretlach, Schmertzling and Old
 Modena.

Infantry { Anger, Marschall, Giulay, Clerici, Ligne,
 Wied, Hartsch, Botta and Young Colloredo.

“ Which were reinforced by the regiments of Anhalt Zerbst
 “ Cuirassiers, and those of Durlach, Haller and Tillier, infantry.

“ In consequence of the abovementioned plan, Sincere's corps
 “ received orders to quit Rüppchen the nineteenth, at seven
 “ o'clock in the morning, and advance to Dippoldiswalda, which
 “ was executed.

“ In

“ In the mean time the Marshal joined the army of Sincere,
 “ and occupied a very advantageous camp, before Dippoldiswalda,
 “ its right being flanked by the heights of Maltern, and its left
 “ by Haefelich; three batallions were also posted in the town of
 “ Dippoldiswalda. If another Prussian corps had occupied this
 “ town whilst General Finck marched to Maxen, or the troops
 “ under the command of Linstaett had been reinforced, Marshal
 “ Daun must have been greatly embarrassed: he would have found
 “ the attack by Reinhardtsgrimme impracticable, without exposing
 “ his right flank to the Prussians, and putting himself between
 “ two fires; and as the left flank of the position at Plauen was
 “ threatened at the same time, had the Imperialists intended at-
 “ tacking Finck’s corps by Roehrsdorf and Wittgendorf, they
 “ would not have ventured to detach a sufficient body of troops to
 “ assure its success.

“ As it was to be feared that his Prussian Majesty would disco-
 “ ver the enterprize of the Imperialists, either by the cannonade,
 “ or by some other means, and that he might in the interim at-
 “ tack the principal army, at this time weakened by a considera-
 “ ble detachment, the Marshal rejoined it, leaving orders with
 “ Sincere’s corps to march to Reinhardtsgrimme the next day,
 “ November the twentieth, at seven o’clock in the morning.
 “ The troops had begun their march, and the heads of the
 “ columns were arrived at Ringelsbayn, when Marshal Daun
 “ (attended by their Royal Highnesses Princes Albert and
 “ Clement of Saxony) returned to take the command of this
 “ corps; having previously made the necessary dispositions at the
 “ grand army, in case of an attack, and observed that the enemy
 “ had not changed their position. The Marshal placed Count
 “ O’Donell at the head of the cavalry, and Baron de Sincere com-
 “ manded the infantry. The order of March was in four columns,

" viz. two of cavalry and two of infantry. The advanced guard,
 " commanded by Major General Baron de Siskowitz, consisted of
 " Scezeni's regiment of hussars, some squadrons of carabiniers,
 " a few croats, and a brigade of grenadiers of five batallions.
 " Lieutenant General Baron de Seckendorf remained upon the
 " height of Maltern, with the regiments of Botta and Young
 " Colloredo, infantry, one squadron of Stampach, one of Anhalt
 " Zerbst, and one hundred hussars and dragoons, detached from
 " the regiments of the Emperor, Esterhasi, and dragoons of the
 " Staff, to cover the rear of the Imperialists, in case a detachment
 " of Prussians should advance from Freyberg, to Dippoldiswalda.
 " Brentano's corps, posted near the Red-House and afterwards at
 " Roehrsdorf, received orders to approach Maxen, and endeavour
 " to take Finck in flank and rear, whilst the Marshal attacked him
 " in front. It had been previously concerted with the army of the
 " Empire, part of which was posted at Gieshubel, under the com-
 " mand of the Prince of Stolberg, that a corps should be detached
 " to Dohna, to inclose Finck's army on this side. Reinhardt-
 " grimme was occupied by three squadrons of Prussian hussars,
 " commanded by Major de Hauschwitz; and General Platen was
 " posted in the rear of this village. Marshal Daun arrived near
 " this spot, formed his order of battle in two lines, and immediately
 " reconnoitred Reinhardtsgrimme, which he afterwards attacked
 " with his advanced guard.

" The enemy's troops posted within and in the rear of this vil-
 " lage, abandoned it at his approach, without defending the im-
 " portant gorge in which it is situated, the passage of which
 " must have been attended with the greatest difficulty; they re-
 " tired into the wood, and from thence to Hausdorf, a retreat
 " which permitted the Imperialists to reconnoitre the roads through
 " this village and the forest. The passages were found narrow,
 " and

“ and the more inconvenient, as the sharp frost, attended with
 “ little snow, had rendered the slope (which is naturally very
 “ steep) so slippery, that it was thought impossible to ascend it
 “ with the artillery and cavalry, whose horses were not shod for
 “ that purpose; but M. de Fabri, at that time Major of the Staff
 “ (or corps of Field Engineers) having assured the Marshal that
 “ he had examined the roads, which, though inconvenient and
 “ difficult, he had found practicable, the order to march was
 “ immediately given; and, after having garnished the woods with
 “ croats and hussars, who drove the Prussians from the nearest
 “ heights on the other side, the corps continued to advance in four
 “ columns by Reinhardtsgrimme to Maxen.

“ General Finck had occupied the heights in front of Maxen
 “ with three battalions, (c) four howitzers, and five twelve-pound-
 “ ers. (N°. 27) General Platen was posted in front near Haus-
 “ dorf, with two battalions; and the remainder of the troops
 “ faced General Brentano. A battery of four six-pounders was
 “ established upon the steep hill on the right of Maxen, (N°. 28)
 “ and two others of two twelve-pounders each, opposite Brentano’s
 “ corps. (N°. 29 and 30.)

“ General Finck’s not having occupied the two mountains, situ-
 “ ated between the wood of Reinhardtsgrimme and Hausdorf, ren-
 “ dered his position very defective, by favouring the debouché
 “ and deployment of the Imperial troops from the abovementioned
 “ wood, which could neither be seen nor prevented, on
 “ account of the two mountains I and F, situated between the
 “ debouché of the wood of Reinhardtsgrimme and the mountains
 “ C and H, upon which he was posted.

“ It must be acknowledged, that after having detached M. de
 “ Wunsch, he was not strong enough to occupy them; but with
 “ what view he posted the General at so great a distance, or why

“ the latter did not afterwards support him, I cannot account for.
 “ I was informed by the Prussian officers, that as soon as General
 “ Finck found himself attacked by the Imperialists, he dispatched
 “ successively two or three officers to General Wunsch, to de-
 “ mand the two battalions of Munchow as a support, during the
 “ attack of the hill of Maxen, and that the General refused to
 “ comply with this order, alledging that he could not spare them.
 “ It would perhaps have been more prudent, if General Wunsch had
 “ not only sent these two battalions, but followed with his whole
 “ force to the assistance of General Finck; for supposing the army
 “ of the Empire had passed the defilé of Müglitz, which the small
 “ force under the command of M. de Wunsch could not have
 “ prevented, the reunion of a numerous body of troops on a
 “ ground so narrow and intersected as that near Maxen, far from
 “ being formidable, would have been rather advantageous to the
 “ Prussians; but M. de Wunsch's corps remained at its post near
 “ Blochwitz during the whole action, satisfied with cannonading
 “ the troops of the Empire, which had advanced to Dohna, from
 “ the two batteries of four twelve-pounders, N°. 57 and 58.

“ As soon as the battalions of grenadiers of the advanced guard
 “ had cleared the wood, they occupied the height on the right,
 “ which the Marshal ascended in order to reconnoitre General
 “ Finck's position, and make the necessary disposition for the at-
 “ tack. He ordered the battalions of grenadiers, as they came
 “ up, to halt at the foot of the mountains, to prevent their be-
 “ ing incommoded by the enemy's fire till the moment of attack.
 “ In spite of the very steep ascent, rendered still more slippery by
 “ the sharp frost, snow and ice, Captain Schroeder of the Impe-
 “ rial artillery, by his skill and exertions, in a short time esta-
 “ blished a battery of eight twelve-pounders, upon the height,
 “ N°. 23, which enfiladed the left flank of the Prussians, and made
 “ considerable

“ considerable havock. The cannonade became very brisk on both
 “ sides; but that of the Imperialists, having the advantage of
 “ situation, did the most execution. As soon as this battery
 “ opened, General Platen retired with his two batallions from d,
 “ and entred into the line f. The troops on the other side of
 “ Maxen faced Brentano’s corps, which had advanced from Ro-
 “ ersdorf to F.

“ In the mean time the Imperial grenadiers, followed by the
 “ infantry, advanced in columns, their cavalry on the left; being
 “ debouched entirely from the wood G, they formed in order of
 “ battle, and brought eight howitzers and six six-pounders upon
 “ the height, (N°. 24) situated at a small distance in front of their
 “ right, and upon that (N°. 64) twenty-six pieces of different ca-
 “ libres. The fire of these batteries, being extremely well nou-
 “ rished, must have carried slaughter and confusion through the
 “ Prussian ranks. Brentano’s corps, in the mean time, continued
 “ its approaches, firing from eight eight-pound culverins, placed
 “ at N°. 26 and 65, upon that part of Finck’s corps which opposed
 “ him near Wittgendorf. The shot from the two attacks having
 “ occasioned some confusion amongst the baggage placed at (h),
 “ which communicated to the batallions, the enemy were obliged
 “ to remove it to (i). The cannonade having continued three
 “ quarters of an hour, the Marshal ordered the grenadiers com-
 “ manded by General Siskowitz, and supported by M. de Ainse
 “ with his brigade of infantry, to attack on the right, and the
 “ brigade of Major Dombasse on the left. The cavalry marched
 “ in the hollow, under cover from the enemy’s fire, and passed
 “ Hausdorf.

“ Whilst the Imperialists were descending the height to attack
 “ the Prussians, two batallions of the latter descended the hill of
 “ Maxen to take them in flank, g; the firing between these troops
 “ hardly

“ hardly lasted a quarter of an hour, the Marshal having left one
“ batallion upon the height, N^o. 24, to secure this flank; the
“ battery likewise enfilading the Prussian batallions, who being
“ at the same time charged in front by the grenadiers, were forced
“ to retreat with precipitation into the village of Maxen.

“ General Finck immediately supported them with a batallion of
“ grenadiers from the right, and two of infantry from the left of
“ the line opposite Brentano's corps, N^o. 36, 37, and 38, with six
“ squadrons of dragoons, 54, who marched through the village
“ of Maxen to the height; but the two batallions who had been
“ repulsed, threw these troops into disorder, and the greatest part
“ of them were made prisoners. The Prussian Major Generals de
“ Rebentisch and Mosel used their utmost endeavours to prevent
“ the disorder, and rally the flying troops; but their efforts were
“ useless against the distinguished bravery of the Imperial grena-
“ diers, which seemed to increase with the difficulty they en-
“ countered in climbing the heights, particularly those occu-
“ pied by the enemies; in short, they carried every thing before
“ them.

“ The enemy's cannon could do but little execution, and the
“ Prussian cavalry was entirely useless, from the want of space on
“ the steep height on which it was posted, and from whence it
“ must necessarily descend to the charge, whereas that of the
“ Imperialists attacked and charged ascending.

“ There were some fleches * upon the heights of Maxen, con-
“ structed entirely of stones, great quantities of which are found
“ in

“ * These fleches were supposed by many to have been constructed by Finck's corps; but
“ I can with truth assert, that they were thrown up the year before, by the Prussian Major
“ General de Knoblock: besides, I have too much respect for Field Engineers in general
“ (even

“ in these environs : far from assisting the Prussians in their defence,
 “ they were certainly hurtful.

“ The grenadiers and Imperial carabiniers carried the principal
 “ height (k) with but little loss, and obliged the Prussians to
 “ abandon their cannon. Flushed with success, they pursued
 “ them with too much ardour, and were falling into confusion;
 “ which the Marshal perceiving, checked the pursuit, and formed
 “ the infantry in order of battle upon the height L, abandoned
 “ by the Prussians. The Imperial cavalry turned the left of this
 “ height M, and pursued the advantage already gained with the
 “ utmost intrepidity.

“ As the attack of Brentano's corps became during this time
 “ more serious, General Finck ordered fifteen squadrons of cuirass-
 “ sers to advance, commanded by Major Generals de Bredow and
 “ Vafold (m); but being obliged to turn some ponds, and pass
 “ through marshy meadows and thick furze, they could neither
 “ form nor attack with the necessary shock and impetuosity; they
 “ were consequently repulsed, and obliged to retire with precipita-
 “ tion to (n). The Imperial grenadiers pursued the victory ob-
 “ tained on their side at Maxen, and continued pushing the Prus-
 “ sians beyond the village.

“ General Finck collected the routed and scattered troops in the
 “ best manner he could, and ordered General de Lindstaett to
 “ form them again near Schmorsdorf (o); Brentano's corps con-
 “ tinued advancing, and during this time arrived at N, and lastly
 “ at (O,) where it joined Marshal Daun's. The new position,

“ (even were they Turks) to suppose they constructed them to be defended; and I hope to
 “ do them justice by supposing they were only intended as a mask. I am more inclined to be
 “ of this opinion, as I have entered a camp abandoned by the Prussians, which at first glance
 “ appeared to be fortified; its parapet consisted of a few faggots, and the cannon were trunks
 “ of trees.

“ ON

“ or rather halt of the Prussians, was but of short duration ; for
 “ the Imperialists, elated with success, advanced with so much
 “ bravery, that nothing could resist their efforts : they charged
 “ the Prussians ; broke their ranks ; and, without giving them
 “ time to breathe, drove them from height to height, and took
 “ the greatest part of their artillery and some colours. The
 “ Prussian cavalry, which threatened to fall upon the Imperial
 “ infantry, was repulsed by the cavalry of the Imperialists, par-
 “ ticularly by the regiment of dragoons of Young Modena, who
 “ afterwards charged and cut up the Prussian infantry, took two
 “ battalions and their colours, together with some standards and
 “ cannon.

“ Count Palfy, Lieutenant General of the army of the Empire,
 “ had advanced from Zehista towards Dohna with the two regi-
 “ ments of hussars, Spleni and Haddick ; and Major General
 “ Kleefeld was posted at the same point of Zoschendorf with
 “ some battalions of croats and the Slavonian hussars. The
 “ prince of Stolberg, having under his command the Counts d’Ef-
 “ fern and de Fugger, had advanced to Buckerswalda, where he
 “ took post with the regiment of infantry of Mayence, one ba-
 “ tallion of Darmstadt, two battalions of Fürstenberg, the regiment
 “ of Imperial dragoons of Savoy, commanded by Major General de
 “ Voghera, and some large field-pieces ; he also cannonaded
 “ Wunsch’s corps from the batteries established at 59, 60, 61,
 “ 62, and 63.

“ The light troops, commanded by Major Generals de Palfy and
 “ de Kleefeld, afterwards passed the ravin, and advanced towards
 “ Sirsen, to inclose General Finck on this side ; the latter, who
 “ was pursued great part of the night, took post in the plain be-
 “ tween Falkenhayn and Blochwitz.

“ The

“ The Marshal detached two regiments of cavalry towards the
 “ Elbe, to prevent the Prussians from escaping on this side by
 “ crossing the river.

“ These dispositions threw General Finck, with the remainder
 “ of his corps, into the most distressed situation possible; sur-
 “ rounded on all sides by gorges and defilés, whose heights were
 “ occupied by the Imperialists, there was not a single opening left
 “ him to retreat.

“ The night being too far advanced for the Imperialists to con-
 “ tinue their attacks, the troops were formed in order of battle
 “ upon the heights, and passed the night under arms. (T.) The
 “ ammunition which arrived from the camp at Plauen, was dis-
 “ tributed to them, and every preparation made for renewing the
 “ attack at day-break.

“ The same night General de Seckendorf, posted near Maltern,
 “ sent word that his hussars and dragoons in front of Dippoldis-
 “ walda had been drove in, and that they discovered the enemy's
 “ infantry and cavalry*. He immediately received orders to de-

“ * Colonel Kleist returning from his expedition in Bohemia with his corps, consisting of
 “ ten squadrons of green hussars, ten squadrons of dragoons of Schorlemmer, and the free
 “ battalion of Corviere, received orders at Sayda to support General Finck, and had there-
 “ fore immediately directed his march to Dippoldiswalda, where he arrived very late at night
 “ on the twentieth. The town was not occupied by the Imperialists, and there was only a
 “ picket of one hundred men posted in a house contiguous to the bridge, without the town.
 “ The Sieur Kempel, Lieutenant of the battalion of Corviere, with fifty men, approached
 “ under favour of the night without being perceived, supported by Captain le Grange, with
 “ one hundred more and a piece of cannon; he killed the two centinels posted at the foot of the
 “ bridge, surprized the picket before it could get under arms, killed several and made a great
 “ many prisoners, entering the town with those who fled, which he occupied.

“ General Hülsen, who had likewise received orders to assist and disengage Finck, marched
 “ the twentieth from his cantonment at Sora, near Wildsdruß, to Collnitz, and pushed his
 “ advanced guard on to Klingenberg; the twenty-first he arrived with the latter at Dippoldis-
 “ walda, and seeing there was no possibility of saving Finck's corps, he retreated with Colonel
 “ Kleist to Freyberg.

" fend his post and the debouché to the last extremity, and in case
 " he found himself absolutely obliged to abandon it, to fall back
 " upon Reinhardtsgrimme and Hausdorf. In the mean time the
 " Marshal occupied the heights of the latter, with six batallions
 " and two regiments of cavalry, under the command of General
 " Plonquet, and sent orders to Count Buccow (General of cavalry,
 " commanding the army near Plauen in his absence) to detach
 " General Baron Anger immediately with four batallions to Rüp-
 " chen, and to reinforce this post, according as circumstances and
 " the strength of the enemy at Dippoldiswalda might require,
 " without risking the safety of the grand army. He was ordered
 " likewise to keep up the communication between the latter and
 " the corps posted at Maxen and Blochwitz, and to cover their
 " left flank. The Generals Anger and Plonquet were to consult
 " on the proper steps to be taken to answer these intentions.

" I have been assured General Finck had formed the resolution
 " of cutting his way through the Imperialists with the remainder
 " of his corps towards Schmorfdorf*, and that he had issued or-
 " ders to the Generals under his command, to distribute cartridges
 " amongst the troops for that purpose; but upon their represen-
 " tation, that his forces were too much weakened to attempt this
 " enterprize with success, he ordered them to be mustered in the
 " night, and found the whole of his infantry amounted but to
 " two thousand eight hundred and thirty-six men; the troops
 " posted upon the height of Maxen having been taken or deserted
 " in great numbers.

" Finding, therefore, that he could not risk such an attack
 " with any hopes of success with so small a force, and having

" * Probably by Muhlbach and Cunnerdorf: it is true that he would have been opposed
 " only by the light troops of Colonel Reid, but at the same time would have found impracticable
 " roads.

“ only eight pieces of cannon remaining, against ten times the
 “ number of troops, furnished with a numerous artillery, and the
 “ position of the Prince of Stolberg at Buckerswalde, rendering
 “ the passage at this place equally impracticable, it was determined
 “ that the regiments of cavalry should file off by the gorge, un-
 “ der favour of the night, pass the corps of Imperial light troops
 “ at break of day near Sirsen, and then pursue their March by Lug
 “ and Lockwitz. M. de Wunsch, though General of infantry,
 “ was ordered by General Finck to execute this manœuvre, having
 “ the most perfect knowledge of the country*.

“ An hour before day-light, the Marshal ordered the cannon to
 “ advance as near as possible, and the grenadiers to hold them-
 “ selves in readiness to renew the attack at day-break.

“ A general officer of the Prussians arrived at the advanced post,
 “ and desired to be admitted to the Commander in Chief. The
 “ Marshal being informed of it, sent General Laschy to acquaint
 “ him they must lay down their arms, and surrender at discretion.
 “ The cannonade had begun before the Marshal could give orders
 “ to postpone the attack, but was immediately silenced. General
 “ Laschy soon after returned, with the answer that Finck's corps
 “ would surrender prisoners, on condition they might retain their
 “ baggage, which the Marshal granted.

“ In the mean time General Wunsch had endeavoured to escape
 “ with the cavalry in the manner indicated, but had met with in-
 “ surmountable obstacles in the attempt; being obliged to lead the
 “ horses one by one across the ice, only a few squadrons of hus-
 “ sars had passed the first gorge when the Imperialists perceived
 “ them. The Marshal insisted that Wunsch's corps, or rather

“ * I have no doubt of this plan being thought of, as I had the information from the Prus-
 “ sian officers themselves; but I cannot conceive how the passage of the cavalry could have
 “ been practicable on this side, still less which way it could have joined the king's army.

“ the six regiments of cavalry which he then commanded, should
 “ be included in the capitulation, upon which General Finck ob-
 “ served, that he could not capitulate for M. de Wunsch, who
 “ was commandant of a separate corps.

“ During this treaty, which Finck prolonged as much as possi-
 “ ble, to give M. de Wunsch time to execute the intended passage,
 “ he sent different officers, in the presence of M. de Laschy, under
 “ pretence of informing Wunsch of his capitulation, but in fact to
 “ see if he had already passed the défilé of Sirsen. M. de Laschy
 “ perceiving the stratagem, threatened to renew the cannonade, if
 “ M. de Wunsch continued his retreat.

“ The difficulty of penetrating through a ground so intersected,
 “ and whose ravins were covered with brush-wood and occupied
 “ by croats, augmented every instant; and the last officer whom
 “ General Finck sent, returned with the information, that scarce
 “ half a squadron had passed Sirsen, and that General Wunsch
 “ found the passage impassable. Upon which General Finck,
 “ and the generals under his command, signed the capitulation at
 “ Blochwitz, General Wunsch excepted, whose corps was not-
 “ withstanding included; even those who had passed the gorge
 “ were obliged to return, and lay down their arms with the rest :
 “ but he being near Sirsen when the capitulation was signed, could
 “ afterwards avail himself of this circumstance, and assert that he
 “ had no share in it.

“ The whole corps having laid down their arms, the prisoners
 “ were conducted to the great garden near Dresden, by the troops
 “ ordered on this duty. The Marshal then posted the principal
 “ part of his corps upon the heights of Maxen, sent Brentano's
 “ division towards Dippoldiswalda, and himself rejoined the grand
 “ army near Dresden.

“ The

“ The number of killed and wounded, was inconsiderable on both sides.

“ The Imperialists took

- 3 Pair of silver kettle drums.
- 1 Pair of brass ditto.
- 24 Standards.
- 96 Pair of colours.

“ A R T I L L E R Y.

- 25 Three-pounders,
 - 2 Four-pounders,
 - 18 Six-pounders,
 - 17 Twelve-pounders,
 - 9 Howitzers,
-
- 71 Pieces of cannon, and 44 ammunition waggons.
-

“ PRISONERS.

"PRISONERS.


1	Lieutenant General	-	Finck.
8	Major Generals	- -	{ Rebentisch, Linstaett, Mosel, Wunsch, Platen, Vafold, Bre- dow, and Gersdorf.
9	General officers		
6	Colonels.		
3	Lieutenant Colonels.		
32	Majors.		
88	Captains.		
168	First Lieutenants.		
85	Second Lieutenants.		
100	Ensigns.		
50	Officers of the Staff.		
8	Officers of the Artillery.		
549	Total of officers.		

" According to the account published by the Imperialists, the
" total number of prisoners, including the non-commissioned of-
" ficers, amounted to fourteen thousand nine hundred and twenty-
" two men.

Teilke concludes this account with observing,


" Every witness of this affair must allow, that the Imperialists,
" independent of their good and judicious dispositions, and the ad-
" vantages they derived from the ground and their artillery, fought
" with the greatest bravery. On the other hand, notwithstanding
" the position of the Prussians, and the ground they occupied,
" rendered them incapable of using their arms with success, they
" certainly displayed a great deal of firmness and intrepidity."

F I N I S.






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


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
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EXPLANATION of PLATE II.

- A. Russian camp in front of Custring from the fifteenth to the twenty-third of August.
- B. Russian barricade of waggons.
- C. and D. The first position of the Russians after they had raised the siege.
- E. and F. Second position of the Russians.
- G. and H. The position of the Russians on the twenty-fifth of August.

- Figure 1. The Prussian advanced corps.
- 2 and 3. The Prussian army the night before the battle.
- 4 to 11. The advance of the Prussians.
- 12 to 16. Their formation for the attack.

PLATE III. FIGURE I.

- I. and K. The Russian baggage and cavalry after having moved out of the square.

- Figure 17 and 18. Second position of the Prussian cavalry.
- 19 and 20. Advance of the Prussian vanguard and batteries, which were afterwards advanced to 22.
- 23. Attack of the vanguard.

PLATE III. FIGURE 2.

- L. Advance of the Russian right wing in pursuit of the Prussian grenadiers.
 - M. Advance of their cavalry for the same purpose.
 - N. The right of the Russian square after it was broken.
 - O. The new flank formed by the Russians.
 - P. Q. R. S. The Russian cavalry which attacked the Prussian batteries.
 - Figure 25. The broken Prussian grenadiers.
 - 26. The Prussian cavalry attacking the Russian.
 - 27. The Prussian cavalry attacking the Russian infantry.
 - 28, 29, 30, 31. Second advance of the Prussian army.
 - 33. Attack and defeat of the Russian cavalry on the Prussian right.
 - 32. 34. 35. The Russian cavalry attacking the battery on the Prussian left, and the flight of thirteen Prussian battalions.
-

PLATE III. FIGURE 3.

- T. The breaking of the Russian left.
- U. V. The Russian infantry and cavalry which formed in the evening and defended themselves.
- Figure 36 and 37. The Prussian cavalry, part of which took up the ground the thirteen battalions had quitted, and part drove back the Russian cavalry; the whole afterwards advanced against the square with the infantry.
- 38 and 39. The Prussian infantry of the right wing attacking and routing the Russians, in conjunction with the cavalry.
- 40. The

40. The Prussian infantry, after having changed its front to the left, endeavouring in vain to force the Russian troops which had formed again in U and V.
41. The Prussian cavalry stationed near Zornsdorf and Wilkerdorf to cover of battle against the Cossacks.
-

PLATE III. FIGURE 4.

W. and X. The Russian position on the twenty-sixth of August.

Y. and Z. Their position on the twenty-seventh, where they fired a *feu de joie*.

Figure 42 and 43. The king's position on the twenty-sixth of August.

44 and 45. His majesty's position on the twenty-seventh, when the Prussians fired a *feu de joie*.

Explanation of the Battle of HOCHKIRCHEN,

PLATE IV.

- A. Camp of the Austrians on the seventh of October.
- B. A corps commanded by the Prince of Baden Durlach.
- C. Heights occupied by light troops under General Laudohn.
- D. Woods occupied by troops under General Brentano.
- E. General Rätzow's camp on the Weissenberg.

- F. The King of Prussia's camp at Hochkirchen.
- G. Five battallions of Austrian grenadiers under General Siskowitz, posted on the Stromberg, and four others under Colonel Count Brown, posted at Klossen.
- H. Position M. Daun's right wing took up on the tenth.
- I. Abbatis made in the wood, which was afterwards opened to let the columns pass.
- K. Place where the right wing of the reserve encamped on the night of the thirteenth, after retreat, beating whilst the whole army marched off in the most perfect silence.
- L. Place where the cavalry of the left, under O'Donel, assembled and passed the night.
- M. March route of the same.
- N. Place where all the infantry of the left, commanded by General Sincere, assembled with the regiments of Ligne, of Brown, eight battallions of grenadiers, and sixteen squadrons of carabineers, and horse grenadiers.
- O. Route which all these troops took during the night to arrive at the place of rendezvous.—N. B. The regiments of Waldeck and Arberg marched by the same route to join the corps of Generals Laudohn and Brentano.
- P. Position during the night of twelve battallions of the right of the first line, commanded by the Duke of Aremberg.
- Q. Route by which they marched, as also four regiments of cavalry, commanded by General Baron de Buccow.
- R. Position of eight battallions from the right of the second line, and one regiment of cavalry, during the night.
- S. Route by which they marched under the orders of Lieutenant General Duke d'Urfel and General Prince Kinsky.
- T. Position of six battallions of the reserve and a regiment of cavalry during the night, under General Count de Coloredo.
- U. Position of two regiments of cavalry and six hundred drafts from the infantry, under the orders of General Wisse.
- W. Four battallions of the reserve, and one battallion of grenadiers, posted in reserve on the Stromberg, under General O'Kelli.

X. Post

- X. Post where General Laudohn's corps passed the night.
- Y. March of this corps in two columns.
- Z. Place of its formation, together with the cavalry of the left wing.
- Aa. Disposition of three columns issuing from the woods at four o'clock in the morning of the fourteenth, and marching to the attack of the Prussian redoubts, under the command of Marshal Daun himself,
- Bb. First formation of these columns during the time the regiments who had been at the head of them in conjunction with the grenadiers, kept pushing the enemy already in disorder, and attacked the church-yard of Hochkirchen.
- Cc. Prussians defending themselves on the heights.
- Dd. First formation of the carabineers and horse grenadiers.
- Ee. A regiment of cavalry from the left wing.
- Ff. General Laudohn's Croats cannonading the Prussians.
- Gg. Second position of Marshal Daun's attack.
- Hh. Heights where the Prussians formed, from whence they made a very heavy cannonade.
- Ii. Various positions of the cavalry of the left wing.
- Kk. Disposition of the attack of the right, under the Duke of Aremberg.
- Ll. Disposition of the attack of the corps marked R. under the Duke of Urfel and Prince Kinsky.
- Mm. Disposition of six battalions of fusileers and one battalion of grenadiers, detached during the night from the corps under the Prince of Durlach.
- Nn. Second position of ditto; the grenadiers take possession of redoubt on the right flank of the Prussian camp.
- Oo. Four regiments of cavalry, two of which attack the enemy in Pp.
- Qq. Second position of the corps Mm, where it cannonades the Prussians.
- Rr. First position of General Retzow, after he had passed the Läubauer Wasser.
- Ss. Corps commanded by the Prince of Durlach advancing to Wieche.
- Tt. Post to which three regiments of cavalry and four battalions, commanded by the Prince of Lowenstein, followed General Retzow's retreat from the Weissenberg.

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- Uu. Heights where the Prussians re-assembled in force to cover their retreat.
 - Vv. Attack between the King of Prussia's *gardes du corps* and the regiment of Lowenstein cavalry.
 - Ww. Different attacks made by General Laudohn's Croats.
 - Xx. Last position of General Retzow's corps covering the king's retreat.
 - Yy. Some infantry attacked by the Prussian cavalry, and sustained by a regiment of cavalry from the left wing.
 - Zz. Last position of two regiments of cavalry under General de Wife.
 - tZ. Third position of Marshal Daun's corps pursuing the retreating enemy.
 - &c. Prince of Wurtemberg's position on the heights between Belgern and Dresse.
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Explanation of PLATE V.

- A. March of the Russians from Bouc to Palzig.
- B. March of the Prussians from Zullichau towards Palzig in several columns, some of them passed through Mose and Kay.
- C. Prussian army in order of battle.
- D. Russians in ditto; their right flank *appuyée* on a height which cut off the Prussians from the road to Crossen, by which one of their columns E attempted to pass but too late, the Russians having already occupied that pass with a battery of cannon at
- F. The Prussians commenced the action at two o'clock in the afternoon by a brisk cannonade, which lasted till half past three; they then tried to force the Russian army through its front, but the ground, and the position they had taken, permitted only a small part of their left wing to attack, besides the Russian artillery.
- G. Was so advantageously posted that they could not gain any ground; at four o'clock the fire of musquetry succeeded to that of the cannon, the Prussians attacked the left of the Russians near their center, but without

out success; the musquetry ceased for some time, and the Russians thought the day already their own, but the hussars and cossacks at the entrance of the wood were compelled to give way, after which the Prussians advanced in three columns H as far as the little eminence.

I. Where being arrived, they deployed to right and left in K, and the action became general; the fire of the small arms lasted two hours.

L. Four regiments of Prussians which attacked the flank of the Russian right wing with fury, and made every exertion to penetrate, but were compelled by the heavy fire of artillery to retire to the main body of their army.

M. Spot where the Russian cavalry was attacked and driven back to N.

O. Cuirassiers.

P. Hussars and Cossacks pursuing the Prussians.

Explanation of PLATE VI.

AB. Russian army in their intrenched camp.

CD. Prussian army.

EFG. March of their columns.

HI. The king's first position.

KL. Second position.

MN. Third position.

O. Attack of the Prussian cavalry which failed.

P. Second attack of the Prussian cavalry, which was equally unsuccessful.

QQ. Last position of the Prussians.

RR. General Laudohn's corps.

SS. The same, which took post behind the Cowbottom, and repulsed the Prussians.

TT. Russian troops forming across their camp.

V. Attack of the enemy's cavalry upon the right flank of the Prussian army, which decided the battle.

X. Battery

- X. Battery on the Spitzberg.
 - Y. Austrian and Russian cavalry forming to oppose the first attack of that of the king.
 - Z. Russian Waggonbourg.
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References to PLATE VII.

- A. Sincere's corps near Maltern.
- B. Brentano's corps near Rochrfdorf.
- C. Sincere's corps, in the rear of Reinhardsgrimme.
- D. Its advanced guard.
- E. Its march in four columns.
- F. Second position of Brentano's corps.
- G. Sincere's corps advancing by Reinhardsgrimme.
- H. Deployment and order of battle of this corps for the attack.
- I. Its attack in columns.
- K. Attack of the height of Maxen.
- L. Deployment of the troops upon this height.
- M. Attack of the cavalry.
- N. Approach of Brentano's corps.
- P. Troops of the army of the empire, under the command of Generals Palfy and Kleefeld.
- Q. Corps under the command of the Prince of Stolberg.
- R. Light troops of the army of the empire, in the rear of the ravin.
- S. Light troops of Sincere's corps.
- T. Surrender of Fink's corps.
 - (a) General Wunsch, near Blofchwitz.
 - (b) General Platen, near Reinhardsgrimme.
 - (c) Fink's corps, near Maxen.
 - (d) General Platen, at Hausdorf.
 - (e) Position of Fink's corps, opposite General Brentano.

(f) General

- (f) General Platen retired and posted in line.
- (g) Two Prussian batallions descending the mountain, to take the Imperial grenadiers in flank.
- (h) Situation of the baggage, which was afterwards conducted to
- (i) Its second position.
- (k) Reinforcement of the right wing
- (l) Reinforcement of the left wing } to support the heights of Maxen,
- (m) Attack of Brentano's corps by the Prussian cuirassiers.
- (n) Post where they rallied:
- (o) Second position of Fink's corps.
- (p) Last position of Fink's corps.
- (q) Ground where the Prussian cavalry attempted to escape.

E R R A T A.

Page	Line	
7	21	for conveyed read convoyed.
7	25	for Cretkowitz read Czetkowitz.
8	8	for Nameft read Namieft.
10	26	for fo read as.
22	10	after Schnabellin read and.
35	27	for attached read attacked.
77	20	for Ruffians read Pruffians.
77	32	for Chivaux read Chevaux.
89	11	place the full stop after the word Campaign.
113	19	for Battale read battle.
114	29	for perfued read purfued.
122	1	for Sagau read Sagan.
126	27	for rife read raife.
127	10	for Glogiau read Glogau.
128	22	for Tokells read Tokelli.
129	1	for Prince read Pruffians.
137	18	for twenty read two, and for forty read four.
	19	for twenty read two.
193	21	for Collin read Kolin.
204	17	for marched off read formed.
215	18	for Count read Court.

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
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